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FOREWORD

In November 1997, the United States Army War College
j oin ed with th e U.S. Souther n Command , the
Inter-American Defense Board, the National Guard
Bureau, and the Latin American Consortium of the
University of New Mexico and New Mexico State University
to cosponsor a conference entitled “The Role of the Armed
Forces in the Americas: Civil-Military Relations for the
21st Century.” The meeting was held from 3 to 6 November
in Santa Fé, New Mexico, and was hosted by the New
Mexico National Guard.
The conference brought together over 150 prominent
civilian governmental and military leaders and some of the
most noted scholars from throughout the Americas. It was
designed to support the Commander-in-Chief, U.S.
Southern Command’s objectives of strengthening
democratic institutions, assisting nations in eliminating
threats to their security, supporting economic and social
progress, and enhancing military professionalism. In
addition, the meeting sought to promote the Army Chief of
Staff’s goals of conflict prevention through peacetime
engagement, strategic outreach to organizations and
institutions outside the Department of Defense, and the
enhancement of Active and Reserve component integration.
Included in this publication are the papers and speeches
delivered at the conference, rapporteurs’ synopses of the
working group discussions and an analysis, with
recommendations, of the implications for civil-military
relations and U.S. policy. These presentations, the level and
scope of participation, the candor of the dialogue, the
outstanding support provided by our cosponsors, and the
charming atmosphere of Santa Fé all contributed to making
the meeting a success.
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The U.S. Army War College extends sincere appreciation to General Charles E. Wilhelm, the Commanderin-Chief, U.S. Southern Command, and to Major General
John C. Thompson, Chairman of the Inter-American
Defense Board, and their staffs for the leadership and
financial support that made the conference possible. We
also recognize Lieutenant General Edward D. Baca, Chief of
the National Guard Bureau; Major General William A.
Navas, Jr., Director of the Army National Guard; the
Adjutants General of New Mexico and Utah, and their
outstanding soldiers who provided the crucial escort,
logistical and interpretation support.
The conference represented a joint military-civilian
effort. The Governor of New Mexico, the Honorable Gary E.
Johnson; his Chief of Staff, Mr. Lou Gallegos; the Santa Fé
County Commission, and the City of Santa Fé permitted
use of their facilities and ensured gracious hospitality
during our stay in their beautiful state and city. Last, but
not least, we would like to express our heartfelt gratitude to
Dr. Gilbert Merkx, Mr. Theo Crevenna, Dr. José García and
Ms. Vicki Madrid Nelson, from the University of New
Mexico-New Mexico State University Latin American
Studies Consortium for their assistance in organizing,
coordinating and administering the conference. Without
their help, this endeavor could not have been undertaken.
Our mutual goals as neighbors in this hemisphere are to
promote democracy, preserve the peace, and provide for our
nations’ common security in the 21st century. We hope this
conference will be but one step on the path toward those
objectives.

RICHARD H. WITHERSPOON
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute
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RECOMMENDATIONS

Based primarily on the Conclusions, Lessons and
Recommendations that came out of the Santa Fé conference
on “The Role of the Armed Forces in the Americas:
Civil-Military Relations for the 21st Century,” the Strategic
Stu dies In stitu te of f er s the f ol l owi ng tar geted
recommendations to Latin American and U.S. leaders:
For Latin American Policymakers.

•
•

•
•

Military institutions should consider unprecedented
levels of civil-military dialogue and regional
cooperation.
New arrangements for domestic and regional security
cooperation should be informed by effective civilian
control over the military and the adoption of a
h emisph eric ap p r oac h as a sup p l ement to
nationalism.
In general, democratically elected civilian leaders
should move more aggressively to strengthen their
control over the military.
At the same time, those leaders must assume
leadership in developing an effective defense policy.
It is the responsibility of civilians, rather than the
military, to decide when and how armed force is used.
The latter, however, should play an important
advisory role. This relationship is best achieved
through a frank and constructive dialogue that
recognizes the political responsibilities of civilian
officials and the technical expertise of military
professionals.

vii

−

−

−
−

•

A fundamental intermediate step is a national
commitment to train and educate civilian
professionals in strategic affairs and the
lea dersh i p and management of d ef ens e
institutions. This requires the creation of think
tanks, the financing of research projects, and the
organization of conferences and seminars that can
bring together civilians and military officers in
shared educational experiences where they can
interact and learn from each other.
The Latin American armed forces should open up
their national defense and war colleges to senior
governmental officials and other key political
actors who would benefit from the educational
programs offered at those institutions.
The Latin American militaries should establish
liaison offices with Congress.
Since public perceptions of the military’s role are of
great importance to the development of functional
inter-institutional relations, a civil-military
dialogue should be fostered to help build public
confidence.

There must be a decision at the national level on the
division of responsibilities between military, police,
and other public safety institutions. Here national
traditions, values, needs and capabilities should
provide the guidelines. Again, civilian authorities
must take the lead. One should expect considerable
variation in policy from country to country.

−

The answer to extensive police corruption is police
and judicial reform, rather than the militarization
of law enforcement (which exposes the armed
forces to corruption and diverts them from
military training).

viii

•

•

•

•

•

There must be a similar decision at the national level
with regard to the military’s use in national
development/civic action programs. Again, such
decisions must be made on a country-by-country basis
in accordance with the values, needs and capabilities
of each country.
Once policy is established, civilian and military
leaders should work closely together to prepare and
defend before Congress a budget that realistically
meets the armed forces’ needs. This would both help
legitimize military spending and hold policymakers
accountable.
Since the reformulation of inter-institutional
relations is at an early stage in much of the
hemisphere, states looking for models to emulate
should examine the processes in the most advanced
countries, where the civil-military dialogue has
already led to extensive cooperation. Continued
regional exchanges of personnel are highly
recommended.
With regard to Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs), it is
recommended that educational and training systems
be created that would focus on military, governmental
and nongovernmental activities involving PKOs.
Such systems should include think tanks, like the
U.S. Army’s Peacekeeping Institute, where key issues
and strategies could be identified, and specialized
training centers, such as Uruguay’s Center for
Instruction for Peacekeeping Operations. The
funding of peacekeeping conferences and roundtables
can also be a great help in determining whether the
region’s armed forces have the capabilities to
undertake specific operations.
Along these same lines, it would be useful to have
more general “cooperative education/training”
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programs and institutes involving military and
civilian participants with regard to a whole range of
national security issues.

•

•

Laws inhibiting subregional cooperation—for
instance, those preventing the sharing of defense
information—need to be reviewed and revised when
deemed desirable.
Human rights education should be incorporated into
the military’s training and instructional system at all
levels.

For U.S. and Latin American Policymakers.

•

There is a need for a new multinational hemispheric
security doctrine for security cooperation. This
should complement, rather than replace, national
objectives and establish agreement on the basic
common denominators of hemispheric security
cooperation.

−

•

This doctrine would be supplemented by greater
levels of multilateral cooperation among police
and judicial officials. This would occur through
channels separate and distinct from those
providing armed forces cooperation on security
matters.

The basic elements of this new hemispheric security
might include commitments to:

−
−

improve cooperation with regard to information on
the transit of vessels and aircraft to prevent the
illegal use of national territory;
improve the exchange of climatological information from sources available to the military;

x

−
−
−
−
−

•

enhance information exchange on insurgent
groups operating near borders in order to prevent
the establishment of sanctuaries;
exchange information on potential arms
purchases to prevent misinterpretations of
intentions;
debrief results of bilateral and multilateral
military exercises so all countries in the region can
benefit from investments in training;
define support functions that can be efficiently
provided to those forces combatting drug
trafficking in the region; and
eventually reach agreement on the specialization
of functions by some armed forces, particularly
those of smaller states. Here NATO can provide a
model.

For the new security doctrine to work, a multilateral
defense architecture must be developed that cannot
be dominated by any single country. This would be
constructed under the authority and through the
cooperation of national defense ministers, thus
assuring its consistency with the principle of civilian
control. This architecture would include:

−

−

the establishment of a defense secretariat devoted
to meetings of the ministers of defense. This body
would coordinate the meetings and provide
periodic follow-up on resolutions adopted at those
sessions;
coordination by that same secretariat of agendas
for meetings of the Conference of American Armies
and chiefs of the regional air forces and navies to
focus on commitments arranged through the
hemispheric security doctrine;
xi

−

−

•

•

•

•

creation of electronic communication systems to
better link defense establishments for purposes of
ex ch an g ing i nf or mati on r el ated to the
hemispheric security doctrine; and
periodic meetings of senior defense ministry
officials below the rank of minister to review the
mechanisms of security cooperation implemented
by defense institutions.

T h ere sh ou l d be mor e c ommuni c ati on and
coopera tion among the c omp onents of the
Inter-American Defense System, such as the
Organization of American States (especially its
Commission on Hemispheric Security) and the
Inter-American Defense Board, and the various
conferences and ministerials.
The Inter-American Defense Board should take the
lead in developing a defense secretariat devoted to
meetings of the ministers of defense, as proposed
above. The secretariat would coordinate those
meetings, as well as those of the Conference of
American Armies and regional air forces and navies.
The IADB should also sponsor periodic meetings of
senior defense ministry officials below the rank of
minister to review the mechanisms of security
cooperation.
The U.S. Department of Defense and the InterAmerican Defense Board should provide funding and
other support to think tanks, such as the recently
established Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies
in Washington, DC, devoted to the development of
civilian competence in defense and security
matters. Such institutes should not be limited to the
United States, but should be established throughout
Latin America. Some could be affiliated with national

xii

defense or war colleges, as is already being done in
some countries; others could be associated with
civilian universities; and still others might be
independent. They should share, however, a common
purpose of national security education, and should be
strictly nonpartisan and nonpolitical in nature.

•

•

•

The U.S. Department of Defense, the Inter-American
Defense Board and associated institutions, such as
SOUTHCOM, the U.S. Army War College and other
military institutions, should increase their
sponsorship of educational and training facilities
devoted to Peacekeeping Operations. The continued
sponsorship of conferences and roundtables on
peacekeeping themes is also useful in identifying key
issues and strategies, and assessing regional
capabilities for undertaking certain kinds of
operations. Consideration might even be given to the
creation of a regional Peacekeeping Institute,
modeled perhaps on the U.S. Army’s PKI. This
institution would be strictly educational, rather than
operational, in nature.
The U.S. Department of Defense, the Inter-American
Defense Board and associated institutions, such as
SOUTHCOM, the U.S. Army War College and other
military institutions,should continue to sponsor
conferences, workshops, seminars and other meetings
designed to facilitate civilian-military interaction,
both in the United States and the other countries in
the hemisphere. This should be part of a broad
program to educate both civilian and military
cultures about each other, as well as about the
challenges to national and international security in
the 21st Century.
There should be increased educational efforts to
better define and implement the goals of the
Inter-American Defense System, including the

xiii

defense of democracy and human rights, the
maintenance of security, and the containment of
criminality.

•

•

•

•

•

A greater effort should be made to promote civilian
participation in the Inter-American Defense System.
The region’s militaries have generally agreed to
redefine their roles in decision-making, but civilians
are often poorly informed and uninterested. To assist
them, the military should recognize them as the
constituencies of the system, and help them become
involved in all of its aspects.
An effort should be made to develop a hemispheric
counternarcotics policy. Among other things, the role
of the Organization of American States should be
stren g th en ed by gi vi ng i ts Inter - Amer i c an
Commission Against Drug Abuse (CICAD) authority
to evaluate the counternarcotics performance of OAS
members.
A more mature relationship between Latin America
and the United States must be developed, abandoning
the historic tendency of the latter to intervene in its
neighbors’ political affairs. There should be a
reinforcement of contacts at the level of parliaments,
political parties, and ministries of defense and foreign
affairs in order to balance the influence of the U.S.
Southern Command.
There should be a substantial increase, monitored by
the OAS, of cooperation among all areas of
government at the national, subregional and
hemispheric levels that have responsibility for
addressing new threats.
There should be a strengthening of all political and
diplomatic or gani zati ons, i nc l ud i ng NonGovernmental Organizations, that have a role in
conflict resolution, using their experiences in past
xiv

peacekeeping and mediation efforts to build a
regional security structure that is not overly
dependent on military instruments.

•

•

There must be a resolution of the modernization
versus arms race dilemma in order to permit all
countries, in reasonable proportion to their legitimate
defense needs under the concept of cooperative
equilibrium, to count on their armed forces when the
duly elected civilian leadership determines it is
necessary.
Several recommendations were made with regard to
Peacekeeping Operations:

−
−

−
•

PKOs should be limited to countries outside the
subregion concerned in order to alleviate fears and
suspicions of intervention and partiality.
Most of the funding should come from either the
United Nations or other international and
regional sources. Too much funding from a single
country creates dependency, and can easily distort
the purposes of the operation or result in a loss of
political resolve.
Authorization to use force must be clearly
outlined. Force should be used only in extreme
circumstances, including self-defense.

More resources, including transfers from the
wealthier countries to poorer countries, are needed to
promote subregional cooperation, especially with
regard to countering organized crime and
narcotrafficking. As matters now stand, resource
scarcity is a major obstacle to such cooperation.
Effective information sharing and operational
cooperation require compatible equipment, software,
data formats, procedures and communications
equipment, as well as transportation and personnel.
xv

There are also significant asymmetries between
states in terms of the capacities of their security
institutions, differences which need to be addressed
for cooperation to be effective.

•

Follow-up conferences to the Santa Fé meeting are
recommended in order to further develop and flesh
out courses of action for U.S. and Latin American
policymakers, both military and civilian.

For U.S. Policymakers.

•
•

•

The United States should act as a catalyst for
multilateral cooperation.
Greatly expanded police and judicial training
assistance should be provided to Latin American
countries to strengthen civilian institutions so that
Latin Americans do not become dependent on the use
of the military for law enforcement.
U.S. military support for non-traditional roles and
missions (e.g., counternarcotics, law enforcement,
economic development) of the Latin American armed
forces should be given only at the request of the duly
elected civilian authority.

−

•

Support for the Latin American militaries’ law
enforcement missions should be given only under
exceptional circumstances, when the rule of law
has broken down and the police and other security
institutions cannot cope with the threats posed by
growing criminal activity. Such support should be
conceived as temporary in nature, lasting only as
long as it takes to develop competent and honest
civilian institutions.

U.S. military sales to Latin America, especially those
involving advanced weapons systems, should be made

xvi

on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the
legitimate security needs of the countries involved,
and exercising care not to destabilize any regional or
subregional balances of power. The initiation and
authorization for such purchases must come from the
democratically elected civilian authority, rather than
the armed forces.

•

The U.S. Department of Defense should increase
resource transfers to Latin America to promote
subregional cooperation. Compatible communications equipment, transportation, and training are
especially needed.

For the U.S. Military.

•

•

•

The U.S. Southern Command should take the lead in
creating electronic communications systems to
improve the sharing of security information between
the hemisphere’s defense establishments.
The U.S. National Guard’s State to State Partnership
Program should be expanded to develop partnerships
with more Latin American militaries in response to
requests from the duly constituted civilian
authorities in those countries.
Human rights training for the Latin American armed
forces should be continued and expanded at all levels.

xvii

PART ONE
INTRODUCTION

1

Chapter One
The Americas: The Strategic Landscape
Colonel Michael R. Gonzáles
Strategic Studies Institute
U.S. Army War College

The end of the Cold War and the emergence of a new
world order herald a period of relative peace and prosperity
for the United States and its allies. The spread of
democracy, coupled with the growth of free trade and rising
expectations, have created both new opportunities and
challenges, which promise to have a profound and lasting
impact on a worldwide scale.
In fulfilling its role as a global leader, the United States
has embraced a National Security Strategy based on the
principle of “Engagement” and built on the three core
objectives of:

•

Enhancing its security with effective diplomacy and
with military forces that are ready to fight and win.

•

Bolstering America’s economic prosperity.

•

Promoting democracy abroad.1

In doing this, the United States hopes to enhance its
security and that of its allies, using an integrated approach
that calls for shaping the international environment to
prevent or deter threats, while maintaining the ability to
respond across the full spectrum of potential crises and
preparing today to meet the challenges of an uncertain
future in the 21st Century.2
While this strategy is designed to optimize mutual
opportunities on a global scale, perhaps nowhere is it more
applicable than in dealing with the United States’ historical

3

allies and friends in the Western Hemisphere. With elected
civilian governments in power in every country except
Cuba, and with the enactment of the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) as a model of free market
economics, the United States has the opportunity to assist
in promoting democracy and fostering economic growth in
the region. By employing elements of its political, economic,
military and socio-cultural power, the U.S. can act as a
catalyst in preserving peace, ensuring stability and
enhancing the quality of life throughout the hemisphere.
With these opportunities also come new challenges.
Transnational threats, including drug trafficking,
terrorism, organized crime, human rights violations, ethnic
unrest, corruption, environmental degradation, and a
number of other social and political issues, are potential
inhibitors to peace, prosperity and stability.3 In a part of the
world where military authoritarianism and oppression
have long been engrained, a major challenge will be to
bridge the gap between the military and civilian segments
of society. With the goal of making the military a viable
instrument of national policy, while subordinating it to civil
authority under democratic rules, it will be necessary to
mold the armed forces into an institution that supports the
people and improves their quality of life.
The Americas are a geographically and culturally
diverse region. They comprise an area stretching from the
Arctic Circle in northern Canada to the tip of Cape Horn in
South America, and from the Aleutians to the Caribbean
Islands. The region consists of 35 sovereign nations, with a
total population of over 800 million people, with perceptions
and concerns as unique as their historical experiences.4
Once relegated to a secondary role in U.S. foreign policy
priorities as Washington focused on the Cold War threat
from the Soviet Union, the region now promises to move to
the forefront in political and economic importance. In this
regard, the goal of the United States is to embrace each
country with the same spirit of individuality, cooperation
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and mutual respect afforded to any other coequal partner in
the community of democratic nations, and to assist each in
the democratization process based on its individual desires
and needs.
By helping shape the international environment, the
United States can enhance global and regional security,
while promoting democracy and reducing the wide range of
threats that challenge its interests and those of its partners.
These “shaping activities” can be undertaken through
diplomacy, international assistance, arms control,
nonproliferation initiatives and military activities.5
The Secretary of Defense, in a document entitled United
States Security Strategy for the Americas, identified U.S.
security objectives for the region:

•

•

•

•
•

Support the commitment to democratic norms in the
region, including civilian control in defense matters,
constructive civil-military relations, and respect for
human rights;
Foster the peaceful resolution of disputes,
transparency of military arms and expenditures, and
development of confidence and security-building
measures appropriate to the region;
Carry out responsibilities under the Panama Canal
Treaty and cooperate with the government of Panama
in addressing issues linked to the companion
Neutrality Treaty;
Work with our friends in the region to confront drug
trafficking, combat terrorism, and support sustainable development;
Expand and deepen defense cooperation with other
countries of the region in support of common
objectives, encouraging them to improve capabilities
for joint actions, including international peacekeeping;
5

•
•

Prevent humanitarian crises from reaching
catastrophic proportions; and
Encourage efforts to prevent the proliferation of
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and associated
delivery systems, as well as other arms control
initiatives of common benefit. It is hoped that
achieving these objectives will ensure the growth of
democracy, peace and prosperity in the region. The
United States is committed to using all of the political,
economic and military assets at its disposal to help
realize these goals.6

The Commander-in-Chief of the United States Southern
Command (SOUTHCOM) is charged with overseeing U.S.
military activities in the region, with the exception of those
in the United States, Canada and Mexico. In an effort to
achieve the goals envisioned by the Secretary of Defense,
SOUTHCOM supports U.S. national interests, working
with our allies in the region, in four specific ways:

•
•

•
•

Building regional cooperative security arrangements
and confidence-building measures to reduce regional
tensions;
Developing military roles and missions by supporting
the armed forces of our allies as they develop the
appropriate force structures and doctrines and
demonstrate a respect for human rights and civilian
control over the military;
Supporting the counterdrug efforts of U.S. lead
agencies and committed allies;
Restructuring SOUTHCOM to ensure continued
support of U.S. national security interests in the
Americas for the 21st Century.7

In an effort to help shape the strategic landscape, the
Southern Command joined with the U.S. Army War College,
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the Inter-American Defense Board and the National Guard
Bureau in sponsoring a conference on civil-military
relations, but also dealing with a number of other important
and inter-related strategic issues. The participation of the
Inter-American Defense Board, which provides military
advice to the Organization of American States, was seen as
critical to the forum in order to ensure a multinational voice
in the proceedings. In addition, the gathering attracted
national delegations, comprised of senior civilian
governmental and military representatives and academics
from almost every democratic nation in the region. Thus,
some of the finest minds in the hemisphere contributed to
the conference.
Since the National Security Strategy,8 National Military
Strategy,9 Quadrennial Defense Review,10 and National
Defense Panel Report11 all envision a greater role for the
Reserve Components, and with its already active role in the
region a key part of SOUTHCOM’s peacetime engagement
initiative, the participation of the National Guard was both
timely and appropriate. Its organization, dual roles and
missions, relationship to its civilian governmental leaders,
and citizen-soldier heritage serve as a model for the role of
the armed forces in a democratic society. Its dual function of
providing for the common defense and protecting the lives,
property and well-being of the citizenry, while adding value
to America, suggest desirable roles for other military
organizations to emulate.
Attempting to carry out the intent of the Army Chief of
Staff’s directive of strategic outreach to organizations and
institutions outside the Department of Defense and to
ensure a balanced representation in our discussions, the
U.S. Army War College invited the Latin American
Consortium of the University of New Mexico and New
Mexico State University to cosponsor the event and to assist
in identifying and inviting the finest academic experts in
the region to participate. The scholars who answered the
call added to the scope and breadth of the proceedings in a
manner rarely experienced in conferences of this type.
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Collectively, the sponsors agreed to call the conference
“The Role of the Armed Forces in the Americas:
Civil-Military Relations for the 21st Century.” The four-fold
purpose of the gathering was to:

•
•
•
•

Examine the dynamic between the military and
civilian segments of society within the democratic
nations of the Western Hemisphere;
Analyze the emerging role for the armed forces, in
support of civil authorities, as an instrument of
national security policy;
Highlight the viability of the National Guard State to
State Partnership Program as a vehicle for increased
international cooperation in the region; and
Establish an ongoing working relationship between
the various military and civilian academic
institutions and governmental agencies in the region,
relative to key strategic issues impacting the
hemisphere as we approach the 21st Century.

The conference included a variety of plenary sessions
and small group working discussions led by civilian and
military leaders from throughout the Western Hemisphere,
all experts in their field. Plenary sessions focused on “The
Role of the Military: Current Issues and Future Prospects,”
and the “National Guard State to State Partnership
Program,” as well as presentations on “Civil-Military
Relations in the 21st Century: A Latin American
Perspective,” “The Peace Process in Guatemala,” and “The
Colombian Army in the 21st Century.” Working groups
deliberated a myr i ad of i s sues i nc l ud i ng: The
Inter-American Defense System, Inter-Institutional
Relations in the National Policy Process, Cooperative
Security and Peacekeeping, Subregional Cooperation, and
Emerging Roles and Missions.
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The following chapters include the papers and speeches
(the latter sometimes in summary form) delivered at the
conference, rapporteurs’ synopses of each of the working
group discussions, and an analysis of the implications, with
recommendations, for the conduct and enhancement of
civil-military relations and U.S. policy. We hope that these
efforts will contribute to an understanding of the complex
issues involved in civil-military relations in a democratic
society, and that they will help foster the evolution of
regional armed forces that are committed to performing
their roles and missions in an environment firmly based on
democratic principles and subordinate to duly elected
civilian leaders working in the interests of the nation and its
citizens.
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Chapter Two
Building New Security Relationships
in the Americas:
The Critical Next Steps
Dr. Richard Downes
North-South Center
University of Miami

ABSTRACT

Thesis:
Military institutions in Latin America should consider
unprecedented levels of civil-military dialogue and regional
cooperation to overcome the detrimental effects of the past.
Implementation of effective civilian control over the
military and adoption of continentalism as a supplement to
nationalism should guide new arrangements for domestic
and regional security cooperation. Such an approach could
be more effective if the United States gave priority to
serving as a catalyst for multilateral cooperation.
Support:
The onset of the neo-liberal state has reduced the size
and influence of military institutions in the past ten years
while non-traditional security threats have risen in
strength and many historic conflicts remain unresolved.
Democratic governments are increasing their control over
military institutions. Greater subregional economic
integration ties the fates of governments more closely
together. While bilateral security cooperation has increased
in some cases, the doctrine and architecture for security
13

cooperation lack a unifying theme and structure. Violent
crime, insurgency, illegal arms trade, climatic anomalies,
and drug trafficking are challenging many democratic
governments. Because the revolution in military affairs
requires major expenditures to modernize forces, few of the
region’s military establishments can afford the investment
required. Historic suspicions about the role of the United
States will continue to impede bilateral cooperation.
Two scenarios for the future are possible. The
pessimistic one sees continued atrophy of some military
institutions and further disruption of the state at the hands
of transnational criminals allied with insurgencies with
territorial aspirations, eventually leading to a return to
authoritarian governments. Selective modernization may
exacerbate historic tensions and cause further higher
allocations for defense needs than would otherwise be
necessary. A more optimistic scenario envisions more
effective military institutions resulting from a greater
civil-military dialogue at the domestic and international
levels, better integration of defense and economic foreign
policies, and higher levels of multilateral trust and
cooperation. The United States can promote higher levels of
regional security by sharing perspectives on civil-military
relations and on multilateral cooperation gained from
NATO and the Persian Gulf War, by promoting multilateral
cooperation in civil infrastructure functions performed by
Latin American militaries, and by emphasizing a
multilateral approach to training, exercise, and
intelligence.
Building New Security Relationships
in the Americas:
The Critical Next Steps
Introduction.
I am pleased and humbled to be here. This is a most
impressive group whose credentials testify to your
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commitment to furthering inter-American security. I
especially thank Dr. Gil Merkx for inviting me to share
personal observations about the topic assigned me, the
current role and future prospects for the armed forces acting
within the hemisphere, including that of the United States.
I am speaking personally, without coordination, approval,
or guidance from any U.S. government institution.
This is an exceptionally good time to take stock.
Decennial evaluations are usually conducted at the end of a
decade, but 1997 is providing us with a handy measuring
tool for two reasons. We are at the end of ten years of
significant reform, as recognized by the Inter-American
Development Bank, and we are also completing ten years of
u n official bu t off i c i al l y- s p ons or ed d i al ogue on
inter-American security issues among security experts in
the hemisphere conducted through the auspices of
American University, the Southern Command, and the
National Defense University, with the increasing
participation of many non-governmental organizations,
including, if I may add, the North-South Center of the
University of Miami.
The approach of the millennium may also provide us
with a handy marker for evaluating future progress. After
all, the millennium is bringing us challenging questions and
predictions. Will the military’s computer systems continue
to normally operate, or will we all be set back
chronologically 100 years, forcing all our war reserve
inventory to be declared obsolete because it is 99 years old?
Is there any truth in predictions of a 1994 news story that “a
newly discovered comet is heading earth’s way, and will
probably miss, but a collision could possibly wipe out the
entire human race”? Can we afford to discount the chance of
“a very large and uneven accumulation of ice around the
South Pole causing a sudden catastrophic re-arrangement
of the earth’s tectonic plates”? We need not be so
apocalyptic.
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Rather, these two reference points suggest that now is
an excellent time for a frank review of where we have been
and where we are going with respect to the role of the armed
forces. Clearly, we are at the end of 10 years of fundamental
change in military institutions in the Western Hemisphere.
The current disparity between security needs and resources
begs definition, innovation, leadership, and commitment.
We can either move toward a conflictive and dysfunctional
future that will betray the historic promise of the Americas,
or we can create security policies and military institutions
that will facilitate achievement of a prosperous community
of democratic governments in the Americas. In my personal
opinion, after years of meetings like this, and hundreds of
analytical articles, books, speeches, and seminars, it is time
to get beyond the hand-wringing, theoretical stage about
the security environment in the Americas and develop a
prescriptive, substantive approach to the issue.
Conflicting Forces Acting upon the Armed Forces.
So, then, where are we? I would like to use the analogy of
a football team, comparing the armed forces to a concept we
can relate to throughout the Americas. In short, our teams
have been cut by up to 50 percent. We have absentee
coaches, managers, and owners, and we are not sure who we
are playing, or who might be supporting us. It is no secret,
especially to many in this room who are living the process,
that the onset of the neo-liberal state has reduced the size
and influence of military institutions.
T h e in trodu cti on to a r ec ent r ep or t by the
Inter-American Development Bank, “Latin America After a
Decade of Reforms: 1997 Economic and Social Progress
Report,” notes that “Latin America has made its choice for
democracy, macroeconomic stability, market-oriented
growth, and decentralization.... Ten years into the process,
Latin America is a very different place, and the results are
starting to bear fruit.”
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What the report doesn’t say is that Latin America’s
military institutions have been significantly reduced in the
process. Taken on an aggregate basis, as a percentage of
Gross National Product, Latin American military spending
fell by nearly one-half between 1984 and 1994, from 2.1 to
1.2 percent. Between 1984 and 1994, Latin America’s
spending on the armed forces fell at an average annual rate
of 3.3 percent. During the same period, the ratio of Latin
America’s armed forces to population decreased at an
annual average rate of 5.1 percent. In almost every country,
these numbers have decreased, Colombia being the
exception for reasons we can surmise.
This transformation has been accompanied by a
reduction of the military’s influence in strategic economic
sectors, such as mining, telecommunications, and energy,
and many military or state-owned or subsidized industries
have been sold to private capital, including international
enterprise, or forced to focus on civilian consumer goods to
sustain their existence. A few militaries have been shielded
from this trend, however, by access to revenues from
natural resources or special taxes. Ecuador’s military
benefits from 15 percent of the nation’s oil revenues.
Colombia raised a special war tax in 1996 resulting in $500
million to support counternarcotics purchases, and the
Chilean armed forces receives 10 percent of the gross
revenue from copper sales.
The decline in military resources is reflected in the
reduced operational rates of Latin American armed forces.
According to a recent paper by Patrice Franko of Maine’s
Colby College, the Navy of one major South American
nation had only two of its forty-nine vessels in optimal
working condition and only 15 of its 49 aircraft were
serviceable. Another major country with an extensive
coastline has only 25 major naval vessels available. Major
programs have been drastically reduced in funding, such as
the Brazilian Navy’s nuclear submarine program.1
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Also excluded from the report is the change in life style
and status imposed upon the Latin American armed forces
as a result of the reforms of the last decade. Anecdotal
evidence suggests that one country’s Army captains have to
work as taxi cab drivers to supplement a meager income. In
another, elevator operators working in a federal ministry
earned more than an Air Force aviator at the rank of colonel.
And in a third, Air Force officers worked only half the day,
devoting the remainder of their time to their private
businesses that were the main source of their family’s
income.
Finally, the political burden of the excesses of the
bureaucratic authoritarian governments of the 1960s and
1970s is being borne by today’s armed forces. Many civilians
elected to office in the 1990s had no experience with the
military other than negative interaction as opponents of the
authoritarian state. Moreover, chief executives are often
too harassed by uncooperative legislatures and trying
economic conditions to give serious attention to security
issues. Complicating the image of the armed forces are
actions by military factions to challenge democratic rule in
various countries in the 1990s. The armed forces have been
forced to undergo two transitions. The first occurred during
the beginning of the democratization phase, when legal
guarantees were negotiated for members accused of
excesses during the authoritarian-bureaucratic period. The
second is the current period, which Felipe Agüero calls the
“transition within a transition.”2 This stage is witnessing
the redefinition of the armed forces’ societal and
professional roles. Legislatures and executives are
asserting their prerogatives on security matters by cutting
budgets and forcing military institutions to consolidate and
operate jointly to avoid becoming a “trunkless elephant.”
Civilians are now quick to point out that the military has
no monopoly on patriotism, and the military has often
reacted negatively to civilian intrusion into military affairs,
citing the lack of civilian expertise or civilian willingness to
manipulate the military for partisan political purposes.
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During a recent conference involving civilian and military
officials from the hemisphere, civilian representatives often
began discussion sessions by questioning the need to spend
any money to sustain military forces during a period of
reduced international tensions.
How is this game going to be played? The irony of this
debate, and of the reductions in military expenditures, is
that war and other forms of organized violence are far from
obsolete. Traditional and non-traditional threats are
creating serious challenges to the region’s governments,
including the United States.
The Ecuador-Peru conflict of 1995 reminds us that
historic, smoldering border conflicts can ignite anew, with
serious consequences. Moreover, the slow progress at
finding a lasting solution, arms purchases related to the
conflict, and a continuing sequence of minor incidents are
not encouraging. The consequences of a next round of
conflict, as pointed out by analysts from Peru and Ecuador
attending the North-South Center’s 1996 conference on the
topic, would not be limited to isolated jungle areas, but
would instead include major elements of each nation’s
infrastructure.
At the opening of the 1995 conference on security
cooperation, OAS Secretary César Gaviria noted that there
were some 31 such disputes throughout the hemisphere,
and a recent paper by a Chilean defense analyst highlighted
the ten most prominent.3 Most of us know the location and
parties to those conflicts and how difficult it is to reach
lasting resolutions. These conflicts are in reality not
“historic”; they are latent, ready to be actualized by
domestic political pressures, demographic trends, natural
resource discoveries, or the unauthorized actions of a local
commander. They could be exacerbated if purchases of new
weapons by neighboring countries, intended to modernize
aging arsenals, are interpreted as efforts to establish a
regional advantage.
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Neither has the threat of insurgency entirely
disappeared. Insurgents openly challenged Colombia’s
democratic process only two weeks ago by disrupting
municipal elections. Even if these insurgents have no
detectable political ideology, the same was the case with
China’s war lords at the end of the 19th century. The net
result—usurpation of the central government’s authority
and power—is the same. Sendero Luminoso is still active in
Peru, and the MRTA has been declared dead more than
once, a troubling record in itself. In Mexico, the People’s
Revolutionary Army continues to inflict casualties on
military and police units in Oaxaca, the Zapatistas have
moved from the Chiapas jungles to the streets of Mexico
City, and armed bands continue to disrupt daily life in
Nicaragua. Nor should we overlook the negative synergism
arising from armed bands operating on borders, whether it
be in the Darién region of Panama, the VenezuelanColombian border, or possibly spilling over from the Andean
nations into Brazil.
It is increasingly difficult to draw the line between
insurgents and drug traffickers. The $49-billion demand of
addicts and occasional users in the United States, coupled
with increasing domestic use within Latin American
nations themselves, have given the drug lords the
unprecedented power to subvert democratic institutions.
London’s prestigious International Institute for Strategic
Studies credits drug trafficking with giving rise to major
criminal organizations and an increase in terrorist and
violent actions. In the opinion of the IISS, “Their main
challenge to government authority is through the corrosive
influence of corruption, perhaps the greatest obstacle to
democratic consolidation in the region.” Why is it so difficult
to get a conviction on a narcotics-trafficking charge in
Miami? How can the “lord of the skies” fly passenger-size
aircraft filled with cocaine around the Americas? Who is
buying up large cattle ranches in Western Venezuela and
for what purposes? The erosion of our justice systems and
the subversion of local and national government
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institutions can best be compared with Sicily’s experience
with the Mafia, a process that eventually forced Sicilian
authorities to launch a life-or-death struggle for control of
society itself.
Neither can we discount the potential threat of
terrorists. Peru, Colombia, and Mexico experienced
terrorist attacks in 1996, and the bombings of the Israeli
Embassy and a Jewish Community Center in Buenos Aires
and of a commuter airplane in Panama have yet to be
resolved.
The onset of the neoliberal state has also been marked by
drastic increases in violence and organized crime. Figures
compiled by the Inter-American Development Bank paint a
grim picture. Between 1980 and 1991, the average homicide
rate, measured as deaths per 100,000 inhabitants, nearly
doubled from 12.8 to 21.4. Some communities have taken
the law into their own hands in the face of burglaries, rapes,
kidnappings, and assaults. One estimate concludes that
crime costs Colombia 15 percent of its Gross National
Product, and the possibility of being punished is about 3
percent. Mexico’s Army is increasingly assuming internal
security roles, including performing law enforcement
functions and having military officers serve in police
organizations. Throughout the region, the armed forces are
being asked to supplement local police forces.
Latin America and the Caribbean are perennially faced
with natural disaster, and the advent of El Niño has created
particularly serious challenges for nations with a Pacific
Coast. Volcanoes and Hurricanes, such as Hurricane
Andrew, have propelled the military into central roles as
coordinators and providers of disaster relief.
To continue the football analogy, a third force—the push
toward regional economic integration—has caused us to ask
who is on our side and who might be supporting us?
The commitment at the Summit of the Americas to agree
upon a Free Trade Area of the Americas by 2005 and the
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increasing pace of subregional trade integration are raising
fundamental questions about bilateral and multilateral
relationships. No longer shielded behind a wall of national
tariffs, national economies are looking for opportunities by
forming customs unions that may lead to free trade on a
larger scale. The growth of intra-regional trade has been
phenomenal. Argentina’s intra-regional exports increased
from 29 percent of total exports in 1991 to over 45 percent in
1995. The percentage of Brazil’s total trade going to other
Mercosul countries rose by 80 percent between 1992 and
1996, when it reached $7.3 billion.
The advantages of freer trade are pushing a veritable
explosion of agreements, meetings, and milestones,
accompanied by political and economic consultation and
cooperation, such as that marked by the multi-billion dollar
guarantee recently extended to Mexico by the United
States. The explosion in subregional trade is being
accompanied by a similar expansion of sub-regional
in v estmen t an d mas si ve i nves tment i n s har ed
infrastructure. Chile is the third largest investor in
Argentina, and gas pipelines throughout southern South
America are tying the region’s economies more closely
together than ever. Economic integration, however,
conflicts directly with previous defense scenarios that
envisioned neighboring countries as constituting the
primary threat to each nation’s security. Taken together,
the phenomena of economic integration, lower budgets and
deteriorated security conditions are pressuring the armed
forces for change to an unprecedented degree. What is
happening in response?
The Armed Forces’ Response.
The armed forces and civil society have made important
progress during the past ten years. Domestically, we are
witnessing the beginnings of a civil-military dialogue based
upon the primacy of the democratic principle of civilian
control of the military. The publication of several elements
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of national defense policies are major steps toward
reconstituting public support for the armed forces. Public
declarations of the principles of Argentine defense policy,
the writing of the Brazilian policy of national defense by a
joint committee of military and civilian experts, published
in November of last year, and the Chilean white paper on
defense are fundamental to understanding and support for
national objectives. Brazil’s annual conference on strategic
issues, soon to realize its fourth meeting, is another major
step at integrating elements of civil society into the dialogue
on security matters.
Associations of retired armed forces officers are
undertaking lobbying campaigns designed to emphasize
their concerns about the plight of the armed forces. Leaders
of the Argentine Forum of the Retired Generals and of
Brazil’s Clube Militar have made specific appeals for
increased attention to the needs of the military through
democratic methods.
Individual officers have decided to enter the democratic
system to gain support for their concerns about the destiny
of their respective nations by being elected to office. They
have sought election to Congress and even to the
presidency, and in the case of Bolivia have been successful.
We are also witnessing the rise of the first cadre of
civilian defense experts who are broadly trained in security
issues, with doctorates in strategic studies from the best
universities, cognizant of the military and political
dynamics of defense policy.
Finally, the increasing unification of control over the
armed forces by the establishment of effective ministries of
defense will lead to more coherent defense policies. This will
lead to a clearer rationale for maintaining an armed force,
and the identification of possible ways to eliminate
duplication of forces or to strengthen national capability
where needed.
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Internationally, there are signals that cooperation on
security issues is increasing throughout the region. I
discuss elsewhere4 three emerging trends marking, in an ad
hoc manner, new ways of security cooperation in the region
based upon 1) sub-regional detente, 2) re-invention of
institutions engaged in security in the region, including
those of the United States, and 3) thematic redesign—an
initiative stressing a new civil-military reality supported by
the periodic meetings of the defense ministers of the
Americas and the recent foundation of the Center for
Hemispheric Defense Studies by the United States. Since
the publication of my report, there have been several
indications that sub-regional detente has become the most
prominent of these trends and is progressing toward
subregional defense cooperation. Combined operations by
Venezuela and Colombia on their border earlier this year
and an announcement that Argentina and Brazil will
establish a formal consultative mechanism on security,
followed by news that Brazil and Chile will do the same, are
indicators that bilateral cooperation is advancing.5
But are these measures enough? As important as these
domestic and international developments might be for the
future of the armed forces as institutions and for the degree
of security the region will enjoy, the process has left several
critical questions unresolved.
Domestically, these include:
1. How will civilian expertise on defense matters be
generated?
2. To what extent should the armed forces become
involved, or remained involved, in public security functions?
3. How will the armed forces receive the support
necessary to maintain their institutional structures, as
expressed through an adequate budget?
Internationally, these include:
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1. How can the inherent difficulties of coordinating
multiple bilateral relations be resolved, especially as
economic integration becomes more multilateral in scope?
2. Can the region’s armed forces reach mutually agreed
upon definitions of the threats to which they should
respond, given their unique capabilities for the controlled
application of force?
3. How can the United States best make a positive
contribution to a better security posture, given its
occasional tendency toward unilateralism and historic
suspicions about its role in the hemisphere and its
hegemonic status?
4. Most importantly, how can a new security doctrine be
achieved that will simultaneously treat the challenges of
the new security environment within an environment of
reduced defense resources?
Answers.
I do not pretend to have all the answers. I am fully aware
that many so-called experts actually believe that the
definition of an expert is anyone who is 500 miles from home
and who has transparencies to project. I can suggest,
however, after over 30 years of dealing with one aspect or
another of inter-American security issues, that there are
two major courses of action that will lead to resolution of
most of these problems.
Domestically, the democratically elected civilian
leadership must assume the burden of developing an
effective defense policy. Just as absentee ownership in
sports or business is not effective, so also is the case in
defense policy. Deciding when and how a nation is to use its
armed forces in a democracy is a fundamental obligation of
elected civilian officials, not of the leadership of the armed
forces. Such a defense policy, in my opinion, is best
developed through a frank and constructive national
dialogue that recognizes the political responsibilities of the
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civilian officials and the technical expertise of the military
professional. A fundamental intermediate step is a national
commitment to train and educate civilian professionals in
strategic affairs and the leadership and management of
defense institutions. No military commander should be put
in the position of acting in a security situation without the
guidance of the civilian national command authorities.
Critical to that policy is a decision, at the national level,
on the division of responsibilities between military, police,
and other public safety institutions for public order and
other domestic functions. National tradition and values
should be the guiding precepts. As different countries’
traditions vary widely, the experience of one country may
not be adaptable to the needs of another. The notion that the
military should assume police functions because of a
supposed incorruptibility has, alas, proven to be unfounded.
The answer to extensive police corruption is thorough
reform of the police and of the judicial system, not an
insertion of the military into functions that place the
nation’s armed forces into direct confrontation with
elements of the civilian populace, whom they have sworn to
protect, and that distract it from training for traditional
military functions.
Once the defense policy has been established, the
civilian and military leadership of the armed forces should
work closely to prepare and defend before the legislative
branch a budget that realistically meets the armed forces’
needs. Allocations of resources to the armed forces will then
be considered the legitimate priorities of civil society, rather
than the mysterious, whimsical, or even wasteful product of
military decisions taken behind closed doors.
Internationally, we must recognize the need for a new
hemispheric security doctrine for security cooperation that
is multilateral in concept. Such a doctrine should
complement, but not replace, national objectives and
establish agreement on the basic common denominators of
hemispheric security cooperation. It would be comple-
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mented by higher levels of multilateral cooperation among
police forces and justice officials, but these actions would
take place through channels separate and distinct from
those providing armed forces cooperation on security
matters. The essential elements of a new hemispheric
security doctrine might include commitments to:
1) enhanced cooperation on information related to the
transit of vessels and aircraft to prevent illegal use of
national territory;
2) the enhanced exchange of climatological information
from sources available to the armed forces to better prepare
for climatic anomalies, such as the effects of El Niño;
3) higher levels of exchange of information on insurgent
groups operating near national borders to prevent use of
sanctuary, a key to the destruction of insurgent groups;
4) commitments to exchange information on potential
arms purchases to prevent misinterpretation of national
intentions;
5) a commitment to debrief the results of bilateral and
multilateral military exercises so that all countries may
gain from the investment in training throughout the region
6) definition of support functions that can efficiently be
provided to the forces acting against drug trafficking in the
region; and
7) even an eventual agreement on specialization of
functions by some armed forces, especially those of smaller
states, as is the case with NATO forces.
Essential to making such a doctrine work is a
complimentary architecture, multilateral in nature, that
will not be subject to domination or manipulation by any one
nation, or a combination of nations in the region. Such an
architecture would be constructed under the authority and
through the cooperation of national defense ministers, thus
guaranteeing its consistency with the precepts of civilian
control. This architecture would include:
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1) the establishment of a secretariat dedicated to
meetings of the ministers of defense. This secretariat would
coordinate meetings of defense ministers and provide
periodic follow-up of resolutions adopted at the respective
meetings;
2) the coordination by that same secretariat of the topics
for meetings of the Conference of American Armies and
chiefs of the region’s air forces and navies to focus on
commitments arranged through the hemispheric security
doctrine;
3) the establishment of electronic communications
systems that will better link defense establishments for
purposes of exchanging information related to the
commitments assumed under the hemispheric security
doctrine;
4) periodic meetings of senior defense ministry officials
below the rank of minister to review the mechanics of
security cooperation carried out by defense institutions.
This approach will not provide immediate answers, but
it is far more consistent with modern needs than the current
system that emphasizes individual nation’s military
capabilities and bilateral relationships, and provides only
limited opportunities for multinational cooperation. Under
civilian control, with budgets that meet national priorities,
and a higher level of multinational cooperation, the region’s
armed forces can meet their security needs more efficiently
and with a higher degree of support from the civilian
population. At the same time, the United States can
enhance the effectiveness of its interaction by sharing
perspectives on civil-military relations and on multilateral
cooperation gained from NATO and the Persian Gulf War,
b y promotin g mul ti l ater al c oop er ati on i n c i vi l
infrastructure functions performed by Latin American
militaries, and by adopting a multilateral approach to
training, exercise, and intelligence that would complement
the hemispheric security doctrine.
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Conclusion.
Can the team be prepared to meet the needs of the
future—to win, satisfy its fans, and put bread on the table of
the players? Two scenarios for the future are possible.
Continuing the current course may lead to continued
atrophy of some military institutions and further disruption
of the state at the hands of transnational criminals allied
with insurgencies with territorial aspirations, eventually
creating pressures for a return to authoritarian
governments and the end of the democratic spring that the
region enjoys. Selective modernization may exacerbate
historic tensions and cause higher allocations for defense
needs than would otherwise be necessary, or even conflict
that could derail economic integration and the benefits
promised to the region as a whole.
A more optimistic scenario, one which I support,
envisions more effective military institutions resulting from
a greater civil-military dialogue at the domestic and
international levels, better integration of defense and
economic foreign policies, and higher levels of trust and
activity in multilateral operations. The United States can
perform a singularly positive role in this process, as has
been described.
Unlike the Europeans who sought to forge peace in the
19th and 20th Centuries, we in the Americas cannot point to
the destructiveness of past wars and appeal to the mandates
of great conferences, such as the Congress of Vienna or
Potsdam Conference, as the basis for overcoming the
deficiencies of our security system. But we who live them
know that revolutionary changes are necessary to sustain
the level of prosperity and dignity embodied in the promise
of America, as envisioned by the leaders of our countries’
independence movements. Fundamental changes are
necessary, and the old questions, “If not us, who, and if not
now, when?” should guide our deliberations. Thank you for
listening to these ideas, and I look forward to your
comments.
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Chapter Three
Brazilian National Defense Policy and
Civil-Military Relations in the Government of
President Fernando Henrique Cardoso1
Dr. Eliézer Rizzo de Oliveira
Campinas State University, Brazil

[The National Defense Policy] is not just a decision of the
military body or the diplomatic corps, but of a diplomatic
vision...that should be supported by a military structure
capable of generating an efficient deterrent effect. . . . In the
strategies stemming from these policies, there should be
occasional support of the armed forces to the police agency in
charge of the permanent fight against organized crime in the
domains of logistics, communications and intelligence. In
exceptional cases, the armed forces could enter into operations
against well-defined targets that require the use of mass or the
physical surrounding of terrain. This is where the armed
forces might use their fighting power. Therefore, it is not a
direct action by the armed forces.
President Fernando Henrique Cardoso2

The object of this essay is to understand Brazil’s
National Defense Policy from the perspective of
civil-military relations under the government of President
Fernando Henrique Cardoso. In this context, the President
has been working on the solution to two issues fundamental
to a full subordination of the military to civilian authority.
First, there has been a growing capability and willingness
on the part of the Executive to direct the armed forces. (In
this respect, it must be noted, that branch differs from the
Legislature, which has been apathetic on this subject.)
Secondly, this has led to the resolution of the military
identity crisis that took place within the framework of
re-democratization and the end of the Cold War.
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My central thesis is that President Cardoso is creating a
new pattern in the relationship between the political
authority and the armed forces. The path to this new
situation is being opened by means of the President’s
political and intellectual leadership as well as by his
legitimacy, which is anchored in his election, in his
economic and political reorganization of the state, and in his
international role as Chief of State. This new pattern of
civil-military relations is also a result of the performance
and institutional profile of the heads of the military
ministries. Thus has been solved some of the most acute
recent problems of the Brazilian military apparatus.
The most symbolic issue-–because it is so loaded with
human and political meaning—is related to those opposed
to the military dictatorship, who were killed or are missing.3
The Law on the Missing (and the Catholic Church, a
foremost defender of Human Rights, kept itself surprisingly
mute on this subject), adapted specifically by the state of Rio
Grande do Sul,4 both closes and expands the political
amnesty established by decree by General João Figueiredo,
the last President of the military regime. Given the scars of
Brazil’s recent past, President Cardoso, by positing the
nation’s reconciliation with itself, went beyond amnesty.
This has made it possible to restructure political life. Under
pressure from international public opinion and a
widespread clamoring by Brazilian society, Cardoso has
gotten Brazil and even the armed forces to recognize that
the latter had disobeyed positive and natural laws by
establishing a structure of terrorism and torture to fight
terrorism and guerrillas. In more general terms, it was a
state terrorism that fought all modalities of “subversion.”
However, by maintaining the limits of the amnesty, the
legal and political equation applied to those who are dead
and missing did not bring about a loss of credibility either
for the military authority or for the legitimacy of the
President vis-a-vis the armed forces. It also did not reduce
the prestige of the military in the eyes of Brazilian society.
On the political and ideological level, this reconciliation

32

process suggests what amounts to almost a historical
discontinuity between the present armed forces and those
that acted in a reproachable way in the past. Therefore,
fears of a trauma in the barracks—that might lead to a
political destabilization in an already unstable political
situation because of reforms within the state—did not
materialize.5
I had the opportunity to analyze the possibility of such
political instability during the first year of President
Cardoso’s administration. At that time I said that:
Brazilian democracy is beginning an important test. The
potential for destabilization. . . resides in the feeling of
isolation, condemnation, or stigma that might affect the
military institution. Notwithstanding its behavior, which is
clearly favorable to democracy, it finds itself against the wall,
facing the possibility of losing its institutional autonomy.
Even at a low level of political power, the armed forces will
make their dissatisfaction known. It is up to both sides that
engaged in violence to apologize. A good number of those
opposing the authoritarian regime believed in building a new
social system that—we know—was supposed to be
authoritarian. However, there were also killings directed
against people who worked for the government and, in some
cases, against comrades of the same revolutionary ideals.
They were victims of the arms that the nation gave the armed
forces that—outside and against the law—offended both
humanity and military principles by putting into operation a
structure of torment and extermination of political prisoners.
Both sides cultivated militarism while being held captive of a
belief in the transforming character of violence in that war
which stemmed from the narrow horizons of the Cold War.6

The positive response of society and the political system
to the President’s initiative reinforced the leadership of the
Navy, Army and Air Force ministers,7 but mostly it
strengthened his own authority in the military area. In the
National Defense Policy (PDN), Cardoso has displayed the
same self-confidence he did when addressing the problem of
the dead and missing under the military regime. The PDN
is the main innovation in the domain of civil-military
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relations, which besides opening the way to the creation of a
Ministry of Defense, serves as a guide for preparing the
military in a manner that is attuned to the country’s foreign
policy. And both are geared to building a new prestige for
Brazil in the international arena. Since both military and
diplomatic spheres involve medium and long-term concepts
and perceptions, Cardoso linked diplomats, military and
other government employees within the recently created
Chamber of Foreign Relations and National Defense over
which he presides.8
The President announced the results of this work,
stating that:
I am signing today the National Defense Policy proposed by the
Chamber of Foreign Relations and National Defense. The ideas
contained in it are the result of a full analysis of today’s national
and international situations as well as of medium-term
scenarios. Therefore, a conclusion was reached that it should be
anchored on a strategic posture that is of a deterring and
defensive character, based on the following assumptions:
borders and limits that are perfectly defined and
internationally recognized; close relations with neighboring
countries and with the international community; rejection of
wars of conquest; the need to find peaceful solutions to
controversies, using force only as a resort to self-defense.9

The clear orientation of the National Defense Policy is
faithfulness to a “diplomatic and military heritage” on both
conceptual and international/foreign policy levels, as well
as to the defense of a democratic state and military
diplomacy. However, the National Defense Policy requires a
more adequate conceptual and political framework with
regard to two factors that are part of civil-military relations.
The first of these concerns action by the armed forces—in
particular, the Army—in the area of public safety. Here we
have legal problems that affect the balance of the
federation—i.e., the relations between the union and the
states. The absence of the legislative branch in decisions on
federal intervention in state Military Police organizations is
remarkable. [Translator’s note: In Brazil, state police are
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known as Military Police—"Polícia Militar."] Those
participating in such decisions are the governors requiring
it and the ministers of Justice and Army. Obviously, it is up
to the President to make the final decision.
However, the most important problem is the equation of
public safety and internal defense: Given the continuity of
the concepts and the operational structures of the military,
public safety crises stimulate the use of the armed forces in
national life. Thus, the border between public safety,
internal defense and defense of the institutions of the
democratic state continues to be nebulous. This requires a
Presidential or Congressional initiative to fully clarify it.
The responsibilities of the two branches concerning the
National Defense Policy are clearly different: The Executive
formulates and implements it, while the Legislature barely
evaluates and monitors it. But the consolidation of
democracy could lead to an increase in legislative functions
directing and sharing responsibilities for the PDN. In that
case, the PDN would continue to be proposed by the
President, but would be subject to approval by the National
Congress.10
As mentioned above, the PDN is inscribed in Brazilian
foreign policy. Defining a new strategic posture means
building a more reliable and responsible profile on the
international plane. This is the significance of Brazil’s
candidacy for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council
(formulated a few years ago by the Foreign Ministry) and of
its recent signing of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
By bringing Brazil into the latter, President Cardoso’s
government admits that the acquisition of nuclear weapons
is not in the national interest; nor is it in accordance with
the country’s scientific and military objectives.
Furthermore, after signing the nuclear agreements with
Argentina and opening Brazilian nuclear programs to
international inspection, “we are providing another
example of our commitment to disarmament and
non-proliferation, and taking another step to strengthen
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Brazil’s credentials in contemporary international
politics.”11
Models of Civil-Military Relations in Brazil:
1945-1997.
In the last seven years, the Brazilian political system
has contributed more to the subordination of the military to
civilian authority than in all of the more than 100 years of
the Republic’s history—a republic created mainly by an
intense mobilization by the military in 1889. The first years
of the new regime not only witnessed a short-lived radical
and highly repressive military dictatorship, but also the
ascension of the armed forces to the highest level of national
politics.
Nevertheless, after recovering political power from the
Army, the oligarchies left the military in a subordinate role
that led younger generations of uniformed men to rebellion
a n d prev en ted the d evel op ment of p r of es si onal
perspectives. The lieutenants’ rebellions that shook the
political system in the 1920s opened the path to the
political-military revolution that ushered in a long period of
conservative modernization of the state and economy, as
was the case in other parts of the world under fascist or
Soviet structures. Thus, Brazil, with the Revolution of
1930, lived under a civilian dictatorship with strong
military support, with the exception of the brief period
under the 1934 Constitution that was terminated by the
coup through which President Getúlio Vargas established
the New State (“Estado Novo”) in November 1937. Though
the dictator implemented important reforms in the armed
forces, he kept the institution subordinated through a
refined game of divide and conquer in order to assure his
own supremacy. In the end, however, the military
overthrew him when he attempted to re-democratize under
his own control.
In Brazil, civil-military relations since the beginning of
the Cold War can be analyzed according to four models. The
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political regime based on the 1946 Constitution established
a high degree of armed forces autonomy by subordinating
them to the Chief of State. Alfred Stepan used the concept of
a “moderating pattern” to analyze the relationship between
the parties and politicians, on the one hand, and the armed
forces, on the other.12 The military commanders felt entitled
by both the nation’s history and the way the military
institution developed to intervene in the political arena to
stimulate or veto ongoing processes. Political leaders
accommodated themselves to these interventions, and
frequently even encouraged them. Parodying General Goes
Monteiro, one could say that the political system allowed
the Army to have its own politics.13
Thus, to take only two examples, the liberalconservative party União Democrática Nacional (UDN) had
its military arm in the “Cruzada Democrática” movement,
organized around the War College (Escola Superior de
Guerra) and the Military Club (Clube Militar), against the
populism of Getúlio Vargas’ constitutional government.
[Translator’s note: Former dictator Vargas returned as a
constitutionally elected President in 1950.] The
Communist Party maintained an identical relationship
with the nationalist left-wing military. But it was a
two-way street where the liberal-conservative military and
the left-wing nationalist military used, respectively, the
UDN and the Communist Party as “party arms” of their
military perspectives.
The second element of the moderating pattern—what I
would rather call the “intervention function of the
military”—features highly politicized military, unions and
social movements. An important example of a social sector
that is mobilized is the civilian bureaucracy, which was
stimulated in the late 1930s and gained an even more
important momentum with the creation of state-owned
companies starting in the 1950s. Finally, the military
apparatus is highly politicized and mobilized. In the late
1940s and early 1950s, stemming from a military initiative
for a nationalist solution to the issue of oil exploration, a
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significant movement developed among the middle class in
favor of a state monopoly in the energy sector. The creation
of Petrobras—a state-owned company holding the oil
exploration monopoly—was a result of this initial
politicization of the energy question in the military area.
Another example is Brazil’s refusal to send troops to Korea.
Getúlio Vargas’ government, which under pressure was
leaning towards accommodating the United States, was led
to review this position because of the nationalistic reaction
of military officers linked to the Communist Party, who at
that point were in charge of the highly politicized Clube
Militar.
Different military sectors were also encouraged by
civilians (especially the parties and the press) to act as
umpires in civilian disputes, but without holding political
power. Short-lived military coups were accepted by
civilians as part of the political game so long as they were
not aimed at replacing civilians at the helm of state.
Unfortunately, they led to an increasing lack of military
discipline, which in turn only accelerated political
instability.
National Defense was defined by the National Security
Council, which Vargas had created in the 1930s. Within the
context of the Cold War and U.S. hegemony, Brazil acquired
military materiel and was subjected to a solid and enduring
doctrinal influence from the United States. The struggle
against subversives, as defined by the Doctrine of National
Security, became a priority in the armed forces’ mission.
Military preparedness for external defense concerned a
distant hypothesis of participating with the United States
in a war against the Soviet Union, together with the
“containment of the internal enemy.” In fact, however,
Brazil’s immediate strategic dispute was with Argentina, as
a result of the colonial inheritance of both countries.14
Two aspects of this model acquired a greater dimension
during the post-1964 military dictatorship. On one hand,
while the direct struggle against the opposition was a result
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of the shutting down of the political regime, that conflict
contributed to the further expansion of the political closing
from 1968 onward. The use of the armed forces in repressive
activities, particularly against paramilitary leftist groups,
led to the organization of a military and police structure
that operated outside the law but under the institutional
direction of the military ministers. Extra-constitutional
authoritarian legislation blocked the judicial study of
punitive measures within and outside the armed forces. On
the other hand, the National Security Council occupied that
space in the military government, above the staffs and the
military ministers, in planning and executing development
projects for the Navy, Army and Air Force.
The military, which had mediated and repressed
political conflicts during the constitutional regime, would in
the dictatorial model replace and subordinate the civilians
in directing the state, restricting the role of the political
parties and consequently that of the Legislature. By
occupying the most important positions in these
governments, in civilian as well as military areas, the
armed forces reinforced social control to a point that it
became the “raison d’etre” of the Army. The dynamics of
military anti-communism prevented the few timid efforts to
reach a political opening from getting anywhere. The armed
forces became a state within a state, such was the degree of
political and institutional autonomy in parts of its
repressive and intelligence sectors.
When political detente occurred, it was directed by
Presidents Ernesto Geisel (1974-79) and João Figueiredo
(1979-85), both Army generals, who exercised power on
behalf of the armed forces. Both faced episodes of acute
resistance by military sectors identified with the social and
political control role of the armed forces, which those
elements wanted to preserve as a requirement of an
envisioned “world power project.” The defeat of this
alternative was due, in part, to the military command
capability of President Geisel, but also to the development of
civil society, the revitalizing and challenging effects of the
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amnesty, and the formation of new parties. Detente and
amnesty widened the political arena, and democratization
brought competition to elections for public office. With the
end of the military dictatorship and the election of the first
civilian president in 1985, the military apparatus was
unable to regain its moderating power; nor were civilian
authorities able to impose themselves on the armed forces.
This ambivalence translated into military tutelage.
The tutelage of the Army Minister, General Leonidas
Pires Gonçalves, over President José Sarney (1985-90) was
based on democratization via transition (partial reforms
under military control) and on the political circumstances of
the New Republic. The death of President-elect Tancredo
Neves created a political vacuum that was quickly filled
through a decision by the future Minister of the Army,
Congressman Ulysses Guimaraes—the most prominent
opposition politician (and Speaker of the Chamber of
Deputies)—and the jurist and politician Afonso Arinos.
This decision, based on a specific interpretation of the
Constitution, resulted in the inauguration of Vice-President
José Sarney. The Judiciary was not called upon to make a
pronouncement, nor did it take the initiative to do so. Thus,
having eliminated the possibility of a government
temporarily headed by the Speaker of the Chamber of
Deputies (in accordance with the rules of temporary
succession of the President), a new and a very early
presidential election was avoided. Had elections been held
at that time, they would have been by direct vote, and the
mentors of the New Republic feared that Leonel Brizola (a
“Getulista”) might be elected President. They considered
Brizola a risk to the political transition in that his
presidency might lead to the military’s return to power.
The authoritarian legislation was partially revoked by
President Sarney as part of the measures preceding the
meeting of the National Constitutional Assembly. During
that meeting, the Minister of the Army tried to contain the
union movement, impede the adoption of a parliamentary
regime, block the creation of a Ministry of Defense, and
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thwart a presidential mandate of less than five years. At the
end of that administration, an Army intervention in the
Companhia Siderurgica Nacional (National Steel
Company) resulted in the deaths of three workers who had
occupied the plant. Military tutelage was also applied in
efforts to provide oversized powers to the Army and to create
difficulties for agrarian reform. During the Sarney
administration, the Minister of the Army acted as a
condottieri of the transition, holding final responsibility for
the continuity of re-democratization. At the same time, the
National Congress, while preparing the new Constitution,
was unable to free itself from the legal and political heritage
of the military’s interventionist function.
President Fernando Collor de Mello (1990-92) performed
a restricted role concerning the armed forces, but should be
credited with designating military ministers who would
follow strictly legal procedures during the presidential
impeachment crisis that ensued. There are indications that
they refused to apply force to remove Collor when corruption
in his administration brought about the suggestion of
impeachment. Actually, they might have been encouraged
to violate legal norms by politicians of strong democratic
inclinations. Nevertheless, the innovative behavior of the
military ministers did not imply a reformulation of strategic
ideas by the armed forces. These conceptions were
transferred in full to the administration of President
Cardoso.
An innovative aspect was the elimination of the “Serviço
Nacional de Informações” (National Intelligence Service) by
President Collor. As a result of this, President Cardoso did
not inherit a civilian intelligence service. But contrary to
Sarney and Collor, Cardoso interacts with military thought
and looks for alternatives at the level of military
organization. At the moment, the House is studying an
administration-introduced bill that would create the
Brazilian Intelligence System and the Brazilian
Intelligence Agency, which would be in charge of providing
the government with “data of a strategic character on the
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difficulties, potentials and impediments to the fulfillment of
its high functions.” The system and agency would be
monitored by a Special Commission of the National
Congress, including three senators and three congressmen.
Within the government, supervision of its activities and the
fulfillment of the National Intelligence Policy would be
given to the Chamber of Foreign Relations and National
Defense, presided over by the President of the Republic.15
The National Defense Policy.
The Diplomatic and Military Heritage.
The National Defense Policy (PDN) is based on a
diplomatic and military heritage. In other words, it contains
concepts and describes practices that are current in the
armed forces and in Itamaraty (the Ministry of Foreign
Relations). On this aspect, the presidential document says
that: “The transformations that have occurred internally as
well as those that took place regionally and globally made it
necessary and timely to issue an explicit [Translator’s note:
used as a verb in the Portuguese original—explicitar] policy
of national defense, stemming from the highest level of the
state, that reflects the aspirations of society and acts as a
reference point for the ensuing strategies.”16 Thus, the PDN
does not mean a profound innovation or a rupture with
previous concepts. This is why some analysts wrongly
assessed it as innocuous and unnecessary, while others
understood that its carefully balanced tone was the result of
difficult negotiations led by diplomats. However, the PDN
in itself constitutes a significant innovation in the patterns
of civil-military relations. In this sense, President Cardoso
is issuing a signal to society, the armed forces and the
political system indicating that military questions are no
longer solely the domain of the armed forces. “In a
democracy, the Defense Policy is not a military issue, it is a
society issue, a government issue. Obviously, the military
participates actively in it.”17
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Historically, Brazil has had many difficulties defining
its national interests. With the exception of the National
Security Doctrine, which resulted from a military vision of
the state, national and international policies generally
reflected the 1967 Constitution. Before the PDN,
everything happened as if the country did not have interests
of a national character. But while taking over a certain
“diplomatic and military heritage,” the working group that
prepared the PDN resorted to three orientations with deep
roots in the Brazilian state, besides the orientation provided
by President Cardoso himself.
The first current of this heritage comes from the
strategic issues area. Consider the testimony by
Ambassador Ronaldo Sardenberg, Minister of the
Secreta ria t of St r ategi c Af f ai r s i n the Car d oso
administration, to the National Defense Commission of the
Argentine Congress, where he defined Brazilian-Argentine
relations as a “strategic partnership” and explained it in
terms of the guiding concepts of Brazilian foreign policy:
First, Brazil tries to preserve national and regional
interests and does not perceive threats of world conflict.
Second, the post-Cold War international framework is
defined by a dissonance between the unipolar military
power (the United States) and multipolar economic powers
(particularly, Japan and Germany). Third, Brazil is trying
to develop its condition as “global trader” in order to achieve
the position of a global actor. Fourth, and most significant
for the purposes of this essay, the Brazilian strategic agenda
would include the following objectives later incorporated
almost in their entirety into the National Defense Policy:
territorial and national integrity; defense of the state under
a democratic rule of law; development of a national scientific
and technological capability; maintaining a regional and
global strategic presence; strengthening of Mercosul, the
Amazon Treaty, and the South Atlantic as a zone of peace
and cooperation; strengthening the Brazilian peace policy;
and the implementation of great strategic associations,
beginning with Argentina.18
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The analysis of the world scene comes from the
diplomatic domain. As Foreign Minister Luiz Felipe
Lampreia noted during a lecture at the “Escola Superior de
Guerra”:
A democratic revolution swept the world, starting in Latin
America, and nowadays the huge majority of people live under
democratic regimes. . . .An economic revolution took place,
based on the exhaustion of the more closed models that
prevailed in the 50’s through the 70’s, and today the vast
majority of people live in economic systems based on market
freedom. . . . We also had a revolution in the behavior of states,
with the growing universalization of the rules of political
coexistence in areas such as non-proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction and environmental protection. . . .It seems
that the path to isolation, autarchy, to options outside the
mainstream of international relations is definitely closed. . . .
There is a clear and intolerable cost for marginality and
xenophobic nationalism. . . . Democracy, economic freedom and
participation in economic and commercial mechanisms and the
universal systems that regulate relations between states
became the standards.

On globalization, from which states cannot escape and
which would not bring about on its own either equity or
justice in international relations, Minister Lampreia said
that Brazilian diplomacy “defends and projects overseas the
national interests. . . . But it does not create interests, nor
can it project that which does not exist. . . . And the
diplomacy of a country like Brazil operates necessarily from
a diplomatic heritage. It does not accept changes that are
not well thought out or are sudden, nor short-term
bargaining, posing or unrealistic quests for prestige.”
The concepts Minister Lampreia expressed about
foreign policy have been incorporated into the heart of the
Defense Policy. First, “our diplomacy is universalistic and
non-exclusionary.” In other words, it does not limit itself to
regional areas and interests, but whenever and wherever
possible tries to strengthen partnerships based on common
interests. Second, “there are no ideological elements
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presiding over these partnerships.” Diplomatic action is
geared to pragmatically expand trade and cooperation at
the world level. Third, only Brazil’s available resources
limit diplomatic action. Finally, Brazilian diplomacy sees
itself as active and capable of initiatives: “We repudiate
every false tutelage and every abstract attachment to
principles that justify inaction and can be responsible for
loss of space in the international scene and loss of time in
necessary strategic movements. We are dedicated to
consolidating and extending Mercosul, which is today a
respected and sought out international partner and a kind
of second dimension of our international projection, thanks
to the economic and commercial—and therefore
political—force that it adds to us.”19
The military reflection on the international situation,
which is characterized by U.S. hegemony without historical
parallel in the strategic arena, is part of the intellectual
background of the PDN. The former Minister of the Navy
and of the Secretariat of Strategic Affairs, Admiral Mário
César Flores, says that
All this international evolution has been so far, still discreetly
and imprecisely, built into the construction of what is called
the new world order, to be controlled like a condominium by
the oligarchy of the powerful under the leadership of a United
States left free by the sunset of the Soviet empire, holding a
military capability that is so far uncontained all over the
world. . . . Once done with the Cold War that legitimatized the
division of the globe between two hegemonies, it is natural
that the United States will now try to extend the order it
considers desirable for the new era. . . . Its relative economic
decline vis-a-vis Japan and Europe . . . puts the United States
at risk of having its hegemony rest primarily on military
power, turning it (perhaps together with Great Britain) into a
militarized country at the service of the new order as, in a way,
has already occurred in the Gulf War with its huge financial
bill that depended on a strong contribution from Japan,
Germany and Saudi Arabia.20
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This concern is shared by Rear Admiral Luiz Sérgio
Silveira Costa, an instructor at the Escola Superior de
Guerra:
Before, we had a bipolar world in political and military terms,
and frozen multilateral trade and nationalisms. What we see
today is a unipolar world in military terms, a relatively more
intense activity by international organizations, such as the UN,
in political terms: a tendency towards economic regionalisms
and, in psycho-social terms, an exacerbation of ethnic
nationalisms and the prevalence of issues such as human
rights, demographic growth, environmental pollution and
unemployment. The United States managed to defeat
communism, but this did not assure peace. . . . The balance of
terror was replaced by the reign of insecurity. . . . In the new
world order, the bipolar world was replaced by American
hegemony. . . . By uniting and leading 28 countries under the
UN aegis, the United States showed that it is the only country
capable of dictating new world rules. . . . We now live under the
Pax Americana, or—in a dissimulated way—the Pax UNana.
[Finally,] the military issues lost preeminence to the economic
ones. It seems that the world is marching towards a . . .softening
in the political and military domains—which does not, however,
mean a scenario of total peace.21

We focus now on the observations by General Gleuber
Vieira, Chief of the Army Staff. As participants in the
international scenario, states have different perceptions of
the new international world order: “Some of these actors try
to preserve and manipulate power. Others fight for a place
in the sun. And there are those that only try to survive.”22
Representative democracies replace authoritarian systems
and planned economies give way to market economies,
where the Minimal State and market forces reign. In the
military domain, institutions tend to take the place of
armed forces. Within this context, the United States
exercises an uncontested military hegemony and a
collegiate economic hegemony within the G-7 sphere. Given
there are no solid and tested rules with regard to its
permanence and range, the post-Cold War order
corresponds to a “world mess” in which the United Nations
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has not been able to manage international conflicts
efficiently.
As for the American continent, General Vieira states
that, because of the “power asymmetry” favoring the United
States, Latin America became a “lower priority in
geo-strategic concerns,” since U.S. interests are primarily
“directed to their most important partners in the power
game and to threats outside the continent.” At the
continental-defense level, most American countries would
have changed their position, traditionally founded on
collective anti-communism, a “powerful anesthetic” during
the Cold War era. But the United States and its neighbors
perceive threats differently. To Washington, drugs seem to
be a priority “chosen to replace communism as a new
continental threat,” followed by concerns with the
environment, the proliferation of arms of mass destruction,
and illegal immigration.
Vieira also says that new democracies—where illegal
“points of convergence of power” such as terrorism,
organized crime, and drug trafficking seek shelter—look
forward to a new relationship between the United States
and Latin America. Therefore, Washington’s “attempts to
make drug trafficking a priority and a central point for
continental mobilization do not seem to be...a wise and
politically satisfactory position.” On the other hand, to
counter the U.S. position, an agenda based on a search for
understanding and mutual confidence would be
indispensable. In other words, there is a need to promote
the establishment of “sub-regional associations” capable of
preventing conflicts through mechanisms of consultation
and mutual confidence. The idea is to avoid hegemonic
interventions of continental or global character. As a rule,
these initiatives should not confront, nor try to replace, the
OAS or the United Nations.
Regarding these sub-regional associations, a Brazilian
Army document23 indicates that initiatives like these would
be considered appropriate so long as all countries involved
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establish mutual confidence measures as an alternative to a
potential regional defense system. Depending on their
success, political or economic sub-regional associations
could “bring us closer and lead to integration in the military
field, fostering reciprocal confidence.” Instead of creating a
“small regional NATO,” the Brazilian Army prefers the
development of follow-up mechanisms for conflict resolution
and confidence-building, such as cooperation on
intelligence, exchange of professionals in the respective
training centers, accepting observers during military
maneuvers, periodic consultations at staff level, meetings of
military experts, joint maneuvers and exercises,
professional internships for officers and NCOs, systematic
bilateral meetings, visits, joint sports and social events, and
joint service activities (navigation through international
rivers, search and rescue, air mail, disaster assistance
operations, flight protection, and so on). That is, instead of a
regional defense association, a more fluid and informal
structure of cooperation would allow “high-level
mechanisms for periodic or emergency consultations,
capable of opening personal confidence channels, and
allowing consultations and clarification when two or more
countries face common threats.” Therefore, as a result of
the power asymmetry and imbalance in the Americas,
“proposa ls for the es tabl i s hment of Per manent
Inter-American Peace Forces, controlled by the OAS, are
considered inopportune” by the Brazilian Army.
On the other hand, the Minister of the Army, General
Zenildo Lucena, has also presented his views on these
matters.24 The Army that the country needs, he says, must
rise to its historic mission of “maintaining Brazil’s unity,
sovereignty, and territorial integrity.” As a result, its lines
of development should be, first of all, to keep its military
units in adequate operational form along our national
territory. Secondly, there needs to be established a Core
Force, “an embryo of the Army of the future,” comprised of
professional soldiers devoted to external defense, with “all
the functions of an immediate deployment force and troops
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ready for use in peacekeeping missions. Such a force would
also serve as a laboratory for experimentation with new
techniques and combat procedures, as well as a hands-on
school for updating permanent personnel.” Thirdly,
teaching and research systems must be improved for the
training of the military’s human resources. Finally, the
greatest possible number of troops must be deployed abroad
as part of peace operations, so they can acquire professional
training and the motivation for personal development.
In conclusion, I would ask the armed forces Staff to
emphasize—without depleting military assets—the
designation of military personnel to defend our national
sovereignty, which is a component of Brazil’s “strategic
dimension.” According to the EMFA [the Brazilian armed
forces Staff], “our sovereignty will be preserved, especially
in those aspects making that concept even more important:
the ownership and jurisdiction over our territory, its
indivisibility and our ability to sustain political actions
aimed at preserving our vital interests.... Our conception
also includes the notion that...society as a whole is also
responsible for defending our sovereignty...and [that the
latter] is not based solely on the military component....”25
Brazil’s Strategic Dimension: Between Past and Future.
When talking about the PDN (National Defense Policy),
which includes national objectives, foreign and domestic
policy, military readiness, and the international picture,
President Cardoso tries to develop a dialogue with
society—a dialogue that, in a way, has already begun. He
says that “we need to reconcile defense needs with the
availability of funds, with Congress approving budgets and,
whenever possible, involving the country’s academic,
scientific, technological, and industrial segments.”26 In
other words, even with responsibility for implementation of
the National Defense Policy falling entirely on the
shoulders of the Executive branch, this does not relieve the
Legislature from participating in the conception of that
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policy. If Congress has the role of discussing the resources
that will make the PDN viable, its more effective
participation will depend, among other things, on the
adoption of a new standard of responsibilities, shared
among the two branches.
We can say that the PDN has a generic content, but it
also precisely defines structures and factors of power at the
international level, as well as objectives, strategic
orientation, and guidelines for military readiness.
Considering this is the first step in an important attitudinal
change toward the power of the state, broad generality does
not represent a serious flaw, but rather a posture of caution.
On the conceptual level, it is important to emphasize that
the PDN will be dealing with “external threats,” advocating
a military readiness that is congruent with the country’s
“foreign attitude.” That is, the PDN is involved at the
foreign relations level: “Dealing with external threats, the
National Defense Policy aims at creating objectives for
defending the nation, as well as orienting the readiness and
employment of national capabilities at all levels and
spheres of power, while also involving civil and military
sectors. The PDN’s major premises are objectives and
principles inserted in the Constitution. They are attuned
with Brazil’s external posture, based on seeking a peaceful
solution to controversies and strengthening international
peace and security.”27
The PDN is shaped by notions such as “national
objectives,” an “international order that is unstable and
unpredictable,” and “Latin America [as] a region without
large strategic tensions.” But there is something new
related to the values rooted in the military: the priority
given to external defense does not include the traditional
and authoritarian concept of a “domestic enemy.” But, as
we will see, this issue has not been resolved. Although Latin
America is “the most demilitarized region on the planet,”
and the world is reorganizing its power structures now that
the “East-West confrontation” is over, the global picture has
more uncertainties than proven, stable, and predictable
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mechanisms. Therefore, Brazil has to strengthen its means
of negotiation, which are capable of thwarting war, and at
the same time, under the rule of law, improve its
instruments for defending national interests. In this way,
“military capability and diplomacy [will be] expressions of
national sovereignty and dignity,”28 since Brazil is not free
from risks to its security, including regional ones.
Oth er Na tion al Def ens e objec ti ves i nc l ud e:
guaranteeing our territory’s sovereignty and integrity,
preserving the rule of law, projecting Brazil into the
international decision-making process, and contributing to
the preservation of peace and security abroad. According to
President Cardoso, “in this new world scenario in which
Brazil needs—and will have—a more active voice on
decisions worldwide, we...are reinforcing our peace policy in
South America, keeping in mind that, for historic and
geographical reasons, there is a more immediate need for
Brazil to take action in relation to its neighbors—namely,
the need for increased integration. This includes financial
integration, an increased cultural integration, and a very
positive military relationship.”29
In short, beginning with these objectives, which link
diplomatic and military sectors, the PDN will be guided by the
following central strategic concepts: (a) preserving national
borders; (b) rejecting wars of conquest; (c) backing peaceful
solutions for disputes and controversies among states.“At the
regional level, we still have areas of instability that are
opposed to Brazilian interests. The actions of international
organized crime and of armed gangs from neighboring
countries in the Brazilian Amazon are two points of great
concern. Military capability and diplomacy are expressions of
national sovereignty and dignity, and Brazil has shown . . . its
determination to live in peace and harmony, according to the
principles of international law. . . .”30
Thus, the PDN’s central orientation is preventive and
defensive, though the country will adopt offensive

51

initiatives as part of this larger strategy. That is, Brazil’s
strategy of preventive defense
values both diplomacy as a vital tool for solving conflicts and . . .
a credible military structure capable of generating an efficient
deterrent effect. . . . Today’s [national defense] policy centers on
an active diplomacy dedicated to peace and a strategic and
dissuading defensive posture based on the following major
premises: borders and limits perfectly defined and
internationally recognized; close relations with neighboring
countries and the international community . . . based on mutual
trust and respect; rejecting wars of conquest; search for peaceful
solutions to controversies; and the use of force only as a means of
self-defense."31

The guidelines of the policy point towards: (a)
contributing to the construction of a law-based, equitable
international order; (b) participating in the principal
decision-making and peace-negotiation processes; (c)
fostering disarmament and the elimination of nuclear
weapons from battlefields; (d) participating in peace forces;
(e) collaboration, integration and peacekeeping in Latin
America; (f) military exchanges with friendly nations; (g)
armed forces participation in national development
programs; (h) military training and improvement in terms
of structure, human resources, science and technology,
education, financial resources, and so on; and (i) better
territorial, air, and sea surveillance systems. The
guidelines close with an interesting—and necessary—
statement: “Keep public opinion informed in order to create
and preserve a National Defense mentality, stimulating
nationalism and dedication to country.”32 This National
Defense mentality suggests not only society’s participation,
but also better human resources for planning and executing
national defense, which is very necessary now that
President Cardoso has decided to create a Defense Ministry.
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Internal Defense, Public Security, and the Defense of the
Democratic State.
The National Defense Policy does not include the concept
of a domestic enemy, a central theme during the military
regime. But since internal defense will only be implemented
as a result of a threat inside the country, a diffuse concept of
internal enemy still conditions the military—even with the
PDN in place. But something has to be emphasized: the
Army’s readiness still focuses more on internal than
external defense. These were my conclusions in a document
entitled “The Army’s Strategic Concept,”33 which was the
center point of a timely debate among senior Army officers
(the Navy, Air Force, and War College were also
represented), as well as retired officers, civilian officials and
academicians. The discussion took place at the Army Staff
on August 12-13, 1997. In the notes prepared for that
seminar, I emphasized the clarity of the defensive
deterrence concept and external defense priorities. That is,
strategies concerned with defending the Amazon and
Guyana regions, the Mid-West and the Plata River basin
are oriented, respectively, by Gamma and Delta Doctrines.
The Gamma Doctrine is divided into offensive strategies
(aimed at a quick victory in a conventional conflict against
forces equal in strength with Brazilian national troops) and
defensive strategies (facing forces clearly superior in a
long-term war). The internal defense is oriented by the
Alpha Doctrine.
Keeping in mind the distribution of Army units inside
Brazilian territory—a result of their readiness for external
and internal defenses—I presented the following thoughts
to the seminar audience: “As for the priority between
external and internal defense, the country of the
Tordesilhas Treaty has an internal defense priority, with
other priorities—for external defense—maintained beyond
that historic landmark.” This is also true with regard to
doctrines for troop employment. Alpha Doctrine is the
forces’ number one priority, deserving a clear treatment
when “facing the existence of multiple threats, some of them
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potentially occurring in a short period of time.” Thus,
whether as a result of realism or deep conviction, internal
defense becomes the land forces’ priority, a situation not
immune to the resurgence of autonomies posing serious
risks to the rule of law, whose defense represents the heart
of internal defense.
Incidently, today’s definitions of internal defense would
have had harmful effects in the past, since “there is a fine
line between defining a social movement as a particular
regime’s adversary and defining it as a national enemy.” So,
I asked: “Could the actions of an entire generation of
military commanders identified with the rule of law (as it
stands today) be sufficient guarantee of respect for the
tenuous line between internal defense and public security
operations? Or between both and the difficult task of
maintaining the balance of the Federation?"34
This essay does not evaluate the Army’s performance in
the recent public security crisis. Nevertheless, I will make
some brief comments on three of these cases. During the
military occupation of Rio de Janeiro’s hills and slums in
late 1994 and early 1995, the Army was used by President
Itamar Franco to restore the state’s authority, which at the
time faced grave challenges from organized crime as well as
the corruption and bankruptcy of Rio’s civilian and military
police forces. The armed forces were deployed by the
President on a mission justified by an extremely serious
public security crisis. That did not mean that they were
creating a situation aimed at preserving a political space or
expanding their areas of influence. The military knew that
it was not a police force, and it was not deployed under the
cover of military autonomy. On the contrary, it reluctantly
accepted the mission. It appreciated that there were high
risks due to its lack of preparation and all the problems
involved in the mission’s execution. Thus, it was not
convenient to create a military model to replace the police
forces in crisis. Governors were—and are—responsible for
adopting the necessary public security policies in their
states. Within this context, which did not even remotely
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resemble a civil war, military participation was a legitimate
tool of the rule of law. Moreover, it was the political
authority that determined the military’s withdrawal when
the situation permitted it.35
Early in his administration, President Cardoso deployed
Army troops to regain control of oil refineries occupied by
striking employees, since the incident could have
interrupted oil and gasoline distribution, creating problems
for his economic reform policies. At the time, I noted that:
Military intervention also creates problems for democracy.
President Henrique Cardoso worked according to law when he
decided to use the military, although it still is not clear why he
deployed the [state’s] Military Police. He took that step
without consulting Congress, something not compatible with
the necessary balance among the three branches of
government. His decision raised an important question for
constitutional reform under the title Defense of the State and
Democratic Institutions. It is indispensable that a
congressional commission be given access to all facts involving
the oil refineries. In addition, although the law does not
demand it, Congress should have a say with regard to the
mission the Army received from the President. Nothing
indicates that political power has suffered military pressures,
but employing military forces can cause discomfort, and not
only in Brazil. Recently, the French government deployed
troops to open roads occupied by striking truck drivers. On the
other hand, after the tragedy in Oklahoma City, the American
President intends to use U.S. forces to fight terrorism. We also
need to take into consideration that the Army’s deployment,
because of an exhaustion of conflict resolution mechanisms, is
one of a growing number of responses the federal government
can make in the face of explosive social situations that
challenge the state’s authority and respect for the law.36

The third case, in mid-1997, had to do with the Army’s
intervention in some rebellious [state] Military Police units.
In the absence of effective public security policies by
governors, an institutional crisis involving disobedience
and a lack of legitimacy of local commanders increased
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discontent among soldiers and officers already upset with
their low salaries. Here I observed that:
Another dimension of the crisis in [the state of] Minas Gerais is
linked to the Army’s participation in these events. In strictly
operational terms, everything went fine. Soldiers secured the
governor’s palace and his official residence without any
confrontation with the rebellious forces. But President Cardoso
will have to explain all legal procedures leading to the Army’s
involvement. Since Cardoso was at the time visiting the UN,
Vice-president Marco Maciel accepted the governor’s request,
but did not sign any authorization for the Army’s operations in
Minas Gerais. According to news reports, . . . Chief of Staff
Clóvis Carvalho had signed the order. Was it the perfect
decision—from a legal point of view—capable of generating
sustainable consequences? Did Mr. Carvalho have the
authority (even if delegated) to sign the order? From a political
standpoint, the action is highly inconvenient and disputable, for
the great risks involving a confrontation with the rebellious
forces in Minas Gerais were well known. (What would have
happened if the rebellious forces had gained control over the
MP’s Command? What if they had invaded the governor’s
palace? What would have been the cost—material, human and
institutional—of expelling the rebels?) In discussing these
risks, President Cardoso’s Chief of Military Affairs, General
Alberto Cardoso, says the tragic shot that killed Corporal
Valério was a lucky strike that ended the police rebellion,
avoiding larger problems.37

In all these cases, the fine line between internal defense,
public security crises, and defense of the democratic state
was not clearly drawn. Considering that “defense of a
democratic state” is a much broader concept than the
others—and more compatible with a democratic regime—I
think this will have such a clear and efficient conceptual
treatment that the Army will not risk becoming a “police’s
police,” in charge of controlling critical public security
situations. President Cardoso recently sent a bill to
Congress giving states more latitude in reorganizing their
police units, especially with regard to demilitarization.
Since early 1997, the administration has been studying the
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creation of a National Guard, which would replace Army
troops in missions involving internal order.38
Returning to my thoughts on the “Army’s Strategic
Concept”—and to conclude my remarks on the National
Defense Policy’s internal and national areas of interest—I
would like to say that: “The democratic equation will be
clearly defined when Congress has an active and
responsible role (a) in defining the PDN, through President
Cardoso’s initiative, and (b) when there is a debate (even if
by referendum) on the armed forces’ deployment for
internal and foreign defense." There is, of course, a lack of
conviction over this equation, which can be found neither in
the constitution nor in the predominant mentality of
Congress. So, one must ask: Which lessons has the Army
Staff learned during the crisis involving Military Police
units? Would the creation of a National Guard be an
attempt to preclude the Army’s involvement in internal
crises that could be resolved without using the state
military apparatus? How will they solve the problem of a
continued existence of military influence within Military
Police units, something that the armed forces seemed to
have overcome?39
In spite of the support several governors gave the
President and his plan to reform the police force, Military
Police units intend not only to preserve their functions and
institutional format, but want a direct armed forces
involvement in the fight against drug trafficking. Through
their commanders—and with the support of Justice
Minister Íris Resende—Military Police and Military Fire
Department units “propose that Federal Police and the
armed forces participate directly in combating drug
trafficking and arms smuggling at the country’s borders.”40
As we have seen, however, President Cardoso’s conception
of public security leads in the opposite direction. He recently
emphasized his position by declaring that the armed forces
can only help police units by giving them “support and
infrastructure, and sometimes providing intelligence.” The
Army Minister confirms his government’s willingness to
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help by giving logistical support. About the direct
involvement endorsed by Minister Resende, General
Zenildo Lucena states: “This may be his [Minister
Resende’s] view, but it is not the armed forces’ position.”41
Conclusions.
This essay has not dealt with all of the questions
involving Brazil’s civil-military relations. I have not
discussed legal definitions for the military’s status as “state
employees” that would give its members special treatment
vis-a-vis public employees.42 Neither have I talked about
the establishment of a Defense Ministry, scientific and
technological developments, the Amazon Air Vigilance
System and other issues, though we should expect the
Defense Ministry to be part of the ongoing changes in
civil-military relations. Another topic not analyzed is the
armed forces reequipment efforts promoted by the Cardoso
administration, with foreign resources.43
Our analysis covered only President Cardoso’s National
Defense Policy, because it is a novel idea in Brazil’s
civil-military relations. We have also indicated that this tool
reinforces the President’s willingness to implement the
Defense Ministry next year [1998], an agency that should
have a civilian mentality in dealing with the PDN and should
stimulate a higher degree of professionalism in military
readiness. As for presidential statements (some excerpts are
presented at the end of this essay), we find two simultaneous
features: First, traditional concepts of military doctrine
(including the new National Security Doctrine, with concepts
like “expressions of national power”) are being incorporated,
step by step, into presidential statements, probably because
of the participation by Mr. Cardoso’s military advisors in
preparing his speeches. A more appropriate hypothesis
would be: President Cardoso “makes a speech from the
military to the military,” since it would be easier for the
armed forces to understand this kind of discourse. Second, at
the same time, he makes a political and diplomatic statement
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to the country, although being very discreet when
talking to the people on matters dealing with the military.
We should emphasize that the adoption of the National
Security Policy will lead to important developments in
civil-military relations during the coming decade, for Brazil
intends to climb to a higher level in its international
responsibilities. In other words, diplomats, the military and
President Cardoso are leading the country to adopt a higher
strategic dimension.
As always, Congress has not worked hard in this area.
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APPENDIX
Excerpts of President Fernando Henrique
Cardoso’s Statements on the Armed Forces

Brazil and the World Order.
“. . . Brazil’s real dimension in the international arena
has to be recognized because of its economic stabilization,
its territorial area, the extension of its coast and air space, a
160-million-people market, and the consolidation of the
country’s democracy—all of which make clear our peaceful
projection beyond Latin America and provide us with the
credentials to be an active participant in the world’s
decision-making process. . . . The armed forces have a vital
role in preserving our territorial integrity and supporting
efforts to ma in tai n p ubl i c or d er , as wel l as i n
complementary missions, such as honoring Brazilian
commitments to peacekeeping operations or—as observers
in friendly countries—becoming vectors of my foreign
policy.” (Ceremony honoring General Officers, Brasília,
April 25, 1995)
Armed Forces and Diplomacy.
“The armed forces have broadened their functions, in
accordance with today’s opinion in Brazil. They have—far
beyond attributions determined by the Constitution—
played a civic and humanitarian role, not only within the
country’s territory, in remote border regions, but also
abroad. Their increased participation in UN peace
operations is one of the most important facets of their
modern operations.” (Ceremony honoring Brazilian
Officers, who were members of the UN Military Observers
Corps in the former Yugoslavia. Brasília, July 6, 1995)
“I have mentioned four areas for the employment of the
Brazilian military, where the armed forces must be able to
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answer to the nation. They are: maintaining constitutional
powers and our territorial integrity; participating in peace
operations abroad, with troops or observers; participating
in complementary actions according to government policies;
and supporting activities on behalf of public security.”
(Republic’s Assembly, Lisbon, July 10, 1995)
“These are some ideas that deserve special attention in
your reflections and professional improvement. In a few
words:— harmonization among military readiness,
economic strengthening, and diplomatic action aimed at
keeping the peace;— awareness of the power delegated by
society, and the armed forces responsibility to that same
society; — understanding the consequences of a constant
evolution of the concept of national defense on the
international arena;— a joint effort among services, as the
best foundation for military professionalism. . . .” (Farewell
to “Brazil” School Ship, Rio de Janeiro, May 3, 1996)
“The new international order is so complex that it would
be difficult for a country, no matter how powerful, to
transform itself into an exclusive ‘pole of power.’ What we
see in this new order, which still shows signs of change and
uncertainty as to its direction, is the control of and need for
shared power. . . .We also see the emergence of decisionmaking groups, but with limited power, like the famous G-7,
for example. But they cannot position themselves as a
central committee for decisions at the international level
because they lack a legitimate base. . . . In South America,
we live in one of the most demilitarized regions of the world
and with limited threats to peace. In spite of this, . . . we
have to recognize that some problems . . .still exist . . .for
example, armed groups in neighboring countries and the
even more serious presence of organized crime. . . . Within
this international picture, in which Brazil needs and will
have an even more present voice on worldwide decisions,
we, at the same time, are strengthening our peace policies in
South America, keeping in mind that here we have—for
historical and geographical reasons—a more immediate
interaction with our neighbors, characterized by increased
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integration. We are integrating economically and
culturally, and with a very positive military relationship.”
(Speech to students of the Navy War College’s superior
courses (EGN), Air Force and Army Command and Staff
Schools, and Superior War College (ESG), Rio de Janeiro,
November 23, 1996)
National Defense Policy: Armed Forces and Internal
Order.
“I want to emphasize the role played by the armed forces.
And here I should not speak; I should listen, because you
know better than I do. Today, I would like to say that,
besides the armed forces’ constitutional responsibilities in
facing threats against our sovereignty and social structure,
we have the principle of authority that has to be considered
by our forces. We have to give logistical and intelligence
support to police units fighting drug-trafficking, arms
smuggling, and organized crime that today are
transnational and affect national sovereignty.” (Speech to
Superior War College students. Planalto Palace, Brasília,
June 17, 1996)
“I still want to say that the armed forces are responsible
for an important part of Brazilian scientific production and
that today’s civil-military dialogue is democratic.
Therefore, our concerns should be about broadening
creative abilities and increasingly integrating the military
into the civilian research fields.” (Ceremony introducing
new General Officers, Planalto Palace, Brasília, August 14,
1996)
“In a democracy, a Defense Policy is not a problem for the
military alone, it is also a problem for society and
government. It is obvious that the military is a very active
part of that policy. But Military Policy and Defense Policy
are two different things. The latter is subordinate to the
country’s definitions of what it wants in the international
arena. What are the security requirements that will enable
Brazil to have an international presence within parameters
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mandated by its Constitution?. . . . This is a peaceful
country, but we must have a Defense Policy to assure this
very peace. . . . We are going to make decisions in an
organized spirit. Brazil has a Defense Policy, and this
committee was established so we could have a strategic view
of our objectives, and could attune our presence in the world
knowing what our national interests are and how we are
going to direct them.” (Closing speech on the 6th National
Superior War College Alumni Convention, São Paulo,
September 21, 1996)
Military Profession.
“I have to say and recognize that our armed forces
professionalism allowed that choice to be made through a
selection process created by the military. The President
only endorses a normal process of evaluation. This, in my
opinion, is very important. . . . You are the result of an
analysis made by your peers. Therefore, your promotion to
the rank of General Officer is well deserved. You have been
through a filter of professional qualification, which is the
only one that really dignifies a person. As Chief of State and
Commander of the armed forces, all I can do, at this point, is
symbolically bestow [your new rank] upon you,...doing my
part in this professional and democratic concept that guides
our armed forces.” (Ceremony introducing new General
Officers, December 19, 1996)
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of Naval Warfare (EGN), Army Staff and Command School (ECEME)
and Air Force School (ESG).

64

3. Article 1 of Law No. 9,140 of December 4, 1995: “For all legal
purposes, all those persons listed in Annex I of the present law are
recognized as dead, due to having participated or having been accused of
participating in political activities in the period from September 2, 1961,
to August 15, 1979, and that were detained for that reason by
government agents and that have been missing since then, without any
news from them.” This law establishes the payment of indemnification
to family members of these victims in order to promote national
reconciliation and pacification as stated in the Amnesty Law (August
1979). In September 1997, the Cardoso government paid
indemnification to 43 other families besides those included in Law No.
9,140. The most intensely debated cases were those of the former Army
Captain Carlos Lamarca and the guerrilla leader, Carlos Marighela.
4. Legislation approved by the Legislative Assembly of the state of
Rio Grande do Sul, at the Executive’s initiative, establishes
indemnification for persons subjected to mistreatment by the police
forces of that state during the same period covered by the Law of the
Missing. Sandra Hahn, “RS Promises to Indemnify Those Who Were
Tortured,” Folha de São Paulo, October 24, 1997, pp. 1-8.
5. Former President José Sarney expressed this discontinuity in
military behavior standards in the following way: “The truth is that our
armed forces were victimized by a policy of resentments. They are
permanent institutions and cannot be judged based on occasional
temporary errors by persons.” José Sarney, “What and Whose Defense?”
Ibid., April 25, 1997, p. 2.
6. Eliézer Rizzo de Oliveira, “Os Desaparecidos e a Anistia,” Correio
Popular, August 1 and 11, 1995.
7. The Army, Navy and Air Force ministers kept under control the
military’s concern about the indemnification of the families of those who
had died and disappeared. Colonel (ret.) Jarbas Passarinho, former
head of the ministries of Education, Labor, Welfare and Justice, as well
as an ex-Senator, criticized the government’s solution to this problem in
the following terms: “Defeated by the infamous military dictatorship,
we are rehabilitating them. . . . Our good communists lost the armed
struggle, but it is as if they had won because they gained official
recognition.” Jarbas Passarinho, “Porque Me Ufano,” O Estado de São
Paulo, September 9, 1997, A-2.
8. The Chamber of Foreign Relations and National Defense is in
charge of “formulating policies, establishing directives, approving and
monitoring programs to be established (concerning): 1. international
cooperation in security and defense matters; 2. border integration; 3.
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indigenous populations and human rights; 4. peacekeeping operations;
5. drug trafficking and other offenses with international ramifications;
6. immigration; and 7. intelligence activities.” Decree 1,895 of May 6,
1996.
9. Speech at a ceremony announcing the National Defense Policy,
Planalto Palace, Brasília, November 7, 1996.
10. Federal Deputy José Genuíno, an active member of the National
Defense Commission, is the author of a constitutional amendment
expanding the Legislature’s functions with regard to the National
Defense Policy, which deletes the military mission of preserving law and
order. José Genuíno, “A Política de Defesa Nacional,” O Estado de São
Paulo, June 26, 1997, p. 2.
11. Cardoso’s speech at the signing ceremony for the Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty that was submitted to Congress, June 20,
1997.
12. Alfred Stepan, Os Militares Na Política, Rio de Janeiro:
Artenova, 1975.
13. General Goes Monteiro, A Revolução de 30 e a Finalidade
Política do Exército.
14. On the military’s preparedness for the hypothesis of war with
Argentina, I refer to the testimony by Colonel (ret.) Geraldo Lesbat
Cavagnari Filho, an Army Staff officer: “The military organization of
national defense was not established to carry out a geopolitical project,
nor to sustain an offensive policy. The military force was prepared for
limited purposes, as an answer to immediate requirements in a specific
situation dominated by the East-West conflict and communist
subversion. Therefore, the hypothesis of war that was accepted
expressed a defensive political attitude towards threats that were
considered as real (revolutionary and conventional warfare in South
America) or theoretical (a world war). However, at the level of military
strategy, the offensive principle prevailed under the perspective of not
allowing an internal limit-situation to occur. . . .” Admitting a
medium-level intensity conflict in South America, the Delta Hypothesis
“considered Argentina as the most dangerous potential enemy—and
moreso if it had the potential to lead a coalition including Uruguay and
Paraguay. In such a case, war would be considered a clash of hegemonic
intention on the South American continent, particularly in the
Southern Cone. . . . The war should be conducted offensively so that
decisive results would be achieved in its initial phase to assure favorable
conditions for later negotiations. Furthermore, military operations
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should be kept out of national territory. Otherwise, a cease-fire would
only be accepted after re-establishing territorial integrity.” Geraldo
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Chapter Four
Civil-Military Relations in Latin America:
Pitfalls and Prospects
General Fred F. Woerner (USA Ret.)
Professor, Department of International Relations
Boston University

I would like to thank the organizers for this opportunity
to appear before this distinguished gathering. Just as a
policeman out of uniform no longer issues tickets, so a
retired general no longer commands audiences.
We are undertaking together an extremely important
dialogue. The civil-military relationship constitutes one of
the most important challenges for emergent democracies in
Latin America because it signals the full integration of the
military into democratic society. It further signals the
mutual development by the civilian and military
authorities of missions for the armed forces that address the
role of the military in peace and war within a democratic
context. And, perhaps most importantly, it signals a break
with a historical tradition of military rule and its
replacement by a relatively new pattern in which the armed
forces are subordinated to democratically elected civilian
control. As both Professors Downes and Rizzo de Oliveira
have indicated, the process is well under way. Yet, we
should not underestimate the difficulty of the challenge in
modernizing the civil-military relationship within the
context of the democratic principle. The task requires a
cultural revolution in both civilian and military sectors in
their knowledge of and respect for each other. The rewards
of success and costs of failure are enormous. With success
comes a harmonious civil-military relationship that will
strengthen both institutions (the military and civilian
governance) and will thus further the cause of democracy.
However, failure—or attempts to marginalize the military
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by an unenlightened civilian authority—will once again
place democracy at risk.
We can draw many lessons. I would like to draw on one
case—that of Venezuela in 1992—that I believe is especially
appropriate, because at that time Venezuela had completed
over three decades of democratic rule. And yet, in February
and November, there were two attempted coups. The first
lesson to be learned is that these coup attempts occurred.
They occurred in a country with a long status of democratic
rule. And what this taught us was that under conditions of
political, economic and social stress, a military may step
outside the democratic process in the interest of its
definition of the greater good.
But there was a second lesson of equal importance, and
that is that the coup failed. This instructs us that democracy
is in ascendancy and, though still vulnerable, it now has the
strength and the emergent institutionalization to
withstand threats that in earlier times would have been
fatal.
Yet, for me, the most important lesson is the
third—namely, that the attempted coups were not
overwhelmingly rejected by the populace. This signals to us
the power, the pervasiveness, and the longevity of the
authoritarian tradition.
I believe, however, and I am in agreement with the
outline presented by Dr. Downes, that we are in an era of
virtually unbelievable change—politically, economically
and socially. We perhaps do not fully appreciate the
enormity of this change because of our proximity to it. And
it will a wa it th e jud gment of our c hi l d r en and
grandchildren, who will look on this time as one of the truly
seminal eras in the revolution of governance over the affairs
of mankind. The challenge is enormous, but it is not
impossible. Change in the character of the civil-military
relationship is possible, but it can only be achieved through
the deliberate and conscientious efforts and good faith of
both the civilian community and the military profession.
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And it is precisely that conscientious effort and good faith
that we are embarked upon in this conference.
We normally look at the challenge in terms of threats.
We are schooled in that line of thinking in the military. And
again, Dr. Downs has elaborated for us a series of threats
that are residual in the Western Hemisphere. And Dr. Rizzo
de Oliveira has brought that down to the specifics of Brazil,
when he instructs us that the current Brazilian national
security/defense policy is fundamentally directed against
foreign threat. But I would like to place the threat to
civil-military relations within a somewhat different context,
and that is the context that faces democracies as they
emerge and institutionalize. Because as I compare mature
democracies vis-a-vis less mature democracies, I observe a
fundamental difference: that mature democracies possess
multiple, peaceful alternatives for problem resolution and
deconfliction that are not within the arsenal of emergent
democracies.
Thus, there is a difference in perception in the civilian
communities towards the military. In a mature democratic
environment, civilians look upon us in the military and
wonder how to put us to better use in peacetime in solving
socially relevant challenges. The debate is frequently one of
cost-effective ways of addressing difficult national issues.
In the vernacular, it may be an issue of “getting our money’s
worth out of the military.” In contrast, in emerging
democracies there is a different attitude on the part of the
civilian community: it is one of limiting the military to
protecting national sovereignty and, in particular, national
frontiers and borders. And when not so involved, if they
could have their way, they would confine the military to the
barracks. And in extremis, there are some who would argue
for the elimination of the military institution in the best
interests of the nation.
And so this presents us with a fundamental dilemma as
we consider the expansion of missions for militaries in
emergent democracies during times of peace. What for a
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mature democracy is a more relevant threat analysis and a
refining of the role of the military may represent for
emergent democracies a renewed justification for military
involvement in politics and a threat of a return to
militarism. Thus, mature democracies can use the military
in this broader security environment without concern of
challenge to democratic governance because of the strength
of their political institutions and processes. This luxury may
not be available in emergent democracies. We need look no
further back in our history than to our experience with the
“National Security Doctrine” to establish the validity of this
thesis.
I join with the presenters in optimism with regard to the
progress being made. We know well the numbers. In 1970,
Latin America was characterized by military governments
except in Mexico, Costa Rica, Venezuela and Colombia.
Now democratic regimes rule everywhere except Cuba. We
know that from 1930 to 1976 over 50 percent of the changes
of government were by methods outside and in violation of
national constitutions. But in comparison, since that date
in 1976 (the Peruvian military assumption of power), there
have been only three—if I count correctly—successful coups
d’etat.
The hemisphere is now free to address the future in
terms of its own interest, no longer encumbered by the
external ideologically-based conflict of the Cold War. The
diminished armed threat has reduced the rationale for
military rule. Extremism of both the right and the left is
progressively being marginalized. National elites are
coming to recognize the cost of arbitrary coersion—that it
outweighs the benefits to be realized—particularly as these
elites increasingly view their prosperity and good fortune in
terms of the international marketplace. The left has
displayed a willingness to participate within the democratic
system. In spite of the setback in Ecuador and Peru, we can
make the general observation that Latin American
countries are at peace with their neighbors. Seated
governments are in place, elected by the people. Economies
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are recovering, but still can ill afford capricious military
budgets and spending. There is greater mass mobilization
that has resulted in powerful demands for legitimate
government and civilian rule. And the increased
complexities of the political and economic agenda demand
broadly based expertise that exceeds that which we possess
in our mutual military institutions. Finally, the fact that
the armed forces have played a supportive role in this
movement toward democracy and the strengthening of the
civil-military relationship is also extremely important.
Challenges, however, remain. These would include, but
not necessarily be limited to:

•
•
•
•
•

•

curtailing in selected countries the disproportionate
political power of the military institution;
instilling more broadly and profoundly a sense of
public accountability and willingness to discipline
from within the institution;
providing for adequate and competent oversight by
elected government officials on matters of national
security;
being alert to enlargements of the private economic
activity of the armed forces that perhaps challenge
the rightful place of the civilian sector;
developing from its current state of infancy the joint
definition (“joint” meaning civilian and military,
working together) of roles and missions for our
militaries in this new era of comparative peace;
and, most importantly, continually enlarging the
civil-military dialogue.

I believe that, although there has been remarkable
progress, the civilian sector has in general acted timidly,
and that there is ample opportunity for a strengthening of
civil governance and the proper placement of military
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institutions within civil society. There is an opportunity to
further strengthen that process that is not yet being fully
leveraged by the civilian sector. I think that we in the
military would accept a greater dominance by the civilian
sector than that which we would volunteer. The challenge,
then, is to both of us: For the civilian sector, it is to act wisely
and with competence in the furtherance of its rightful place
as the dominant force in our nations; and for us in the
military, it is to support them in the movement towards this
objective, which will serve our national interest.
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Chapter Five
Armed Forces Missions and the Strengthening
of Democracy in the Americas
Licenciado Luis Tibiletti
President, Ser 2000, Argentina
SUMMARY

The object of my presentation is to analyze which
functions of the armed forces can contribute to improved
civil-military relations as a way of strengthening the
American democracies. To attain that goal, it is first
necessary to stress that my methodology differs from that of
Samuel Huntington, the author of several classic works on
civil-military relations. Huntington’s focus on military
professionalism and the forms of civilian control is based on
the assumption that there is a natural acceptance of the
principle of military subordination to civilian authority by
society as a whole. The problem is that this supposition is
false for the civic culture that is predominant in Latin
America. There the Hispanic origins of the culture and its
institutional history have made civilian control of the
military something that is neither normal nor natural.
Yet now, for the first time, with this latest wave of
regional democratization, the assumption of civilian control
has begun to permeate society’s consciousness, auguring
what could be the permanent stability of the democratic
system.
Another interesting point—following the important
work of Spanish Professor José Antonio Olmeda—is that
the English expression “civil-military” should be translated
into Spanish with the words civil-militares rather than
cívico-militares, since the word cívico alludes to the
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condition of citizens, and that means civilians as well as
those in uniform.
Taking into account yet another linguistic consideration,
we must be very careful about the use of the English word
“support” when discussing the relationship of the armed
forces to democracy. This is because the Spanish term
soporte has two meanings, and neither applied to
civil-military relations contributes to the strengthening of
democracy: The first is that the armed forces endure and
tolerate, but don’t integrate themselves into the democratic
system. The second is that they are the foundation on which
democracy is established. As Alfred Stepan has indicated,
this is incompatible with democracy, which can only be
based on the popular will and not on bayonets, as Napoleon
suggested.
These clarifications being made, I want to talk about
some trends relating to military functions and their
implications for the consolidation of democracy. The recent
huge international changes have confused military
planners all over the world. The redefinition of functions,
roles and missions has been turned into a desperate search
to replace the enemy and permit a return to the intellectual
and strategic placidity of the Cold War.1
There is a very real link between the ways of redefining
functions and the strengthening of democracy. In the first
place, because our Latin American political leaders have
been raised in a patrimonial oligarchical way of conducting
politics, they have systematically refused to exercise, much
less train themselves for, the legitimate state monopoly of
violence. Therefore, everything that had to do with military
functions, including matters related to the police, was
delegated totally to the military. In effect, this amounted to
the renunciation of political leadership and political power.
This explains why intellectuals and politicians who want
to consolidate democracy are unalterably opposed to any
efforts on the part of the armed forces to reassume functions
linked to the monopoly of state violence, such as the
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struggles against narcotrafficking and terrorism. The only
way to prevent a return to “armour-plated democracies” is
by allowing—indeed, impelling —civil society to take that
responsibility upon itself and, through a network of
Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), to demand that
political leaders assume their responsibilities once and for
all.2
The same may be said with regard to military functions
linked to the internal development of the country. We do not
deny that there are states whose weakness prevents them
from integrating their entire national territory, and even
attaining some of their social goals, which may be tempted
to use the armed forces in a “civic action” capacity.
Nevertheless, this is the very opposite of what needs to be
done to strengthen civil society. Without a strong civil
society, democracy is not possible. This may be the most
important lesson for the 21st Century, and we should not
forget it when thinking about the future.
In closing, I would like to outline those military functions
that can help consolidate our democracies. These are based
on a correct interpretation of professionalism, in
Huntington’s sense, and generally coincide with the same
functions performed in the developed states of the First
World. Here we refer to the function of providing the state
with a military instrument in line with the economic
possibilities of the country, and modern in terms of doctrine
and equipment, that can fulfill the traditional mission of
armed vigilance, without excluding the new needs of
cooperative equilibrium with neighbors and shared
responsibility for maintaining world peace.3
Linking this conception of military functions with the
debate on governability and security, I wish to conclude by
indicating some conditions for a possible path towards
higher levels of security, the resetting of the armed forces in
a more expectable position, and the strengthening of
democracy:
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•

•

•

•

•

Assumption on the part of the Latin American
political sectors of the entire responsibility for the
formulation of international security, national
defense and public security policies, abandoning the
comfortable position that “I know nothing about it;
this is a subject for experts.” To renounce the political
core of security is to renounce power.
Consensual definition on the part of the majority
political sectors of each country of that nation’s
security agenda, and subsequently the negotiation of
security agreements starting on subregional levels
and eventually on the hemispheric level.
Subsequent joint identification of interests, threats
and opportunities at the subregional level, thus
removing the geopolitical obstacles to the processes of
integration.
The establishment of mature relations with the
United States, closing the search for leaderships
chosen by the North American power. At the same
time, reinforcement of contacts and political relations
at the level of ministries of defense and foreign affairs,
parliaments and political parties in order to
neutralize the influence of the parallel military
diplomacy of the U.S. Southern Command, which
allows it to carry out its missions without
understanding democracy.
Substantial increase, under the supervision of the
Organization of American States, of cooperation
among all areas of government at the national,
subregional and hemispheric levels that have
responsibility for addressing new threats. These
would include the armed forces, but only in support of
the state’s needs, not allowing them to change the
essence of conflicts.
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•

•

Resolution of the “modernization versus arms race”
dilemma in order to allow all countries to count, in
reasonable proportion, on armed forces that are able
to interoperate—based on the idea of a cooperative
balance—when political systems of security demand
it.
Strengthening all organizations of a political and
diplomatic nature, including NGOs, for conflict
resolution, using their experiences with Contadora,
MOMEP (in the Peru-Ecuador dispute) and Europe
(such as the OSCE or the OSCM). It will thus be
possible to build security with tools suitable for the
nature of regional threats, and not always using
military instruments.

ENDNOTES - CHAPTER FIVE
1. In this sense, we can refer to the “ordering effort” that
Huntington attempted in his famous “clash of civilizations.”
2. As an example, one may cite the important restructuring process
in which the Buenos Aires provincial police force, which is the largest in
the country, is involved. This occurred after the force had reached a
point of collapse as a result of inefficiency and corruption, conditions
which it shared with certain local judicial and political leaders. The
project was devised by politicians and lawyers, and implemented by the
political authorities.
3. Thus, for example, in July 1996 the Argentine Senate
unanimously approved a declaration where this responsibility is
assumed.
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PART THREE
NATIONAL SECURITY AND CIVIL-MILITARY
RELATIONS IN THE 21st CENTURY:
THREE VIEWS FROM LATIN AMERICA
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Chapter Six
Civil-Military Relations in the Americas
for the 21st Century:
A Latin American Perspective
Professor Luis Bitencourt Emilio
Universidade Católica de Brasília

I have been asked to address the topic of this
conference—"Civil-Military Relations in the Americas for
the 21st Century"—from a Latin American perspective.
Although it troubles me that I must attempt to summarize
the complexity of Latin American views on this
issue—which is perhaps an impossible task—at the same
time I feel honored and privileged to have been invited to
talk to you. The invitation was accompanied by the request
that I cover the subject in the shortest time possible.
Besides the natural difficulty of interpreting and
summarizing a Latin American perspective, the topic
involves three additional challenges. The first is the
enigmatic, symbolic and useless (since it only makes sense
as an artificial time marker) expression “21st Century.” In
Latin America, the expression is even more symbolic: we
love to write centuries in roman numerals, either Siglo XXI
or Século XXI. Anyway, the phrase “21st Century” gives the
topic the obscure and mystic quality of the uncertain. And it
gives us, the participants in this conference, the feeling that
we are alchemists or apprentice wizards: we must speculate
on the future and chase away the shadows of the past.
Without the right to consult the oracles, we are invited to
look into the 21st Century.
The second challenge is the delicate issue of
civil-military relations in Latin America. This topic has
provoked mild debate among Latin American political
scientists. However, when the subject is addressed in the
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North, it seems to go beyond the political sciences and into
the terrain of thermo-dynamics: if the issue is discussed in
the North, it provokes heated reactions in the South.
Finally, the subject involves the notion of the
“Americas,” observed from the standpoint of those
interested in ensuring external security and democratic
stability. Moreover, it involves—or implies—the idea that
the military may be a threat to democracy. Regional
security initiatives fuel different perceptions and stimulate
different levels of sensitivity in the Americas. The
combination of an extraordinary power asymmetry with the
lack of serious threats to the region does not inspire Latin
America to reach common security arrangements. Besides,
when the suggestion for such arrangements originates in
the United States it usually arouses reservations in Latin
America. In sum, the mere fact that the United States is the
one proposing the creation of a regional security system
ignites traditional suspicions in Latin American countries.
I will briefly deal with the first two challenges in order to
define a referential framework for these ideas, and will
concentrate more heavily on the last: the Americas within
the context of both the initiative of this meeting and the U.S.
strategy for the region. The first two topics have been
intensively debated in the panels. The third, however,
which is related both to the initiative for this meeting and to
the U.S. strategy for the region (under the broad topic
“cooperative security”), involves the philosophy of
hemispheric relations at a time that is extraordinarily
important for all of us. It is a more palatable issue, and
therefore more adequate for dessert speeches such as this.
Anticipating the agenda for the 21st Century requires
some reflection on the meaning of this temporal mark: 21st
Century. Some, like Stephen Jay Gould, try to identify the
exact starting point of the century—whether it will be in the
year 2000 or 2001—and they are seriously concerned about
this issue. Others, such as Peter Drucker or Alvin Toffler,
whose concerns about the future have assured that they do
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not have to concern themselves about their future—at least
financially—understand that the 21st Century has already
started. For them, recent global changes (such as the end of
the Cold War, the technological revolution, and the
globalization of the economy) have been so profound that
the temporal mark 21st Century has been anticipated by
events. Both, of course, have a planetary vision that is quite
selective in terms of where to apply their conclusions. I can
only imagine how true those conclusions would be for some
of the planet’s inhabitants—the majority, in fact (and
specifically in Latin America)—whose only temporal
references are the scars from their daily struggles to
survive.
What can we expect of the future? Santayana taught us
to respect history. Pessimists look upon the past and talk
about the inevitability of conflict and war. Their argument
is the frequency of wars. In contrast, optimists look upon the
past and anticipate the inevitability of cooperation and
peace. Their argument is the horror provoked by wars.
Researcher’s caution suggests moderation, and advises us
to respect the logic of the pessimists’ argument while at the
same time recognizing the need —albeit idealistic—for
peace and cooperation. But it also suggests that we not
seek—whether as realists or idealists, pessimists or
optimists—in an uncertain and malleable future, an escape
from the present. In my native town of Ponta Grossa, in
southern Brazil, we thought we had solved this problem.
We had a motto we proudly displayed in all public buildings:
“Ponta Grossa: Here the Future is Today!” This was an
inspirational phrase for a while, until someone destroyed
the illusion by writing underneath: “If here the future is
today, then this is a city without a future.”
Scholars—both realists and idealists—failed to predict
the end of the Cold War in spite of the sophistication of their
academic analyses. They are now recovering from their
intellectual hangover. And as they avoid this uncomfortable
near past, they draft theses looking towards the future. In
the prolific U.S. academic environment—where ideas may
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be totally wrong but have the power of resonating the world
over—there are now emerging the first intellectual spasms
pushed by a need to create a new defense strategy. The first
of these arose from idealistic defense circles, still
intoxicated with the celebration of victory in the Cold War.
It is the end of history, Francis Fukuyama assured us as he
predicted a peaceful future, guaranteed by democracies
which do not go to war against each other. But this
idealist/pacifist argument, immediately echoed by the
supporters of the democratic peace, was threatening to
those interested in maintaining high defense budgets and to
arms industry CEOs—all clever psychologists of fear.
McDonald’s and Coca Cola stockholders—convinced that
where liberal democracy has installed their enterprises
there can be no war—could celebrate (probably by
engorging fast food). But Boeing or Raytheon stockholders
could not do the same. The argument of a peaceful future
has inspired the mathematicians of the defense budget, who
are now interested not in squaring the circle but in
triangulating the Pentagon.
For some Latin American militaries, concerned with
reinforcing or at least preserving their shrinking military
budgets, Fukuyama became an “F—- word.” For some who
read his article “The End of History,” made famous in
National Interest, Fukuyama’s ideas were perfectly in
agreement with themes previously suggested by Lyndon La
Rouche. The latter, who had never reached any political or
literary standing in the United States, found a certain
echo—fortunately short-lived—among some sectors in
Latin America. These elements were concerned about the
possibility of a U.S. conspiracy to transform the armed
forces in the region into law enforcement agencies. For these
sectors, Fukuyama’s words about the reduction of tension
and the reasons for conflict fit like a glove the alleged U.S.
strategy to dismantle and demoralize Latin American
armed forces.
Soon, however, it was discovered that the glove, as in the
O. J. Simpson trial, did not fit the hand. Consequently, La
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Rouche’s conspiracy theory was forgotten. In reality, its
acceptance was based on a hypothesis of causal, sequential
stupidity that was extremely difficult to verify: First, Latin
Americans had to be incredibly stupid to accept such an
idea; and, second, Americans had to be utterly stupid to
articulate it. On the one hand, the scheme—if it
existed—revealed an absolute ignorance of Latin American
realities, including those relating to the region’s armed
forces. On the other hand, to be successful, it was totally
dependent upon a premise of Latin American stupidity.
Third, Americans and Latin Americans had to be
simultaneously stupid; the former for believing in the
stupidity of the latter, and the latter for believing in the
stupidity of the former. At this point, I think we have had
enough stupidity.
Casper Weinberger injected new blood into the realist
side by dramatically invoking the phantom of the Third
World War: a war that will have no veterans, as Walter
Mondale reminded us. Also, Professor Zbigniew Brzezinski
appeared on the scene to torment both critics of geopolitics
and newspaper editors; the critics because they believed
that geopolitics was out of fashion, the editors because they
had to cope with misspellings of his name. Brzezinski called
attention to the permanent importance of European
geo-strategy (since that region is still the axis of the world)
in the future blueprint of international relations. The
influential and alluring Samuel Huntington, for his part,
tried to drive U.S. policymakers’ attention to the rapid
identification of a super enemy, as a way of avoiding the
erosion of U.S. national influence. Soon, he found this
catalytic enemy in a clash, not among nations but rather
civilizations: an argument magnificently written—as
usual—but with arguable logic—also as usual.
In Latin America, we have been watching this debate
from the sidelines; we have more pressing domestic
economic and political problems. Paradoxically, our literary
heroes are not found in the realm of political science but
rather in fiction. We lean more towards the sinfully
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romantic, and we find more delight, even in the hard terrain
of politics, in nostalgic prose and poetry than in academic
writings. Authors such as Octavio Paz, Pedro Nava or Jorge
Luis Borges had a greater political impact than any purely
political writer in the region. Names such as Kissinger—a
Cold War strategist with a heavy mixture of realist
intellectualism and cynical geo-political surrealism—do not
fill our bookshelves. We celebrate the end of the Cold War
more as distant spectators than as participants.
For us in Latin America, the main impact of the Cold
War, with its profound implications for civil-military
relations, was the generation of internal conflicts fueled by
subversion. Many of our countries were unwillingly
transformed into theaters of operation for the larger
conflict. Consequently, the first step towards understanding civil-military relations in the Latin America of the
21st Century is to detail the distortions provoked by the
Cold War in our internal politics. Failing to take into
account those distortions, as well as the fluid nature of the
political transitions still underway, is a recipe for analytical
disaster.
Therefore, within Latin America the Cold War is more
remarkable for its indirect than its direct effects; more
remarkable for the sequels than for the disease. It basically
created a propitious environment for the installation and
support of authoritarian regimes. Not that the military had
not taken power—and even shown some appetite for
political power—before in Latin America, but in this case
communist subversion allied itself with its visceral enemy,
the “Americanist” counter-subversion, to arrive at an
unprecedented institutionalization of military regimes.
Hence, we can easily understand where the concern with
civil-military relations comes from, which is the second
challenge this conference poses.
To begin with, we must recognize that the expression
“civil-military relations” is no more than a convenient
euphemism to hide our true concern. The critical point is not
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in the understanding of civil-military relations in the
region, but rather in the evaluation of the prospects for the
subordination of the armed forces to the political authority.
Thus, our first step is to understand how the militaries
conform to—accept and support—the decisions made in the
political spheres in their own countries.
In fact, this effort to coin a palatable euphemism,
“civil-military relations,” has created indigestion in military
stomachs through the promotion of the civil-military
dichotomy. Such a dichotomy is both militarily undesirable
and methodologically ineffective. The militaries in the
region do not feel detached from their societies, or from the
civilians. Rather, they feel they belong to society (some
militaries believe they even belong more than civilians), and
they are “uniformed civilians,” as some like to say. Even the
Argentine armed forces, which were considered elitists until
a few years ago, are not considered such any longer.
By the same token, from the methodological point of view
the division between civilian and military is ineffective
because the problem does not lie in the posited division, but
in the degree of subordination of the military to the political
authority. In surveys conducted in the region, the militaries
are often among those groups enjoying the highest ratings
from public opinion. Therefore, “civil-military relations” are
not problematic; the problem lies in the relations of the
state’s political sphere, which involve policy-making,
whereas the role of the armed forces is instrumental—that
is, to carry out those decisions.
As I said before, this is the central issue of the
conference, and I will not stop to analyze it. This would
mean repeating much of what we have been discussing in
the panels. So far, I have tried to position and clarify my
argument. Now, I would like to return to the motive
underlying the interest in understanding civil-military
relations. First, we must recognize that the basic motive for
such an interest is idealistic: to create a universe of peaceful
nations capable of negotiating their differences in an
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orderly fashion and doing business. This is an attractive
image, and democracy has been identified as the
cornerstone for the creation of this peaceful universe.
One of the obstacles to making this idyllic image
concrete lies in the apparently endless desire of the military
to participate in the political banquet. Theoretically, the
military should be an instrument of the state, thus of the
political authority, the latter being the only valid
interpreter of the society’s will. Only the political power,
under a clear perception of necessity, can decide on the
activation of the military.
On the topic of the role of the armed forces vis-a-vis
society, I am opposed to an idea commonly espoused by
military schools: namely, that the armed forces are basic
societal institutions. The Ecuadoran General Paco
Moncayo, for example, wrote an excellent and informative
book, Armed Forces and Society (which I strongly
recommend to all those who desire to understand how the
militaries in the region see themselves and their respective
societies), where he describes generically and historically
the role of the armed forces and analyzes their importance
in Latin America. In this book, he offers a number of
arguments to characterize the role and relevance of the
armed forces. I just disagree with his first line. Mirroring
ideas common to many militaries in the region, he states
that the “armed forces are a basic institution of the state, no
matter their organization, level of development, form of
government or historical or cultural tradition.”
I do not believe the armed forces are a basic institution of
the state. If that were the case, General Moncayo would not
have needed to write an entire book to justify the need for
and relevance of the armed forces. However, I do believe
that this is a common perception among the military in
Latin America. I prefer, though, to consider that the armed
forces are an important institution of the state. In some
cases, they even preceded the creation of the state—as
Moncayo demonstrates—in historical circumstances.
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However, the state is not defined—as would be the case if
the armed forces were basic institutions—by the existence
of its armed forces. There are states that have no armed
forces, and are no less important or less respected. I would
accept further that in Latin America the role of the armed
forces goes well beyond the classical concept of protecting
sovereignty. The Latin American armed forces wield a
unifying power in the state. They have had a role in the
construction of the nationality of Latin American countries.
They are at once social and socializing tools, given the
characteristics of Latin American societies. These
important features, however, do not turn them into “basic”
institutions of the state.
The objective of my counterargument is to show that
societies have responsibility in the definition of the
missions, roles and limits of their armed forces. Also,
societies must continually pressure their armed forces to
reflect on their roles at the service of their societies. Both
armed forces and societies have responsibility in defining,
reviewing, and updating these roles. Societies concerned
with armed forces and defense mean societies informed on
armed forces and defense. And informed societies demand
the existence of think tanks, independent research
institutions, and defense research projects promoted and
sponsored by the armed forces themselves. Mainly, societies
educated on national security matters have a greater
awareness of the roles of their armed forces, and of the
potential deviations that may transform them into
oppressors rather than defenders of society.
Specifically, in the case of the military, I believe that
Clemenceau was not being ironic in his oft-repeated phrase:
“War is too serious a matter to be left to the military.”
Indeed, the decision to submerge the nation in armed
conflict must involve the society as a whole. The military is
only a part of society; it receives from the society an
instrumental mission to defend society. It is an instrument
of the institutionalized coercion of the state—as Weber
would say—but merely an instrument—as I dare to say.
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Furthermore, and for that reason, the nature of military
decisions does not mix well with the negotiation and
compromise that are the essence of political decisions, at
least in the purposely diffuse and unclear sphere of
democratic decisions. The art of politics lies in the arena of
the possible and negotiable. Military art lies in discipline
and obedience. Political action involves consultation and
interpretation. Military action involves readiness and
response to command. The political gesture represents the
will of the society. The military gesture represents the
sovereign decision of the state, as interpreted by its political
authority.
That is the theory. In practice, in our region military
intervention in the political sphere—on behalf of the most
diverse motives—has been more the rule than the
exception. This is why we must make exceptional efforts to
try to understand that dynamic. This is especially
important for those who—because they believe in the
peaceful vocation of democracies—are concerned about
securing peace in the Americas. Also, this is why we are
concerned about the preservation of this exceptional
moment in the history of the Americas. This is a remarkable
moment, be it because of the existence of thirty-three
democracies or the relatively peaceful nature of the
strategic environment. Therefore, it is understandable that
this is the basic motivation for the U.S. strategy in the
region.
Nevertheless, two problems endure. First, not all Latin
American militaries necessarily share these idealistic
visions—in fact many believe that the military has and
should have an effective moderating and controlling power
over political misdeeds. We cannot deny—and this has been
made clear not only in this conference but in others on the
same topic—that there are many differences between the
North American vision and the different Latin American
visions on the role of the military inside their own states.
There are differences related to the position of the armed
forces within their respective states. There are differences
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in the understanding of the specific functions of the armed
forces. There are differences in the political and
institutional contexts of the various countries. Particularly,
there are gigantic differences in the missions within the
purely operational contexts of the armed forces.
Second, Latin Americans usually view North American
security initiatives with considerable mistrust. Some see
them as merely self-seeking, episodic and intrusive in the
interests and autonomy of the countries in the region.
Others see them as simplistic and incapable of
distinguishing and understanding regional peculiarities.
César Sereseres, for instance, in a biting comment in a
sy mposiu m promoted by SOU TH COM i n 1994,
characterized U.S. strategic interest in the region as merely
marginal. He suggested that a Latin America free of
conflicts is important for the United States only to the
extent that it allows the U.S. to focus on more important
interests in Europe, Asia and the Middle East. Similarly,
the Brazilian general, Gleuber Vieira, also at that
symposium, noted that:
the interests of the U.S. are basically oriented towards their
more important partners and extra-continental threats, not
towards Latin America. . . . . Latin Americans cannot reasonably
expect that somebody in Washington will be more sensitive to
the problems in the region than to their interests in the Middle
East, Russia, the Balkans, the Far East or North Korea. Nobody
should be surprised at the difficulty the U.S. finds in identifying
and assessing the wide spectrum of multidimensional domestic
challenges faced by Latin America.

I will now deal with the third and last point, which is also
the largest challenge. Is it possible, in the area of
international security, to create an identity for the
Americas based on a democratic ideal when the initiative for
this combined effort comes from the United States? Is it
possible to break the mistrust of accidental allies
(accidental because they happen to share the same
hemisphere) regarding the sponsor of the initiative? An
initiative that, on the one hand, obviously meets the
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strategic interests of the United States, but that, on the
other, seems to meet Latin American interests as well.
For understandable reasons, many countries have
preferred to define their policies contrary to those of the
United States. From the point of view of intellectual
structures that inspire strategic defense initiatives in the
North and South of the hemisphere, it seems that either the
United States and Latin America have been working in
opposite directions or are suffering from an acute timing
problem. By using the same idealistic and realistic
paradigms mentioned above, it is possible to see a curious
inversion in the political defense definitions in the
Americas. In the past, the realism of U.S. policies taught
Latin Americans—culturally, sociologically, and
emotionally deeply idealistic peoples—to be mistrustful . . .
and realistic vis-a-vis U.S. initiatives. Presently, the new
U.S. security initiatives towards the region (like those that
led to the Defense Ministerials in Williamsburg and
Bariloche)—intensely impregnated with idealistic
values—face a wary Latin America . . . as a consequence of
the realism that we were made to learn.
The result of these Latin American positions,
constructed against the flow of U.S. initiatives, is the
definition of reactive and essentially negative agendas.
“Negative agendas” help protect smaller powers’ interests
in their relationships with hegemonic powers. This is only
true, however, when the strategic environment is static or
stable, as it was during the Cold War. Everything changes
when the characteristics of the strategic environment
change, as they changed after the end of the Cold War. The
difficulty with negative agendas is that they may cause us to
miss opportunities for cooperation in areas where interests
may eventually converge or be negotiable. In a situation of
change in the global strategic environment, this negative
position taken a priori may lead to isolation and loss of
autonomy, also a priori. And the ones that lose the most are
the weaker actors, not the stronger.
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Within our hemisphere, there are three other factors
complicating the construction of this strategic paradise.
First, the changes in the international system are not yet
consolidated. Many inertial forces from the old strategic
system are still alive. These forces affect U.S. policies as
well as multilateral organizations, most of them created to
ensure the stability of the old system. In short, the bipolar
system was dissolved, but we are still in the process of
transition to a system whose features and time of arrival
nobody can predict. Second, the United States, the
remaining power from the bipolar system, is in our
hemisphere; the U.S. is our neighbor. As a global actor, the
United States feels it must articulate its leadership on a
global scale. As the sponsor for a new security agenda, based
on regional cooperation, the U.S. has the respect of the
countries in the region, who are after all its allies in regional
multilateralism. At the same time, though, the United
States also causes distrust among those same partners.
Third, in the domestic environment of several Latin
American countries, where the memories of a very recent
authoritarian past are still fresh, effects of the previous
regimes still persist. Notwithstanding the democratizing
wave in the hemisphere, in many countries the democratic
model is still not broadly consolidated. At the same time,
urgent internal demands, particularly those of a social
nature, do not allow these countries to focus on issues of
international security.
Thus, the regional situation, including the North
American initiative proposing a new regional security
agenda and the corresponding caution of Latin Americans,
can be comically depicted as a condominium of apartments.
The apartments are different, and the families that live
there have different problems. On the penthouse live two
very rich families, one particularly powerful, with interests
and investments in many other neighborhoods. The other
dwellers, however, are facing serious difficulties, especially
financial. Overall, the relationship among the dwellers is
friendly, but there have been arguments here and there,

97

apart from some domestic conflicts that ended up spilling
over into other apartments. The poorer residents have
mixed feelings toward their rich neighbor. On the one hand,
they admire his success, his apartment, his televisions and
cars. On the other hand, they hold old grievances. They
complain of his arrogance and past insistence on imposing
his points of view on the condominium. They also complain
of his persistent mania for interfering in domestic disputes
within some apartments: as we all know, it is best not to
interfere in family arguments.
For a long time, our rich and powerful penthouse
neighbor was engaged in a heated dispute with a resident on
the other side of the street. This resident, who was also a
powerful and tough guy, had a curious fixation on the color
red. He had a strange compulsion for painting everything
red. Besides, he never missed opportunities to show his
aversion towards our neighbor, and built a huge wall
around his property. The two sides were always threatening
and arguing with each other. At a given time, the conflict
rose to such levels that it echoed over the entire building.
Then, prodded by the rich penthouse neighbor, most of the
apartments became entirely dominated by the husbands,
who established authoritarian rule within their respective
families. Husbands, it was assumed, would be more capable
of resisting the other neighbor’s attempts to have our
apartments painted red. Finally, after a long time, the
tensions subsided, and the dictatorial rule of the husbands
was replaced by a more participatory decision-making
process. More recently, the resident across the street went
bankrupt and gave up the fight with our penthouse
neighbor. Even his huge wall fell, dismantled.
The problems in our condominium did not end, however.
Imagine that there is a heated discussion in one of these
apartments. There is not enough money to pay for the
children’s school. A big hospital bill is on the table. The wife
complains about the husband because he is not making
enough money. The husband complains about the wife
because she is not helping. The dinner has been burned.
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The baby is crying. Just then, somebody knocks on the door:
it is the rich neighbor. He has come to invite the couple to a
meeting in two hours to discuss a new security system for
the building.
It is easy to imagine how difficult it is for the couple to
feel any sympathy for the rich neighbor’s initiative. In the
back of their minds, the owners of that chaotic apartment
believe that a new security system may be useful, even
necessary, for the future . . . . But right now?
This is not the most opportune time for Latin Americans
to define a regional defense agenda. In particular, it is not
the best time to define concerns about civil-military
relations, especially at the encouragement of the United
States. However, if politics is the art of the possible,
strategic politics should be the art of the impossible. There
is a growing sense in the region that, despite difficulties and
suspicions, the opportunity we now have to define a
productive defense agenda may not be repeated. As for the
U.S. initiative, the central point is that, independently of
the reasons that led the United States to present the
proposal in this shape, this is the first time we have been
presented with an open agenda, and the proposal includes
our participation in the definition of the agenda itself. On
the one hand, this means that the U.S. recognizes that
solutions for regional problems cannot be imposed; the
design and implementation of possible solutions depend on
the participation of the Latin American countries. On the
other, it implies responsibilities for Latin American
countries. For us, this is a precious moment, with profound
implications for our aspirations for the next century. To
define what we Latin Americans want of this moment is
fundamental and urgent.
To summarize, as I reflected on “Civil-Military Relations
in the Americas for the 21st Century” I posed three
fundamental themes: l. The future is unpredictable, but the
present suggests the need for new conceptual defense
structures both domestically and for the hemisphere. 2. The
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real concern with the military in Latin America does not lie
in civil-military relations, but in the subordination of the
military to the political authority as a way of preserving the
fledgling democracies in the region. In that sense, more
important than ensuring the obedience of the military is
ensuring the participation of society in the political
definition of the role of the armed forces. 3. With respect to
the recent U.S. initiatives for cooperative security
arrangements, including concerns about the preservation of
democracies, I accepted the vast difficulties that lie in the
enormous asymmetry of power in the region. In particular, I
underscored what I see as the Latin American countries’
responsibilities, which are implicit in their participation in
the design of the new security agenda. And I gave two
reasons for this: 1. in spite of the fact that the new security
agenda is being pushed by the United States, the agenda is
open; and 2. the global strategic moment is characterized by
a rearrangement of forces and, as such, it has opened some
windows for productive cooperation. It is therefore essential
that Latin Americans participate in the process. To
paraphrase a well-known saying, this is a U.S. initiative,
and the U.S. is a friend of Latin America . . . whether we like
it or not.
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Chapter Seven
The Colombian Army in the 21st Century
Major General Manuel José Bonett Locarno
Commanding General, Colombian Armed Forces
SUMMARY

Major General Bonett presented his vision of what the
Colombian Army should be in the 21st Century. He began
by admitting that his country has a lot of problems.
However, he said that it also had a lot of natural resources
and potential, and that by the year 2020 most of those
problems would be solved and the country would be living in
peace. In the years ahead, the Army would focus on a
number of distinct roles:
1. The defense of democracy. A prerequisite for this role is
the defense of national security, broadly defined. The
protection of democracy, he said, is attained through the
protection of the population and civil society. This includes
the defense of national sovereignty and culture, national
borders, frontiers, natural resources, and the survival of
ethnic groups. Civilian authorities must be properly
elected. In the 21st Century, he argued, it was almost
unthinkable that there would be undemocratic countries in
the hemisphere. Any country that reverted to dictatorial
rule would find itself isolated.
2. Respect for human rights and the opinion of the
international community. Bonett said that there could not
be democracy and peace without human rights. Moreover,
he argued that Colombia’s internal conflicts (wars) could
not be won without the support of the population, and that
was dependent on respecting human rights. Therefore, the
military forces of the 21st Century had to be both
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academically educated and practically trained to respect
human rights.
3. Combatting the trafficking in illegal drugs. Bonett
said that he did not know which was worst, the social
pen etration a n d c or r up ti on that c omes f r om
narcotrafficking or the violence and subversion of
democratic institutions. But he also noted that, beyond
these problems, narcotrafficking can lead to confrontation
between allied nations. He said that Colombia had paid a
heavy price for its involvement with drugs, not only with
regard to the above domestic ills, but in terms of its relations
with other countries. Colombia had become a suspect
nation, the target of all blame. Yet, he argued that without
the demand/consumption from the developed countries the
problem would not exist. This is not to deny Colombian
responsibility in these matters, but it is important to
emphasize that we are all responsible for fighting this
scourge. He said that the military could help by destroying
illegal crops, educating the populace against drug use, and
avoiding repression in its counterdrug operations. He
concluded that drug trafficking was a national security
threat that weakened military as well as civilian
institutions.
4. Respect for the environment and conservation. Bonett
pointed out that economic development, though entailing
obvious benefits, also has created environmental hazards
such as air pollution, the destruction of vegetation and
water resources, and the changing of climate patterns. He
said that the military could help solve these problems by
planting trees, creating natural parks, recuperating water
resources, and assisting in other civic works. He speculated
that in the next century the armed forces might become
more deeply involved in such activities. If there were fewer
military conflicts, there would presumably be more
opportunities and resources available to engage in such
missions. Nature conservation, he opined, could become one
of the military’s biggest challenges.
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5. Multinational cooperation. Major General Bonett said
that multinational military cooperation could help defuse
tensions and improve security in various regions. In the
21st Century, he noted, poor countries could ill afford to
spend precious monies and resources to fight their
neighbors. Multinational forces must be organized to help
resolve conflicts without violating national borders or
sovereignty. Such forces, he noted, would not be acting out of
selfish national interests, but would be reacting in
compliance with a mission agreed upon in the United
Nations or other international fora.
6. Improving the quality of life. Bonett averred that
poverty is perhaps the greatest threat to Colombia today. It
is largely responsible for narcotrafficking and organized
crime. The military must use its resources to support
socioeconomic and cultural development through the
construction of roads, schools, hospitals, sports areas, parks
and other installations, and by serving as role models for
Colombian youth. The key for the next century, he said, will
be education and the quality of life. Of critical importance
will be the re-enforcement of the nuclear family.
7. Scientific improvement. The 21st Century, he
declared, will be a century of high technology. Those who do
not have access to this will not be able to compete.
Therefore, the military must use its resources and
organization to support the government in developing
national education and research programs.
In conclusion, Bonett said that the soldier of the future
will be a soldier-citizen who will have problem-solving skills
in a broad range of activities. He/she must be able to
implement policies in a nonviolent manner if at all possible,
respecting human rights and promoting democracy, social
justice, and national sovereignty and well-being.
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Chapter Eight
The Peace Process in Guatemala1
Brigadier General Víctor Manuel Ventura Arellano
Vice-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Guatemala
SUMMARY

Brigadier General Ventura Arellano began by noting
that the end of the Cold War had provided an impetus for
defusing internal conflicts in countries that had long been
immersed in the East-West struggle. With the lowering of
international tensions and the discrediting of armed
struggle as a strategy for taking power, it had been possible
for Guatemala to put an end to 36 years of violent conflict.
He traced the process of negotiations from the initial
contacts with the Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional
Guatemalteca (URNG) to the signing of the final
agreements on the implementation and verification of the
peace accords in December 1996.
Ventura Arellano then went on to discuss the actual
implementation of the agreements. He said there were 3
stages in the process: 1. 15 January through 14 April 1997;
2. 15 April through 31 December 1997; and 3. 1998 to the
year 2000. During the first months of 1997, the government
began implementing those programs dealing with displaced
populations, including the return of refugees from Mexico
and local development projects designed to integrate the
returnees in their communities. The demobilization and
disarming of the URNG was begun in early March, with the
deployment of the U.N. Mission’s military cease-fire
verification team. Almost 3,000 ex-combatants were
registered in 8 camps, where they went through orientation
and job training programs. On 3 May, the U.N. team
delivered to the Guatemalan government its report on the
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number of arms turned in, and the cease-fire was finalized.
In spite of this, some 400 ex-combatants remained in
temporary shelters, while employment opportunities were
created for them. It was expected that they would be
relocated by the end of the year. He also said that
consultations had been held with organizations in civil
society in an effort to identify and aid human rights victims.
Included in these efforts were provisions for socioeconomic
and psychological assistance.
In addition, Ventura reported that by the end of 1997 the
Guatemalan military would be reduced by a third. (This
included the mobile military police, which had already been
demobilized.) By that time, also, legal initiatives would be
presented which would provide the basis for redefining the
state’s intelligence mechanisms. Other measures designed
to strengthen civilian authority and the functioning of the
military in a democratic society included: the disbanding of
the Comités Voluntarios de Defensa Civil (deemed
necessary to lower tensions and build the trust necessary to
facilitate the peace process); training programs to help
reinsert demobilized military personnel into civilian life;
the transfer of the Department of Arms and Munitions
Control (which is responsible for regulating the possession
and bearing of arms) to the Ministry of Interior, and the
strict limitation of the military’s role in this area to giving
advice on matters endangering national security; armed
forces modernization, including downsizing and
educational and doctrinal reforms, to enable the institution
to adjust to changing national and international
circumstances; reforms in the military justice system to
allow ordinary courts to try cases involving armed forces
personnel who commit common crimes; pending reforms in
the terms of military service; changes in intelligence
operations (also pending), which would limit the role of
military intelligence to military functions, establish a
Department of Civil Intelligence and Information Analysis
in the Ministry of Interior, and create legislative oversight
mechanisms; and efforts to provide greater opportunities
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for women in the military at all levels, including their
admission to the Politechnical School, the alma mater of the
armed forces.
Ventura Arellano went on to talk about the impact of the
peace accords. He said that one of the areas in which they
had greatest impact was in the significant improvement in
the human rights situation. He also noted that they had a
noticeable effect in strengthening civilian institutions,
which would permit the consolidation of the democratic
process. At the same time, he claimed, the military had not
been weakened. Rather, freed from the responsibility of
conducting counterinsurgency operations, it would have
more resources at its disposal to support the police, if
necessary, in maintaining public order, as well as to
participate in U.N. peacekeeping operations. Finally, he
said that the restoration of peace had led to the discovery of
other serious national problems that had been ignored
during the civil war. Guatemala was now trying to overcome
those problems with the support of the international
community.
In conclusion, Brigadier General Ventura made three
points: First, strengthening the security of the citizenry is a
fundamental prerequisite for obtaining the stability that
the peace process requires. This can be accomplished
through the professionalization of the Civilian National
Police, the strengthening of human rights, the creation of a
culture of respect for law and democracy, and, above all, the
acceleration of the modernization and strengthening of the
justice sector. In order to avoid a vacuum of authority, the
armed forces will support the Civilian National Police, in
fulfillment of a governmental decision, until the police have
the capacity to maintain order themselves.
Second, stability and governability are preconditions for
productive investment and social development. The
government will continue making investments in rural
areas in order to generate the conditions needed to attract
private investment, both national and foreign, which is the
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generator of productive employment. It will also continue
making the efforts necessary to assure the quantity and
quality of government social expenditures established by
the accords. The military, he said, would faithfully carry out
its mission emanating from expected constitutional
reforms, thus contributing to the country’s governability
and stability.
Finally, the military is waiting for those constitutional
reforms, such as the constitutive law of the Army and other
legal modifications derived from the peace accords, so that it
can properly impl ement them, ther eby p ubl i c l y
demonstrating its complete desire to support the
strengthening of the civilian authority in a culture of
peaceful coexistence.
ENDNOTE - CHAPTER EIGHT
1. This chapter is based on BG Ventura Arellano’s paper, “The
Peace Process in Guatemala,” rather than on his speech, which was a
considerably abbreviated version of the former.
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PART FOUR
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS
AND U.S. POLICY:
A U.S. MILITARY PERSPECTIVE
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Chapter Nine
The U.S. National Guard and State to State
Partnership:
Implications for Latin America
Major General William J. Jefferds, Ed.D.,
(ARNGUS Ret.)
Special Assistant to the Chief,
U.S. National Guard Bureau
and
Colonel Robert B. James
Director of International Affairs
U.S. National Guard Bureau
SUMMARY

Introduction.
Major General Jefferds began the presentation by
briefly discussing the roles and missions of the National
Guard. He noted that there are over 500,000 Army and Air
National Guardmen and women located in more than 3,000
communities in the 50 states and other U.S. territories.
Guard personnel have been in every military engagement
the United States has been involved in since its inception.
The Guard even preceded this country as an institution.
Jefferds explained that, although the Guard is an
integral part of the Army and Air Force, its units stay under
the command of the governor of each territory until they are
federalized by the President of the United States to perform
federal missions. The Guard, he said, has three missions:
First, it has a federal mission where it is an integral part of
the Army and Air Force, and its units serve on active duty.
As an example, he cited the Guard presence not only in
Bosnia, but in 68 countries around the world. Second, it has
a state mission in which it is responsible to the governor.
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Here, he mentioned disaster relief. He said that in the state
of California, where he used to command the Army National
Guard, there were four seasons—fires, floods, earthquakes
and riots—and the Guard had been actively dealing with all
these problems for many years. Third, there is its local
mission. Guard personnel serve in civilian roles—as
teachers, lawyers, doctors, truck drivers and salespeople—
in the communities where they live. In this sense, they
represent mainstream America.
Jefferds said that the National Guard was very proud of
its many programs. One of the most unique and newest of
these was started under former Secretary of Defense
William Perry, as part of an operation called “Preventive
Defense,” and then passed on to the current Secretary of
Defense, William Cohen. “Preventive Defense” covers many
areas, but one of the most important involves the
development of partnerships between individual U.S. states
and various foreign countries. At that point, Jefferds
yielded the floor to Colonel James, who went on to discuss
the Guard’s State Partnership Program in detail.
The State to State Partnership Program.
Colonel James said that the origins of the program,
which began in 1992, came from a request by Lithuania to
the Department of Defense to help in the creation of a
military based on the principle of civilian control. DOD
turned to the National Guard Bureau for help, and the
result was what you see today.
James explained that the National Guard, in its
international programs, seeks to capitalize on the unique
role of its citizen-soldiers. It does this through an aggressive
program of engagement, both in the United States and
abroad. Through its State to State Partnership Program,
the Guard links U.S. states with foreign nations in an
attempt to establish broad ties of cooperation between the
two sides. In the process, personal and institutional
relationships are developed at all levels of society. He said
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that they had found that the interpersonal relationships
that they have developed are as important as the
institutional ones. He also said that the Guard, in its
relations with other countries, tries to build on those things
that it does in its federal and state missions. He used the
example of disaster relief. The idea of using the Guard’s
missions to help its foreign partners was an important part
of the State to State Partnership Program.
Colonel James explained that the purpose of the
program was to promote the National Security Strategy of
the United States. In doing so, the Guard worked with the
U.S. Ambassador in support of his Country Plan in those
countries participating in the program. It also worked with
the theater Commander-in-Chief (CINC) in an effort to
support the National Military Strategy of the United States.
The objectives were to:

•
•
•

foster democratic institutions and free-market
economies;
project American values of life, liberty and the pursuit
of happiness; and
promote interoperability between military and
civilian communities.

The program had begun as a Eurocentric operation
designed to bring nations—many of which did not
understand the concept of military and civilians working
together—out of the Cold War and into a new reality. At the
same time, it attempted to replace prejudice with an
informed opinion. The idea was to establish genuine
partnerships, long-term functional relationships that go
well beyond the military. In the process, the National Guard
would provide a role model for military subordination to
civil authority, and also demonstrate that it was a
cost-effective and credible defense force.
The speaker then proceeded to walk the audience
through the process of establishing such a program. He
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emphasized that the Guard would not go into a country on
its own. Rather, a host nation must request a National
Guard presence. Once that request has been made to the
U.S. Ambassador—and this is usually done by the Minister
of Defense, or in some cases the President or Foreign
Minister—the Ambassador would review it, and either
accept or reject it. Assuming the former, he would then
include it in his Country Plan. He would then forward it to
the theater CINC, who would also review it, and if it were
accepted, he would include it in his Country Plan. The CINC
would then send it on to the Department of Defense, which
would forward it to the National Guard Bureau for
implementation.
Once the National Guard Bureau receives a request,
Colonel James’ office—the Office of International
Affairs—attempts to match the requesting country with an
appropriate state. In doing this, a number of considerations
are taken into account. They look at similarities in ethnic
background, geography and economy. Once his staff makes
a recommendation, he forwards it to a General Officers
Steering Committee (GOSC). The GOSC is composed of 7
Adjutants General, 2 Deputy Adjutants General, and a
retired division commander, who review the proposal and
make a recommendation. This is then sent to the Chief of
the National Guard Bureau, Lieutenant General Edward
Baca, who will approve or reject it. (Col. James noted that at
this stage proposals are rarely rejected.) Once the
recommendation has been accepted, it is then forwarded
back to the theater CINC and the U.S. Embassy, so that the
host nation can be properly notified and the relationship can
begin.
James returned to the theme of the National Guard’s
unique qualifications for this program. He said that Guard
personnel were a unique blend of citizen-soldiers, who were
totally involved in the communities they lived in. They were
part of mainstream America. Not only were they a
cost-effective defense force, but the fact that many
Guardsmen were community leaders made them a model of
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democratic civil-military relations. They supplied military
support to civil authority, including crisis action, emergency
response, disaster relief, and humanitarian assistance. He
said that the Guard was a valuable way of involving
communities themselves in such efforts.
Since the State to State Partnership Program’s birth in
1992, it has rapidly picked up speed. Today, the Guard is in
68 countries. In Europe, 21 countries are matched with 23
U.S. states. While many of these matches are made on the
basis of ethnic backgrounds, this is not always the case.
Colonel James mentioned Romania and Bulgaria, two
countries which share common borders and rivers and have
nuclear plants, but which did not talk to each other during
the Cold War. So the Guard matched them with Alabama
and Tennessee, which also share borders and rivers and
have nuclear facilities, to show that neighbors could live
together in a harmonious fashion. He noted that Gen.
Jefferds had just returned from an exercise in Romania,
involving the Romanian civil defense force in a scenario in
which an airplane loaded with hazardous materials crashed
close to the international border. Thus, three countries
worked together to rehearse a response that served each
nation’s interests. The United States was involved in a
support capacity, but it was Romania and Bulgaria that
actually conducted the exercise. Similarly, the Guard has
partnerships with some of the countries in the former Soviet
Union, like Ukraine and Georgia. In this regard, the
program serves as an integral part of the Partners for Peace
effort.
Two years ago, the U.S. Southern Command asked the
Guard to put together some partnerships for Central
America, with a view to eventually expanding such
programs into other Latin American countries. As a result,
there are now a number of partnerships in progress or being
planned: Louisiana and New Hampshire are both involved
in Belize. Other current partnerships include Missouri and
Panama, Kentucky and Ecuador, and West Virginia and
Peru. Still awaiting final approval are proposed
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partnerships between Puerto Rico and Honduras, Florida
and Venezuela, and Connecticut and Uruguay.
Colonel James said that the Program can do many
things with its foreign partners, and he mentioned a few:
medical and engineering activities, non-commissioned
officer development, environmental protection, disaster
relief, and emergency response. He recalled that the Guard
had helped one Eastern European nation establish a
chaplain’s corps, and another create a code of military
justice. He again emphasized that all these programs
originate with requests from the host country. The Guard
does not solicit requests.
In conclusion, he noted that the State to State
Partnership Program had come a long way. It was now a
global operation. He said he had on his desk proposals for
Africa and the Pacific. He ended with a quote from Goethe:
“I find that the greatest thing in life is not so much where we
are, but rather in what direction we are moving.”
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THE WORKSHOP REPORTS
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Chapter Ten
The Inter-American Defense System
Dr. Thomas Bruneau
U.S. Naval Postgraduate School

This panel, which included approximately twenty
military and civilian officials from North America, South
America, Central America and the Caribbean, decided to
divide its discussion of this topic into four main questions
that were dealt with sequentially. These were as follows:
What is the system? Does a system really exist? How does it
work? And how should it work?
The Inter-American Defense System consists of a
collection of countries, instruments, organizations, and
norms that are often poorly integrated due to political and
military considerations from its founding until the present.
This short definition, which sounds better in Spanish than
English, captures the panel’s sense of the system. It first of
all consists of the independent republics of the Western
Hemisphere stretching from the Arctic to Antarctica and
including the Caribbean. The instruments and norms
include all the corpus of treaties and documents from the
Rio Treaty of 1947 and the creation of the Organization of
American States in 1948 until the present day. The
organizations include the Organization of American States
(OAS), Inter-American Defense Board (IADB), InterAmerican Defense College, annual conferences of the
American armies, navies, and air forces, the December 1994
Summit of the Americas, and the two defense ministerials.
The system is, then, very broad and general. Since it is so
broad and general, it raises the question as to whether it
really exists. The panel thus decided to look further into the
existence and nature of a system.

119

The panel’s further discussion and debate resulted in a
consensus that a system really does exist. It exists to the
extent that a concept such as “system” is necessarily
abstract and allows us to define something concrete out of a
collection of diverse elements. The issue is particularly
relevant in that the system was initiated in 1947 with the
Rio Treaty, and while it has adjusted to changing
circumstances, the current world and security environment
are so dramatically different that there is a real question
whether it can at all resemble the original system. There
was agreement that there are elements or components that
often work well together. In the last analysis, while it may
not be very coherent, it is in fact the system we want. If the
political leaders wanted it to be more of an integrated and
coherent system, it would be. When there are special
circumstances and sufficient political will is achieved, the
system takes on a greater degree of integration than when
the will is lacking. The system is a system of cooperation,
including communication, on issues that are perceived as at
least challenges and maybe even threats. Currently, there
is a high degree of cooperation in promoting confidencebuilding measures and de-mining. Finally, there is
agreement that a system does exist as long as we
understand that a “system” is an analytical construct.
To evaluate how well the system works presupposes an
explicit set of criteria for evaluation. In this system, as in
most other international systems, there are no such
specified criteria. The panel agreed, however, that there are
several elements which are positive and provide evidence of
the operation of a system. The first is the availability of fora,
such as the OAS, IADB, defense ministerials and other
mechanisms, which allow for debate and understanding of
issues of mutual concern, such as democratic consolidation,
human rights, threats arising from drugs, and the like. The
second is the fact that by existing at all the system allows
other countries in the hemisphere to leaven the
asymmetrical power of the United States. Indeed, this
factor is one of the main reasons motivating these countries
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to participate. Third is the counterfactual matter of the dog
that didn’t bark. Overall, relations among the countries in
the region are good, including in the area of defense. Since
there is a relatively high level of interaction, there is much
evidence of a system. And the results are positive. It is
clearly not negative in its impact, since there is in fact very
little inter-state conflict in the hemisphere. Further, all
countries in the region but Cuba are now under popularly
elected governments, and in some cases it can be shown that
the demonstration or contagion effect was significant in the
expansion of democracy. The prospects are for a continued
low level of conflict since democracies tend not to go to war
with other democracies. This last point is indicative of how
the priorities and functions of the system have changed with
the times. The system now seeks to promote democratic
consolidation, and so far it has been successful.
The discussion and suggestions on how the system
should work are extensive. The fact that the participants
could conceive of the system doing more in the changed
world context suggests that they indeed view it as a system.
The suggestions for elaboration or improvement are also
three in number. The first concerned the operation of the
organizational elements of the system. Here the
participants wanted to see more cooperation and
communication among such components as the OAS and the
IADB, and particularly the former’s Commission on
Hemispheric Security, and the various conferences and
ministerials. The intent of this was to increase the efficiency
of the elements in the system by improving definitions and
communications. The second concerned the definition and
implementation of goals, including defending democracy
and human rights, ensuring security, and defeating
criminality. It was suggested that through education these
goals could be better defined and implemented. And third,
it was stressed that civilians, particularly those in
government and the media, would have to be more involved
in the system. Traditionally, in most of the region (excluding
Canada, the Commonwealth Caribbean, and the United
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States), issues of security and defense were left to the
military. Civilians had little or no role, and virtually no
interest. Today, in the context of democratic consolidation,
the civilians have no option but to become involved. The
militaries generally agree to a (re)definition of roles in
decision-making. The civilians have the responsibilities to
be aware and to act, but often are poorly informed and not
interested in being involved. To assist them, the military
should recognize them as the constituencies of the InterAmerican Defense System and help them become involved
in all of its aspects.
In sum, the participants in the panel agreed that there is
indeed an Inter-American Defense System, that it is
probably about what those in power want it to be, that it
does have some important functions, and that civilians have
to assume more responsibility.
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Chapter Eleven
Inter-Institutional Relations
in the National Policy Process
Dr. Judith Gentleman
U.S. Air War College

The working group focused its discussion on
institutional relations in the defense and security policy
arena, with particular emphasis on emerging patterns of
civil-military relations. The group’s deliberations were
shaped by the varying experiences of the countries
represented, together with the fact that different countries
were experiencing different historical moments in the
evolution of their political and defense policy processes.
Although these processes might be similar as nations in the
region have largely come to accept a set of commonly held
norms concerning democracy and the primacy of civilian
political authority, Latin American nations are still at
different junctures in their own evolving democratic
consolidation. In some cases, states may be attempting to
create new laws and build new institutions. In others,
leaders may be attempting to bring about compliance with
existing regulatory and decision-making procedures; in still
others, actors may be stalled in a defense policy process in
which either the military or civilian leadership may be
avoiding policy-making responsibilities. In some, problems
of policy implementation remain to be solved. Finally, in
some states, support from civil society for the recomposition
of the military and the redefinition of its role in society may
be weak owing to the residues from the transition from
authoritarianism.
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The Roles and Missions Debate.
The discussion highlighted the divergent notions of
appropriate roles and missions, as seen from the
perspectives of national leaders, civil society and the
military itself. The d evel op ment of ef f ec ti ve
inter-institutional relations is predicated upon a clear
understanding of the military’s role in defense and—as was
repeatedly stressed by several participants—in assuring
the nation’s security. Indeed, the question of the proper use
of the term “defense” versus “security” engaged many in the
group. One panel member argued that a correct analysis of
the components of national power requires that the political
factor include the military and that both be integrated into a
more mature concept of “security.” In an integral concept of
security, for instance, which would encompass such issues
as food, law enforcement, democracy, the environment, and
the survival of the state, it would be appropriate to address
military efforts in agriculture, including the training of
conscripts for farming. In this way, the military would not
only help insure the nation’s security, but also instill
workers with the discipline and technical knowledge
necessary for agriculture. There was considerable
divergence of views as to the appropriate roles for military
establishments. Participants discussed options ranging
from armed forces that were conceived as “development
armies” to those that would be largely confined to the
barracks while they continued to search for an appropriate
role. (The latter reflecting civil society’s reluctance to permit
them wider roles following years of military governance.) In
some instances, militaries are being urged to become
extensively involved in the internal development challenges
faced by their societies. In these cases, their roles might
include economic development, border control, customs
collection, management of civil aviation and airport
maintenance, environmental protection, natural resources
management, support for the educational system, natural
disaster relief, health care, and finally, law enforcement.
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On the other hand, some militaries are being
increasingly confined to an external defense role. In some
cases, this is due to the rejection of the corporatist model
that underlay many traditional military organizations and
led to military interventions in the political arena, as well as
to the sea change that has swept the region economically
with the opening of the market, and has much improved
inter-state relations. With diminished inter-state tensions
and public sector revenues, and with rising levels of regional
economic cooperation, some felt that defense had been
“devalued” as a public policy goal or public good. As such, in
some nations the military had lost its preeminent role
within the state. Dramatic declines in defense spending
have effectively limited the military’s role above and beyond
the issue of the appropriate civil-military infrastructure.
A further complication arises from uncertainty as to the
appropriateness of the institution’s role in the socialization
of youth versus its responsibility for offering recruits
professional military training in support of its traditional
mission. Should the military conceive of itself as primarily
playing a peacetime role as the likelihood of war and
regional conflict wane? Alternatively, should it regard itself
as chiefly being responsible for war preparation for internal
or external defense? In short, regional militaries and
civilian leaders alike are uncertain as to whether to
embrace a more or less expansive concept of security as
opposed to a more limited notion of defense. While this is by
no means a new dilemma, it is one that currently confronts
many states in the region.
New threats are arising that require a coordinated
response from security forces, among them migration,
narcotrafficking and organized crime. In some cases, the
state has responded primarily through the gendarmerie
and the coast guard, with little if any employment of the
traditional defense side of the house. Indeed, scarce
resources are being allocated to the “security” or law
enforcement community. Inevitably, with doctrinal issues
concerning force employment as well as matters of
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institutional responsibility unresolved, competition over
scarce resources breeds discontent and rivalries. In some
instances, despite uncertainty over formal responsibilities,
an “inversion” of roles may be occurring, with a de facto
“militarization” of the police and a “policization” of the
military. This outcome stems mainly from the state’s failure
to define responsibilities for internal security requirements
or the maintenance of public order, a situation that was a
source of concern for the working group.
The New Civil-Military Dialogue.
The above difficulties notwithstanding, remarkable
efforts have been undertaken to address the need for elected
democratic civilian leaders to harmonize institutional
relations with the armed forces and begin shouldering
responsibility for defense and security planning. Emerging
profiles of civil-military relations have been shaped by the
process of economic liberalization that has driven declining
defense budgets and substantial privatizations, some of
which have affected the military sector. In many countries,
military issues have become a low priority, with the armed
forces suffering a loss of prestige and influence. In others,
the military has gained growing respect, and ranks among
the top national institutions in terms of public opinion. In
some cases, this rebound in popularity has grown in
recognition of the fact that the military appears to be
abiding by the new rules of the game despite internal
pressures and even the prosecution of military personnel for
past transgressions. The working group noted the great
importance that attaches to public perceptions of the
military’s role as the foundation for developing functional
inter-institutional relations.
For those building new institutional relations between
civilian authorities and the military, the choices have
sometimes included a decision to separate the armed forces
from the political sphere—in particular from political
parties—in an effort to depoliticize the military. Officers
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have been encouraged to avoid taking public positions in
political debates. The services are to be delinked from any
identification with political parties’ positions or platforms,
and active duty officers have been asked to suspend their
party affiliations. Overall, the goal has been to achieve what
Samuel Huntington has called “objective” civilian control of
the military. In this arrangement, the military manages its
own professional responsibilities and remains free of the
subjective interventions of political actors. It remains
outside the political fray in exchange for the right to exercise
full authority within the sphere of its own professional
competence.
Importantly, civil-military dialogue achieved through
both public and non-public seminars and work groups is
helping build mutual confidence between civilian and
military sectors. In one country, seminars on the
international security environment, military roles and
missions, the legal structure for military organizations,
poverty and security, and the public perception of the armed
forces, together with a simultaneous prolonged national
social debate, have facilitated the development of new
military laws that are consonant with democracy.
In the past, civilian politicians in many countries often
avoided broaching issues that would be disturbing to the
military. Although there were constitutional mandates and
laws governing military affairs, unwritten rules, informal
relations and taboos frequently shaped national policy in
this arena. Change, however, has brought about a new
openness that has pushed to the fore many issues for
discussion that were previously off limits. Indeed, in some
cases debate has even surfaced concerning secrecy and the
classification of documents as they relate to civilian access
to critical information.
In this new climate of openness, it is anticipated that
legislative debates will be permitted to go beyond
formalities to address issues such as the military budget,
military education, and threats and other global factors that
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may signify a different military formation in the future. To
accomplish this, some armed forces have established
lia ison s with n ati onal l egi s l atur es . Devel op i ng
congressional expertise has helped support the February
1998 meeting of parliamentary defense committees of the
Americas.
In some countries, a civilian-led Ministry of Defense now
exercises full authority over the armed forces. Sometimes,
it runs the budget and decides promotions. It no longer plays
only a “decorative” role, but rather enforces the “Defense
Law” of the country that places strict limits on the proper
role of the military in society. The group discussed the issue
of whether it is necessary to have a civilian Minister of
Defense, and some suggested that the question was not so
much that of the identity of the minister as his
subordination to elected civilian authority within the
democratic framework.
As one member of the group put it, the military must be
subject to political control rather than autonomous. Elected
civilian authority must exercise political control and must
do so to wall off the military from day-to-day partisan
political intrusions. In some cases, however, the civilian
sector has provided neither stability nor direction for
institutional development, and it has been left to the
military to establish order for itself. For some members of
the group, however, the notion of civilian leadership in
defense ministries was preferable because a civilian (in
theory at least) would be better able to interpret the
aspirations of civil society.
Dimensions of Inter-Institutional Relations.
The work group considered several inter-institutional
relationships whose proper management was deemed
critical to the successful institutionalization of civilmilitary relations in a democracy:
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•
•
•

Relations between the President and the Executive,
including the bureaucracy, the armed forces, and even
maneuver units close to the Presidency.
Inter-service relations. Staffs may require
reorganization and improved coordination.
Congressional-armed forces relations. The
Williamsburg Defense Ministerial meeting of 1995
touched upon some of the issues important to this
relationship.

•

Political party-armed forces relations.

•

Armed forces-police relations.

•
•

Civil society and the armed forces. Intellectuals,
professionals and organized religion play important
roles.
Relations internal to the military services.

In all these domains, the challenge is to build dialogue
and cooperation.
The group considered the U.S. interagency model that
coordinates inter-institutional relations and shapes policy
in the national security arena, together with other
coordination models now in place in several countries.
Along with procedural routines, personal relations
constitute an important element in the successful
harmonization of the executive, civil, legislative and
military perspectives.
The Legislative-Military Relationship.
The discussion repeatedly returned to the pivotal subject
of the legislature’s role in defense and security policy. The
sentiment was that there was still a tremendous amount of
work to do in forging new productive relationships. In some
cases, although laws have been passed (such as Argentina’s
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National Security Act) that govern defense policy, there is
often a failure to institutionalize them effectively or to
develop regulations that facilitate the implementation of
new laws. Civilian authority inadequately shoulders its
implementation responsibilities. To remedy this problem,
communications need to be improved and dialogues
established and maintained on a regular basis. Such
developments must move beyond the informal realm and
achieve institutionalization in all countries. Leadership on
defense issues can only come through improved
communication and dialogue, and forums must be
established and promoted to foster this activity. Although
legislatures typically have few staff resources at their
disposal, lawmakers must overcome old habits of deference
to traditionally powerful executives, and that includes
habits of deference to military authorities.
In some instances, the relationship between the military
and congressional representatives has been confined to
informal contacts with little formal institutionalization.
Elsewhere, the military itself has had to learn how to
become a more effective player within a formal process of
governance by developing lobbying skills in the
congressional sphere. In some countries, the legislature has
developed the capacity to act and has been effective in
dealing with what is for many a new policy arena and a new
set of responsibilities.
Education for Defense Policy-Making.
The group highlighted the importance of educating the
general public, and civilian policymakers in particular, in
defense and security matters. In some countries,
professional military education has been made available to
senior government officials and some key political actors
through National Defense or War Colleges. In one instance,
civil-military familiarization has been brought about by
including the military under the umbrella of the civilian
civil service. Ultimately, much more must be done to
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develop civilian political competence in defense and security
analysis in order to build military confidence in civilian
management. This may come in part from enhanced contact
between civilian leaders and the military, but it may also
require the funding of institutes and think tanks dedicated
to this effort. The military itself should designate funds to
support workshops, seminars and meetings to facilitate
interaction between the civilian sector and the armed
forces. Military liaison offices could be established in
congress, as has been done in some countries. Without an
educated civilian constituency with skills appropriate for
defense policy management, formal inter-institutional
relations, even if well elaborated, will be undermined by the
absence of interpersonal confidence and trust.
Thus, a step-by-step process must be developed in the
region that formally stipulates the role to be played by
civilians in defense policy, and then charts a course to
prepare both military and civilian elements to meet their
shared responsibilities for defense policy formulation and
implementation. The recently established Center for
Hemispheric Defense Studies in Washington, DC should
provide an additional forum for educating civilians about
defense policy and military organizations. In the end,
however, building military confidence in their civilian
counterparts is an age-old problem in Latin America, and
overcoming the legacy of the past and the realities of current
and future problems will be difficult. No doubt this is in part
due to the low esteem in which political parties and
“politicians” are still generally held by Latin American
militaries. The problem is further exacerbated by the
weakness of civil society in many countries. Conversely,
civilian distrust and suspicion towards their military
counterparts must also somehow be overcome.
Conclusions.
The work group reached agreement in several areas,
including a recognition that the roles and missions issue
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must be sorted out for the military by the political
leadership prior to any effective elaboration of
inter-institutional relations. Second, the development of
confidence between civilian and military actors in the
defense arena is critical to facilitate the further
strengthening of the inter-institutional environment. Also
essential to these efforts are communication and dialogue.
Creative approaches to each must be forthcoming from both
civilian and military sectors, as both share responsibility for
defense policy formulation and implementation. The
reformulation of inter-institutional relations is at an early
stage throughout much of the region. It will be to the
advantage of states looking for solutions to examine the
process of development now underway in those countries
where the dialogue has already led to cooperation.
Continued regional exchanges are thus vital to this process.
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Chapter Twelve
Cooperative Security and Peacekeeping
Lieutenant Colonel Victor Tise
U.S. Air Force Academy

This panel examined past and recent experiences in
Peacekeeping Operations (PKOs) and cooperative security
missions of the countries represented at the conference.
Presenters briefed from various points of view, including
g ov ern men t, acad emi c and , i n some i ns tanc es,
representatives of the armed forces. During the discussions,
the panelists spoke on an individual or academic basis, with
the disclaimer that the views expressed did not represent
those of their respective governments. Few concrete
conclusions were reached because of the varied
backgrounds and diverse opinions of the various presenters.
Due to this inability to reach conclusions and the complexity
of the subject matter, the group chose to pose questions for
consideration, rather than offer conclusions or policy
recommendations for future missions. This report will
attempt to synthesize the workshop’s main points of
agreement and disagreement.
Many countries in the inter-American community have
extensive and broad-ranging experience in Peacekeeping
Operations. These efforts have occurred on a multinational
basis in both global and regional venues. Latin American
countries have participated in cooperative security
operations for over 50 years. Examples include UN military
observer missions in the Balkans and Middle East, and unit
deployments to such countries as Cyprus, India, Pakistan,
Angola and, more recently, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Rwanda,
and Mozambique. Regional efforts include UN observer
missions to El Salvador, Guatemala, the UN Mission in
Haiti (UNMIH), and the recent Military Observer Mission
in Ecuador and Peru (MOMEP). On the other hand, many
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countries have had little or no PKO experience. Federal
statutes, constitutional restrictions and, in some cases, lack
of political resolve limit the participation of many
governments.
The group focused on three general areas:
1. PKOs as cooperative security or collective security on
both global and regional bases.
2. Organizing and preparing for PKOs—training,
financing, rules of engagement (ROE), and the political will
of participating nations, including those being supported by
the operations.
3. Cooperative security and its application to
peacekeeping in the Western Hemisphere.
Peacekeeping as Cooperative or Collective
Security: Applications in the Americas.
What constitutes peacekeeping? What are cooperative
and collective security? Defining peacekeeping was not
nearly as problematic for the panelists as defining the latter
terms. As one speaker put it: “Definitions are not as
important as the context in which security arrangements
are mandated. Security is ultimately in the eye of the
beholder.”
Certainly, peacekeeping has changed drastically since
the end of the Cold War. The accelerated transformation of
the international scene during the past 7 years has made it
necessary to reformulate security systems at the global
level, as well as at the regional and national levels. PKOs
will continue to be more complex and complicated than
those of earlier years. The expectations of the international
community (including the inter-American community) are
now quite different from what they were in the days of
Lester Pearson and Dag Hammerskjold. New players will
become involved, and peacekeeping initiatives may no
longer be the automatic purview of the United Nations.
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Still, the UN is currently the only international
organization with the chartered authority to promote
international peace and stability. (As one panelist observed:
“If the UN did not exist, it would be necessary to invent it.”)
It must have the support of the international community to
exercise that authority effectively in the context of growing
demands for stability. Beyond this, however, the workshop,
when considering peacekeeping in this hemisphere,
discussed the possibility that the Organization of American
States might take on some of the roles currently performed
by the UN.
Rather than viewing peacekeeping and cooperative
security as two distinct activities, most participants
initially agreed that the former was a tool of the UN
cooperative security framework. Nevertheless, one speaker
strongly argued that UN-sponsored peacekeeping could
never be considered cooperative security because of the veto
power of the 5 permanent members of the Security Council.
Forceful arguments were then presented in favor of
identifying regional and subregional peacekeeping with
collective security rather than cooperative security.
Support for this proposition, especially with regard to the
inter-American community, focused on shared values, such
as democracy and economic well-being.
Are PKOs More Feasible in a Global or Regional
Context?
In terms of cooperative security, all nations in the
in ter-A merica n communi ty have l ong- stand i ng
commitments to maintaining international peace and
stability around the world. But when it comes to such efforts
in the Western Hemisphere, the work group had mixed
emotions. For one country to be involved in the affairs of its
neighbors could lead to perceptions of partiality, when what
is needed in such operations is strict impartiality (and the
perception thereof). To avoid this, it might be desirable to
limit PKO involvement to countries outside the subregion
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concerned. An example might be Southern Cone countries
taking part in stability operations in Central America.
Recent operations have been far more diverse than
traditional peacekeeping and observer missions. PKOs now
encompass a wide range of multinational combined military
and civilian activities. The entire gamut of cooperative
security is covered, from peacekeeping to peace enforcement
and peacebuilding to stability operations. Who would have
foreseen, as recently as a decade ago, that an international
contingent composed of military forces from the United
States, Canada, Argentina, Honduras, Guatemala,
Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nepal, the Netherlands, and the
Caribbean community, would become involved in the
stability operations of the UN Mission in Haiti? Working
under the mandate of UN Security Council Resolution 940,
UNMIH forces not only assisted the fragile, but legitimate
government of Haiti in maintaining a secure and stable
environment by training a 5,200-man police force, they also
assisted in the conduct of free and fair elections. For the
first time in the country’s history, Haitians witnessed a
peaceful transition of power from one popularly elected
president to another. To take another recent example, Latin
American military forces have participated in UN
operations to separate warring factions involved in ethnic
cleansing in Bosnia-Herzegovina, enabling both borders
and governance to be reestablished. One could also cite
many other instances in which Latin American militaries
have taken part in global and regional cooperative security
efforts.
If the Inter-American System Is Capable
of Incorporating Peacekeeping, Then What Are
the Mechanisms for Framing Cooperative Security?
When considering security today, one can no longer
think in terms of territorial security alone. In an
interconnected modern world, security involves the
integrity of the community of nations as a whole. One
participant noted that there are security issues that
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transcend any country’s internal capabilities and that
require multinational cooperation. Further, competition in
the global market has meant that the state of a country’s
economy is often a priority focus of foreign and national
security policy. As a point of departure, it was agreed that
peacekeeping in its traditional sense, whether global,
regional or subregional, requires the consent of the parties
in conflict.
Organizing and Preparing for PKOs.
How do the American nations prepare and organize for
future PKOs? It was agreed that gatherings such as this
conference were a step in the right direction. Opportunities
for dialogue where experiences can be shared are an
enormous help in determining whether the region’s armed
forces have the capabilities to undertake certain PKOs. The
participants learned, for instance, that Uruguay has
extensive experience in such operations, ranking as the
tenth largest participant in international PKOs.
Uruguayan forces have participated in PKOs since 1935,
and now have a Training Center for Peacekeeping
Operations. Similarly, the U.S. Army’s Peacekeeping
Institute (PKI) has been established to analyze
peacekeeping missions in the post-Cold War era. The PKI
has played an important role in identifying key issues, such
as combined assessment and planning, unity of effort,
military subordination to political and diplomatic
structures, creation of sustainable security (rule of law),
proper military support to civil operations, training for
peace operations, and the enhancement of public support
(consent) for such operations. The exchange of ideas and
concepts at these various academic and operational fora is
invaluable. Experience is the best teacher, and we should
take advantage of each other’s wisdom to hone not only
war-fighting capabilities, but also an understanding of how
to conduct peacekeeping.
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Additionally, the workshop spoke extensively about the
creation of an educational and training system that includes
military, governmental and nongovernmental activities
involving PKOs. There was a strong consensus that civilian
decisionmakers must recognize the military’s peacekeeping
as well as war-fighting capabilities. Dialogue between the
Executive, Congress and senior military leaders is
essential. All of the military participants from countries
which had recently engaged in PKOs in Somalia, Haiti and
Bosnia pointed out that their forces could not have done the
job alone. Involvement of national and international
civilian agencies is vital to the success of virtually any PKO.
Participation in UN and other multinational endeavors
will continue to be carefully assessed on a case-to-case basis
by civilian leaders in conjunction with the military. In
addition to evaluating the capability of the force, the
availability of funding and the political will of the populace
will have to be considered. Having funds available is an
absolute key to success. Without money, a UN peacekeeping
force cannot perform its mission. The group agreed that
most financing should come from either the United Nations
or other international and regional sources. Too much
funding from individual nations can easily result in a loss of
political resolve to conduct certain collective security
efforts. The bottom line is that a nation’s participation will
be heavily influenced by its leaders’ balancing of ends, ways,
and means in light of their perception of national interests.
One of the primary keys to the success of the UN Mission
in Haiti was the Rules of Engagement (ROE) set forth for all
participating nations. This was a ROE that had been crafted
at the same time and by the same players who had drawn up
UN Resolution 940, which served as the mandate for the
UNMIH. The workshop participants agreed that
authorization to use force must be clearly outlined. Force
should only be used in extreme circumstances, including of
course self-defense. Learning the ROE becomes an
important training endeavor for all soldiers, sailors,
airmen, and marines taking part in a PKO.
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The social, economic and political situation of a nation
that is to receive peacekeeping assistance will be the focus of
the UN Security Council or other regional organizations
during the formulation of appropriate mandates or accords.
A UN mandate is the basis of a commander’s Mission
Statement and Commander’s Intent. Given a mandate,
commanders can then plan, write and transmit their
C on cept of Oper ati ons, Op er ati ons Or d er s and
Fragmentary Orders to subordinate units from the
participating international contingents. The development
of the mandates must be an exhaustive process, taking into
account the needs of the relevant nations, the consent of the
affected parties, and the capabilities of the PKO forces.
Ultimately, the mandate will spell out an end state or
definition of success, which will allow participants to
formulate their exit criteria.
Finally, the group posed its last question concerning
regional cooperative security: Should mechanisms be
developed so that the OAS can be given chartered authority,
like the UN, to promote peace and stability in the Americas?
The implication here was that the OAS would formulate,
coordinate, and be responsible for overseeing the
implementation of mandates. This was one question on
which no closure could be reached.
Conclusion.
The dynamics of the workshop demonstrated the ability
of the inter-American community to come together through
its military members, academics and politicos to discuss
complex issues such as international peacekeeping and
cooperative security. They also underlined the inability to
reach consensus and offer policy recommendations. As one
panelist put it, “cooperative security and collective security
need a seminar in themselves.” This is especially true when
considering peacekeeping in the Americas. Even though the
workshop did not feel compelled to present conclusions, this
rapporteur did find three areas of consensus:
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1. Countries of the Americas have had, and continue to
have, a genuine commitment to participation in
maintaining world peace and stability.
2. Peacekeeping must be under the auspices of the
United Nations or some other international organization
that has recognized chartered authority to formulate and
implement viable mandates.
3. Determining successful criteria for peacekeeping
missions, whether global or regional, is extremely complex.
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Chapter Thirteen
Subregional Cooperation
Dr. William Stanley
University of New Mexico

This panel addressed the current status and future
prospects of subregional security cooperation in the
Americas, examining different patterns of cooperation in
different parts of the hemisphere, as well as emerging
trends and challenges. Participants represented countries
of such diverse size, economies, social and political
structures, and national security concerns, that their
perspectives were necessarily wide-ranging and not easily
summarized. Comments did not always respond directly to
previous interventions and did not consistently produce an
obvious accumulation of points of agreement. As one
panelist remarked late in the second session, “I’m concerned
about the broad range of themes brought up by the
presenters. We need to clarify some conceptual issues about
what we mean by cooperation and security. That isn’t to say
we should oversimplify; cooperation is multidimensional,
and it doesn’t have to involve homogeneity. Heterogeneity
provides the richness of diversity that makes cooperation
fruitful . . . . But I wouldn’t want to be the rapporteur . . . .”
Despite the diversity of topics and views, a number of
themes did indeed come out of the discussions, and a clear
consensus emerged on a few points: 1. subregional
cooperation is both more possible and more necessary than
ever; 2. very important progress has already been made in
cooperation, confidence building, and the near-elimination
of risk of interstate conflict in some regions; and 3.
significant challenges remain, even in areas where
cooperation is most advanced.
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This report will examine additional points of
convergence and divergence on the following issues: 1. the
effect of democratization on the trajectory, importance, and
form of subregional security cooperation; 2. the interaction
of economic integration and security cooperation; 3.
differences across subregions; 4. resource questions; and, 5.
the role of the United States.
Democratization and Subregional Cooperation.
The hemisphere-wide transition from military
authoritarian regimes to elected civilian governance has
brought greater confidence and predictability to the politics
of neighboring countries, markedly reducing the likelihood
of interstate conflict and increasing the willingness and
ability of national defense institutions to cooperate across
borders. Democratization has, in countries such as Brazil,
been accompanied by new defense and national security
doctrines emphasizing a broader notion of sustained and
sustainable security incorporating protection and
enhancement of individual rights and liberties,
preservation and deepening of democracy, social and
economic development, and regional development. Under
such doctrines, the purpose of subregional cooperation is,
first and foremost, the defense of democracy and human
rights within the region, since all states have a shared
interest in preserving and expanding these achievements.
This was, in fact, one of the points of greatest consensus
among participants on the panel: Defense of democracy is
the central security goal, and in turn a necessary condition
for the continued survival of subregional cooperation. As one
participant put it, “democracy is the sine qua non of
cooperation: a democratic state is much less likely to have
the confidence to cooperate with an authoritarian
neighbor.” Another stressed that the defense of human
rights should be a central goal of subregional cooperation.
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Economic Integration.
Panelists agreed that growing economic integration had
created conditions propitious for subregional security
cooperation—indeed, most participants argued that
economic integration made such cooperation essential. As
economies are linked more closely with one another,
increased interdependency, common interests, and social
contacts have lowered security officials’ estimations of the
likelihood of interstate conflict, even between states with
histories of armed conflict. Market integration can only
proceed in a climate of stability and predictability. Thus,
economic integration has reinforced social and political
demand for effective security cooperation. With economic
integration has come growing attention to common
interests on such issues as environmental protection,
greater willingness to view the environment as a security
issue, and some progress toward cooperation on such issues.
That said, several participants noted that security
cooperation does not flow automatically from economic
integration: it must be deliberately constructed through the
efforts of all states involved. Economic integration brings
with it a series of complexities and potential threats to
national and public security that necessitate more active
efforts at coordination. Greater movement of goods, people,
money, and information inevitably facilitate transnational
criminal activities such as arms and drug trade that can
threaten public safety and, in the view of some participants,
undermine state sovereignty. Several panelists voiced
concerns that during high-level regional political meetings,
security concerns have too often been subordinated to
economic questions considered more urgent and politically
salient by civilian leaders. In the view of some, economic
and political integration have often outstripped the
development of “socio-professional” contacts between
militaries.
Moreover, several participants remarked that the
transnational nature of the security problems emerging
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from economic integration presents difficult challenges for
security cooperation. As one panelist put it, “No state can
act unilaterally in this area: only cooperation (that respects
sovereignty) is capable of dealing with these problems.”
Yet, this same individual argued that fully effective
cooperation is only possible if democratic governments
remain in power. From this perspective, corruption, crime,
and messianic leaders are counterposed to human rights,
democracy, and the orderly functioning of markets under a
liberal legal framework. The demands that regional
economic integration generate for stability and security
cooperation can only be fulfilled through preservation of
democratic governance throughout a given region.
Another participant noted that regions seeking to
develop a cooperative defense and security regime need a
formula to address social, economic, military, legal, and
technological differences between states. Yet, this is a tall
order. The legal issues alone are daunting: states in Latin
America have diverse laws and constitutional provisions
with respect to the proper jurisdictions of police and
military institutions. In some countries, the military is
involved in law enforcement and has primary responsibility
for dealing with illegal traffic in drugs, weapons,
undocumented migrants, money laundering, and such
environmental crimes as timber and wildlife poaching. In
other states, the police have exclusive responsibility for
domestic law enforcement, even on those issues that involve
international criminal networks. In view of these
differences, military-to-military cooperation is often
insufficient, and even legally inappropriate, to deal with
gray area threats that include a significant law enforcement
component.
Furthermore, in some countries the jurisdictional
boundaries between police and military are rapidly
changing as a result of public security reforms and
restructuring. In Panama, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras and Haiti, civilian police forces have taken on, or
are moving toward, primary responsibility for domestic
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public security. In Mexico, change is in the opposite
direction, with the military moving increasingly into law
enforcement roles. Several participants argued that in view
of the significant differences across states, and rapid
changes within states regarding institutional responsibility
for dealing with transnational criminal threats, high-level
civilian leadership is needed to provide overall policy
guidance and to assist in making appropriate coordination
linkages across military, police and judicial institutions.
One speaker remarked that too often decisionmakers have
perceived a “false dilemma between military and political
solutions to problems. Instead, we need to find wise ways to
combine these two elements to deal with the problems we
face.” To accomplish this will require extensive cooperation
not only between states, but between civilian and military
leaders within and between states. Several panelists
complained that civilian elected officials have not
consistently provided the degree of leadership needed, in
part because of a tendency to see security issues as
secondary to economic and political concerns.
Differences across Subregions.
The incentives for subregional cooperation, and the
goals of states in attempting such cooperation, differ
significantly across subregions. The different nature of
concerns expressed by panelists from different parts of the
hemisphere highlighted the probability that subregional
cooperation will be more fruitful than cooperation across
dissimilar areas, because attempts at cooperation within
subregions can develop naturally from shared interests and
similar capabilities. There are marked differences between
subregions in terms of technical capacity, resources, and
siz e of militaries. Suc h d i f f er enc es ar e not an
insurmountable obstacle to cooperation between different
subregions—as evidenced by the participation of South
American militaries in de-mining operations in Central
America, for example—but they are significant enough that
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sub-regional cooperation is likely to outpace broader
hemispheric cooperation for some time to come.
Remarks from participants representing Mercosur and
Southern Cone states indicated a primary focus on avoiding
interstate conflict. Cooperation in this region has focused
on confidence-building measures, high-level meetings
among senior military officials, technical cooperation,
intelligence sharing, resolution of cartographic and
boundary issues, professional exchanges, and movement
toward combined maneuvers. Participants expressed
considerable satisfaction with the important achievements
already made in these areas. Countries with histories of
bitter conflict have made significant strides toward mutual
confidence.
In contrast, cooperation in the Andean region has
produced less reduction in tensions, despite considerable
investment of effort and resources. This region faces both
continued interstate tensions, as well as extensive
transnational criminal operations with complex financial,
logistical, operational and political links to insurgencies.
This combination of challenges has proven difficult to
surmount, in part, according to one panelist from the region,
because of a tendency not to deal adequately with the
political component of insurgencies, focusing instead on
their criminal, narco-terrorist dimension.
In Central America, the main concerns are with
transnational criminal phenomena, including illegal traffic
in arms, dru g s, and p eop l e; money l aund er i ng;
sophisticated car theft and re-export rings; and widespread
kidnapping that often involves cross-border networks.
Several speakers lamented that criminal networks have
made much faster progress in developing the ability to move
information and operate in a transnational setting than
have states in the region. One officer noted that national
institutions are inherently handicapped by the fact that
they are constitutionally and institutionally bound to a
given state, while criminal networks can move fluidly
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throughout the region. The only solution to this is extensive
sharing of information and joint action. The Central
American Framework Treaty for Democratic Security
provides the broad outlines of mechanisms for needed
cooperation, but has been very difficult to implement due to
a lack of resources.
Remarks by a panelist from a Caribbean country
reflected the very different concerns of small states,
particularly those heavily dependent on tourism. He cited
the difficulty of dealing with drug trafficking in a country
with numerous beaches that are easily accessible by road,
and large numbers of tourist boats coming and going.
Stronger enforcement efforts could undercut tourism,
damaging the broader interests of the nation. Such
domestic constraints limit the ability of such states to
actively pursue cooperative anti-crime measures.
Resources and Other Constraints.
Resources are a significant obstacle to sub-regional
cooperation. Effective information sharing and operational
cooperation require the purchase, development, or
adaptation of compatible equipment, software, data
formats, procedures, and communications equipment, as
well as substantial transportation and personnel costs. All
of these involve extensive expenditures that have not been
feasible, especially in the present context of stagnant or
declining government budgets. Moreover, one of the most
difficult obstacles to cooperation has been significant
asymmetries between states in the capacities of their
security institutions, asymmetries that need to be
addressed for cooperation to be effective. Surmounting
these gaps would require resource transfers that are
difficult if not impossible for the more technically advanced
countries to provide due to fiscal constraints. Panelists had
few solutions to offer for this problem: many mentioned the
possibility that the United States could play a constructive
role by providing resources, but this was consistently
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combined with concerns that U.S. assistance might not
reflect the needs of recipient states, but rather the distinct
priorities of the United States.
Other constraints mentioned were institutional—both
at the domestic and international levels. In some countries,
existing legislation prevents the sharing of defense
information, as is required for active cooperation. Until
laws are changed, some states will be inhibited from
cooperating as fully and effectively as they could. One
Central American panelist also argued that the
inter-American system needed to develop a stronger and
more credible capacity for conflict resolution and mediation.
He noted that military leaders in Guatemala and El
Salvador regretted that the Organization of American
States (OAS) had not been able to play a more prominent
and effective role in peace processes. Although the United
Nations had made valuable contributions toward resolving
civil wars in the region, many military officers would have
been more comfortable had mediation and verification
functions been carried out by an inter-American institution
such as the OAS.
The United States’ Role.
As already indicated, the majority of participants
acknowledged that national resources were scarce and that
greater U.S. assistance to subregional cooperative efforts
would be welcome and highly valuable. The desire for U.S.
aid was matched, however, by concern that in the past such
assistance has tended to reflect U.S. priorities, not national
or subregional ones. A number of speakers cited the
“distorting effect” of U.S. Cold War priorities, and, more
recently, Washington’s rather single-minded focus on drug
trafficking to the virtual exclusion of broader public safety
and regional security concerns of Latin American states.
Several participants mentioned that, from their point of
view, drug trafficking, even large-scale operations, was only
part of an overall pattern of crime and social instability with
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multiple dimensions. The drug problem, often the
overwhelming priority of the United States, is not
necessarily the priority concern of states receiving U.S.
assistance. Several panelists expressed what can only be
characterized as resentment at U.S. insensitivity to local
priorities and concerns, and questioned whether receiving
U.S. aid would be a net gain.
In this context, some participants urged that
Washington reformulate its security assistance programs
in such a way as to promote a broader, shared set of goals
involving democratic stability and the economic integration
that such stability makes possible. This might require the
United States to subordinate or postpone its specific
concerns about drug trafficking while helping countries
enhance their ability to cooperate on an integrated set of
concerns of which drug trafficking would be only one part.
In the process of providing assistance programs, several
panelists stressed that the United States should be careful
not to contribute to divisions between Latin American
states, but rather should provide consistent, balanced aid
focusing on support for cooperation.
There was little consensus about what institutional
mechanisms would be most propitious for such assistance.
Possibilities mentioned included the Department of
Defense, the Agency for International Development, and
multilateral lending agencies. This remained an open
question.
Conclusions.
The panel’s main point of consensus was that there is a
powerful synergy between democratization and regional
economic liberalization that makes regional security
cooperation more necessary, more desired by political and
economic leaders, and more feasible. Expansion of liberal
economic activity requires a degree of stability that can only
be achieved through cooperation, and cooperation is only
possible through continued democracy, because of the
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greater confidence that democratic regimes can have in one
another’s intentions and stability. As one panelist put it, a
key to sustained cooperation is transparency. Significant
obstacles remain, however, despite the generally propitious
context and the important steps already taken. Among
these are shortages of financial and technical resources,
legal and institutional differences that are difficult to
bridge, and in some contexts a lack of overall political
guidance needed to coordinate the activities of diverse
institutions operating in different legal frameworks.
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Chapter Fourteen
Emerging Roles and Missions
Dr. Andrés Serbin
Venezuelan Institute of Social and Political Studies
and
Central University of Venezuela

Meth odolog y o f Wor k: Af ter a f i r st r ound of
presentations and commentaries by the group’s
participants, a rough draft was produced by the rapporteur.
This draft was then discussed by the group and a second
version produced that was again subjected to commentaries
and revision. The following summary has been approved by
the participants as a whole and contains their main points
of agreement and disagreement.
The discussion identified a common ground for all cases
analyzed: Faced with the new changes that are confronting
the armed forces of these diverse countries—changes that
are extremely complex and rapid—the fundamental
challenge is adaptation. From this perspective, there have
been developed various forms of identifying and prioritizing
new and old threats and, consequently, different ways of
defining emerging roles and missions as a function of special
national, subregional and regional circumstances.
Nevertheless, within the group there was a consensus
that, notwithstanding these changes, the traditional
mission of the armed forces to defend the vital interests of
the nation persists—in particular, the defense of national
sovereignty, territorial integrity, and national values and
institutions (especially democratic institutions).
Notwithstanding this traditional mission, the situations
of change mentioned above pose new threats and
challenges. These include: a. threats/challenges within our
borders; b. threats/challenges outside our borders; and c.
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threats/challenges on the international level that we have
the obligation of meeting as “good international citizens.”
By the same token, along with past and present threats and
challenges, it is necessary to foresee the threats and
challenges of the future.
The identification and prioritization of threats and
challenges and the consequent identification of emerging
roles and missions basically respond in each case to three
variables—external and internal environments and
available resources—both individually and in combination.
In some cases, threats linked to the external environment
are prioritized within the post-Cold War framework
associated with the new international order, financial
globalization, trade liberalization, and the technological
revolution, which may in turn impact the domestic
environment, particularly in the socioeconomic sphere. In
other cases, the emphasis is placed on regional integration,
which imposes strategic alliances, cooperation among
partners and defense of common interests as a function of
extraregional threats, with their consequent domestic
impacts. Finally, in other cases and as a function of the
limited availability of human and financial resources, the
emphasis is put on the adaptation to new domestic
situations linked to the need to promote development,
consolidate democracy and combat poverty and exclusion,
in which the armed forces can be involved in civic action
programs, either as leading actor or in supporting and
complementing the work of the government and/or private
sector.
On the other hand, the definition of emerging roles and
missions for the armed forces also responds to three
fundamental relational nuclei among various domestic
sectors: a. the relations between the government and armed
forces, conditioned by the characteristics of the respective
political sy stems and p ol i ti c al c ul tur es ( s tr ong
presidentialism, the role of legislative power, the roles of
governors and municipal authorities); b. the relations
between the police and the armed forces (in a broad
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spectrum that ranges from a model of total compartmentalization of the two forces to the militarization of the
police or the adoption of police functions by the armed
forces), and c. the relations of civil society and the armed
forces (similarly with a broad spectrum of experiences from
the involvement of both sectors in civic action programs to
the nonexistence of common programs and the consequent
isolation of the two sectors).
Within this framework, there was identified a present
tendency in these three predominant relational forms to
promote open and transparent processes in the definition of
emerging roles and missions, starting with the sharing of
information in an open and accountable manner.
From this ensemble of conditioning factors, there was
identified, along with the continuing traditional mission, a
set of subsidiary missions and an ensemble of accessory
missions for the armed forces in the hemisphere. Without
establishing hierarchies, the discussion group included the
following among the subsidiary missions: a. support for
economic and social development; b. defense of national
identity; c. providing a national capacity to engage in
international peacekeeping missions; d. maintenance of
internal public order as a function of two conditions: when
the police find themselves overwhelmed, and when there
exists an express order of the Executive; e. protection of the
environment; f. assistance in cases of national or regional
disaster; g. the struggle against crime (here, however, there
was no clear consensus, except for a desire that the mission
be in support of rather than a substitute for the police;
otherwise, approaches would have to be strongly
conditioned by the internal structures of the security forces
of each country and by the resources available); and h. the
defense of regional institutionality (similarly, in a broad
spectrum of positions as a function of the diverse progress of
subregional integration schema). Finally, among the
accessory missions were identified: a. the contribution to
scientific and technological research when resources exist
for such purposes; b. the administration and preservation of
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national parks (though in some cases this mission is
assigned to specific forces); and c. the control of explosives
and armaments.
In conclusion, the work group agreed that the
identification of emerging roles and missions must be made
jointly by civilians and militaries, in accordance with the
particular circumstances of each country, which led some
participants to the conclusion that there was a need for
growing involvement of civilians in national security and
defense subjects through adequate programs of education
and training.
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PART SIX
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
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Chapter Fifteen
The Role of the Armed Forces in the Americas:
Conclusions, Lessons, Recommendations and
Unresolved Issues
Donald E. Schulz
Strategic Studies Institute
U.S. Army War College

Introduction.
The end of the Cold War has brought a sea change in
civil-military relations and the role of the armed forces in
Latin America. The neoliberal revolution has strengthened
the hand of democratically elected civilian leaders and
eroded the influence of the armed forces, bringing marked
declines in military spending and manpower. At the same
time, new threats to national security have arisen, even as
some old ones have persisted. While the danger from the
Soviet Union and Cuba no longer exists, it has been replaced
by the bogeymen of narcotrafficking and organized crime.
In turn, this has led to a greater involvement of the armed
forces in the public security arena. Meanwhile, insurgencies
drag on in Colombia, Mexico and Peru. (Colombia, indeed,
is so torn by the violence of guerrillas, narcotraffickers,
paramilitary groups and the armed forces that many
observers have begun to use terms like “balkanization” and
“ungovernability” to describe its condition.) Border
dispu tes—most notabl y between Ec uad or and
Peru—persist. Notwithstanding these continuing
problems, the region’s militaries, anxious to prevent a
further erosion of their budgets and influence, have sought
to find new roles and missions beyond law enforcement that
might serve to bolster their raison d’etre.
Where is all this leading? While it is clear that Latin
America is in the midst of a great period of transition, it is
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not at all obvious what it is transitioning to. Moreover,
change can be a frightening thing. The speakers at the
Santa Fé conference identified two very different
alternative scenarios for the future. The first of these, which
might be termed the “Decay Model,” described a region torn
by violence and institutional disintegration. In this
scenario, socioeconomic and political conflicts grow beyond
the capacity of national institutions to contain them; society
is increasingly disrupted by organized crime, insurgencies
and economic crisis; military modernization sparks regional
arms races, resurrecting the spectre of external threats; and
democratic institutions and civil-military relationships
atrophy. The end-state is a return to authoritarian
government, either through direct military rule or, perhaps
more likely, a civilian strongman backed by the armed
forces.
In contrast, the second scenario, or “Development
Model,” posits societies that are in the process of solving
their socioeconomic problems, while broadening and
deepening democratization. In this vision, organized crime
has been contained, insurgencies eliminated, and economic
growth is raising living standards and leading to more
equitable societies. Regional peace prevails, as economic
integration binds countries ever more tightly together in a
web of shared interests. Meanwhile, civilian control over the
armed forces becomes engrained in the political culture.
Military institutions are more professional and efficient,
and there is a healthy civil-military dialogue on both the
domestic and international levels. In turn, increased
international trust leads to more multilateral military
cooperation in terms of training, exercises, intelligence
sharing, joint operations, and other activities.
These scenarios are, of course, polar alternatives. The
real world of the 21st Century will almost certainly be
somewhere in between. Latin America itself is not a
monolithic entity. Within the region, there will continue to
be major differences between countries in terms of the
quality of democracy, degree of civilian control over the
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military, and ability to generate sustained and equitable
socioeconomic development while maintaining internal
security and the rule of law. Some countries will probably
do quite well, while others will flounder.
In short, one should not underestimate the challenges
ahead. What is being attempted will require enormous
efforts in several different realms—political, military,
economic and social—simultaneously. Politically, this will
involve the transformation of deeply engrained attitudes of
authoritarianism and submission. These changes must
occur in civilians as well as the military. As one speaker
noted, the Latin American political leadership is largely the
product of a “patrimonial oligarchic tradition” that has not
prepared it to exercise democratic control over the armed
forces. The traditional way that civilians have dealt with
national security issues has been to renounce their
responsibilities and abdicate leadership. But in doing that,
they have also all too often abdicated power. Clearly, that
must change, and there is considerable evidence that it is.
At the same time, however, there is a danger
that—because of past experiences with the military—
civilian leaders will attempt to marginalize (or in extreme
cases even destroy) the armed forces. This could once again
place democracy at risk. Not all Latin American militaries
are committed to democracy. Some officers still believe,
especially when their personal and institutional interests
are at stake, that they should intervene when necessary in
order to defend the Fatherland from irresponsible
politicians. Perceived threats from the civilian sector could
easily trigger a violent backlash.
As for U.S.-Latin American relations, there were notable
differences between U.S. and Latin American participants.
The latter still view the United States with considerable
suspicion, the product of a long history of North American
intervention in the region. As one speaker noted, the Cold
War created a propitious environment for installing and
supporting dictatorships, and Latin Americans are unlikely
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to forget this. They have no illusions about any natural or
automatic identity of interests between their countries and
the “Colossus of the North.” Even when U.S. and Latin
American interests are the same, the two sides are likely to
have different priorities. Inevitably, this means that there
will continue to be friction in the relationship.
This being said, the end of the Cold War has left Latin
Americans free to address the future in terms of their own
interests, and many of them have identified those interests
as requiring a closer socioeconomic relationship with the
United States. Since socioeconomic relations also have
political and military implications, there has inevitably
been spillover into the security arena. The following
subsections discuss the conclusions reached in the
conference’s workshops on security issues.
The Inter-American Defense System.
In general, the work group gave the Inter-American
Defense System high marks. While the “system” (which
consists of a collection of countries, instruments,
organizations, and norms) is often poorly integrated, it is
the system the hemisphere’s leaders want. If they wanted it
to be more integrated and coherent, they would change it.
The system is flexible enough to take on greater coherence
and integration when circumstances require it, and the will
exists. At the same time, it seems to work fairly well. It
provides a forum for debate and exchange of information,
and to a certain extent allows the Latin American countries
to counterbalance the power of the United States. It has also
made some modest contributions to regional peace and the
promotion of democracy, and it appears to be gaining
momentum in this respect.
Inter-Institutional Relations in the National Policy
Process.
Different countries are at different stages in the
evolution of their political and defense processes. Though
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almost all Latin American states are democratic, there is
considerable variation in the quality and degree of
consolidation of democracy. The development of
inter-institutional relations is predicated on a clear
understanding of the military’s role in assuring the nation’s
defense and security. There was much debate in the
workshop over the “defense” versus “security” issue.
Clearly, the two are not the same. The latter encompasses a
much broader range of issues. New threats (e.g.,
narcotrafficking, migration, and common crime) have led to
different responses in different countries. Some states rely
on the police and coast guard. In others, there is an
inversion of roles, with the “militarization of the police” and
a “policization of the military.” This tendency stems largely
from the state’s failure to define responsibility for internal
security requirements and the maintenance of public order,
a source of much concern within the group.
In some countries, a civilian Minister of Defense now
exercises full control over the armed forces. There was no
agreement as to whether this was always necessary. Some
participants suggested that the institutional identity of the
minister was less important than his subordination to
democratically elected civilian authority. Others felt that
civilian defense ministers were preferable. The bottom line,
however, was that elected civilians must shield the military
from day-to-day partisan political intrusions. There was
general agreement that there is still a tremendous amount
of work to do i n ter ms of f or gi ng p r od uc ti ve
legislative-military relations.
Cooperative Security and Peacekeeping.

.

The transformation of the international scene has made
it necessary to reformulate security systems at the global
level, as well as regional and national levels. Recent
operations have been far more diverse than earlier
missions, and have covered the entire gamut of cooperative
security from peacekeeping to peace enforcement,
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peacebuilding and stability operations. Such activities will
continue to be more complex and complicated than in the
past. The expectations of the international community are
v ery differen t fr om what they wer e und er Dag
Hammerskjold. New players will become involved, and
initiatives may no longer be the automatic purview of the
United Nations. Still, the UN is currently the only
international organization with chartered authority to
promote international peace and stability.
Subregional Cooperation.
Subregional cooperation is more possible and necessary
than ever. Important progress has been made in
confidence-building and other forms of collaboration, and in
some regions the risk of inter-state conflict has nearly been
eliminated. Nevertheless, significant challenges remain,
even in areas where cooperation is most advanced.
The transition to democracy has markedly reduced the
likelihood of inter-state conflict and increased the
willingness and ability of national defense institutions to
cooperate across borders. In some countries, democracy has
been accompanied by new defense and national security
doctrines stressing a broader notion of security,
incorporating protection of individual rights, the
preservation of democracy, and the fostering of
socioeconomic and regional development. Under such
doctrines, the purpose of subregional cooperation is, first of
all, the defense of democracy and human rights. There was
broad consensus on this point: Defense of democracy is the
central security goal, and a necessary condition for
continued subregional cooperation. A democratic state is
much less likely to cooperate with an authoritarian
neighbor than with a democratic neighbor.
Growing economic integration has created conditions
favorable for subregional security cooperation—indeed,
such cooperation is essential. Market integration requires a
climate of stability and predictability. Common interests
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and social contacts have lowered the likelihood of
inter-state conflict. At the same time, regional economic
integration brings with it new problems and threats (e.g.,
migration, organized crime, narcotrafficking and arms
smuggling) requiring greater regional cooperation. Thus
has integration reinforced the social and political demand
for effective security cooperation.
Some regions have been more successful than others.
The Southern Cone countries have primarily focused on
avoiding interstate conflict, and have made considerable
progress. This is much less the case, however, in the Andean
region, which is faced with a much more complex
combination of problems. In Central America, in turn, the
main concern is with transnational criminal activities, such
as narcotrafficking, arms smuggling, car theft and re-export
rings. The panelists noted that criminal organizations had
made more progress in terms of their ability to operate in a
transnational setting than governments had, because
national institutions are handicapped by the fact that they
are constitutionally and institutionally bound to a single
state whereas criminal networks can move fluidly
throughout the region.
Roles and Missions.
Faced with new changes that are confronting the armed
forces of these diverse countries—changes that are
extremely rapid and complex—the fundamental challenge
is adaptation. Thus, various forms of identifying and
prioritizing new and old threats and different ways of
defining roles and missions have been developed, depending
on national, regional and subregional circumstances.
The identification and prioritization of threats and
challenges and the identification of roles and missions
generally reflect three variables: internal environment,
external environment, and available resources. In some
cases, threats linked to the external environment are
prioritized according to the needs of the new international
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order, including financial globalization, trade liberalization
and the technological revolution, which may impact the
domestic environment, especially in the socioeconomic
realm. In other instances, the emphasis is on regional
in teg ration , wh ich r equi r es s tr ategi c al l i anc es ,
partnerships and a definition of common interests in
response to extra-regional threats and their domestic
impacts. In still other cases, as a function of limited human
and material resources, the emphasis is on adaptation to
new domestic situations linked to the need to promote
economic development, consolidate democracy, and combat
poverty and inequality. Here, the armed forces may be
involved in civic action programs, either in a lead role or in
support of the government and/or private sector.
The definition of emerging roles and missions is also a
response to: 1. relations between the government and the
armed forces, which are conditioned by the respective
political systems and political cultures; 2. relations between
the police and armed forces, which can range from total
separation to the militarization of the police and the
adoption of police functions by the military; and 3. relations
between civil society and the armed forces, which run the
gamut from isolation to the involvement of both sectors in
common programs. There is a present tendency in such
relationships to promote transparency in the definition of
emerging roles and missions, starting with the sharing of
information in an open and accountable manner.
There was a consensus that the traditional mission of
the armed forces—the defense of sovereignty and territorial
integrity—is still of vital importance. In addition, however,
a number of secondary missions were identified, including:
support for economic and social development; defense of
national identity; international peacekeeping; maintenance
of internal public order when the police require support and
the Executive expressly orders it; environmental protection;
national and regional disaster relief; defense of regional
institutionality; scientific and technological research;
administration and preservation of national parks; control
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of armaments and explosives; and crime control. On the
last, there was no clear consensus, except for the desire that
the mission be in support of rather than a substitute for the
police.
Lessons.
A number of general lessons came out of the
presentations and discussions. General Woerner, for
instance, commenting on the significance of the Venezuelan
coup attempts of 1992, suggested that one lesson had to do
with the fact that these attempts had occurred in a country
with over three decades of democratic rule. This
demonstrated, first of all, that: Under conditions of political,
economic and social stress, a military may step outside the
democratic process and attempt to overthrow the
government, even in a country with a substantial tradition of
democracy. Secondly, however, was the fact that the coups
failed. From this he concluded that: Democracy is in the
ascendancy and, though still vulnerable, it now has the
strength and institutionalization to survive threats that
would have been fatal in earlier times. But the most
important lesson, he argued, was the third, namely that:
The attempted coups were not overwhelmingly rejected by
the populace. This shows the continuing power,
pervasiveness and durability of the authoritarian tradition.
In turn, this suggests that while a change in the
character of the civil-military relationship is possible, it can
only be achieved through the conscientious efforts and good
faith of both civilian and military communities.
Woerner also observed that there is a fundamental
difference between mature democracies and less mature
democracies in that the former possess multiple, peaceful
alternatives for conflict resolution that the latter do not have.
Because they are more secure, civilians in a mature
democracy will be more willing to accept the military as a
legitimate national actor and more open to allowing it to
perform non-traditional roles and missions. In contrast, in
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emerging democracies, civilians are likely to be more
suspicious and fearful, and thus may try to limit the armed
forces to protecting national sovereignty. And when the
latter are not involved in such activities, civilians might be
tempted to confine them to their barracks, or perhaps even
try to eliminate the institution altogether. In short, mature
democracies can use the military in a broader way without
as much concern for challenges to democratic governance.
Emerging democracies may not feel they have this option.
How aggressive should civilian leaders be in their efforts
to extend their control over the military? Woerner
suggested that, notwithstanding the remarkable progress
that had been made, civilians had, in general, acted too
timidly. He argued that there were opportunities to further
strengthen democracy—including civilian control—that
had not been fully explored. He felt that the armed forces
would accept a greater degree of civilian dominance than it
would volunteer.
Luis Tibiletti, though more pessimistic than Woerner
about both military and civilian leaders, came to a
somewhat similar conclusion. Given the historical tendency
of civilians to renounce political power, he suggested that
the only way to prevent a return to military domination was
for civ il society , i nc l ud i ng Non- Gover nmental
Organizations, to demand that political leaders assume
their responsibilities. He said that civilians must reassume
functions such as counternarcotics, counterterrorism and
economic development that had been turned over to the
armed forces. Going a step further than Woerner, he argued
that the use of the military in civic action operations would
weaken civil society. And without strong civil societies,
viable democracies were impossible.
Different people drew different lessons. Most of the
participants at the Santa Fé conference would probably not
have gone as far as Tibiletti. Indeed, a number of speakers
placed the issue of new roles and missions in a considerably
more favorable light. In his keynote address, Major General
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Manuel Bonett Locarno, Commander of the Colombian
armed forces, made the case for shifting the focus of the
army of the future (specifically, in Colombia) to a wide range
of nontraditional missions, including the defense of
democracy and human rights, counternarcotics,
multinational peacekeeping and conflict resolution,
environmental protection, socioeconomic development, and
support for science and education. U.S. National Guard
representatives made an implicit case for their institution
as a role model for Latin American militaries, and several of
the workshops focused heavily on new roles and missions
from differing perspectives. The following subsections
summarize the lessons learned from those sessions.
Inter-Institutional Relations in the National Policy
Process.
There was considerable debate over the appropriate
roles for the armed forces. The discussion focused on a wide
range of activities, including border control, customs
collection, management of civil aviation and airport
maintenance, economic development, environmental
protection, disaster relief, health care, law enforcement,
and support for education. But there was also sentiment for
confining the military to a traditional defense role. The
group felt that the political leadership must sort out the
roles and missions issue for the military before effective
inter-institutional relations can occur.
The panelists also concluded that the development of
confidence between civilian and military actors is critical to
the strengthening of the inter-institutional environment.
Essential to this process are communication and dialogue.
This is true whether one is talking about relations between
the President and other elements of the Executive branch
(including the armed forces), congressional-military
relations, or relations between the armed forces and the
police, political p ar ti es and c i vi l soc i ety. Suc h
communication should be institutionalized so it can be
maintained on a regular basis.
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Another lesson is that without an educated civilian
constituency, skilled in defense policy management, formal
inter-institutional relations will be undermined by a lack of
interpersonal confidence and trust. The group emphasized
the importance of educating the general public, and
especially civilian policymakers, in defense and security
matters. Much more needs to be done to build civilian
political competence in defense matters in order to build
military confidence in civilian management.
Cooperative Security and Peacekeeping.

.

Peacekeeping operations must be under the auspices of
the United Nations or some other international
organization that has recognized chartered authority. In
the traditional sense of the term, they require the consent of
the parties in conflict. Decisions to undertake PKOs must be
made on a case-by-case basis, through an exhaustive
development of mandates which take into account the needs
of the recipient countries, the capability of the force, the
availability of funding, and the political will (consent) of the
populace involved. Ultimately, the mandate must also spell
out the desired end-state or definition of success, which will
allow participants to formulate their exit criteria/strategy.
The bottom line, however, is funding: Without it, the
operation cannot be successful.
Dialogue between executive, congressional and senior
military leaders is essential. The military cannot get the job
done by itself. Civilian support is necessary. Thus, the
involvement of national and international civilian agencies
is vital to the success of the operation.
Subregional Cooperation.

.

There is a powerful synergy between democratization
and regional economic liberalization that makes regional
security cooperation more necessary, more desired by
political and economic leaders, and more feasible than ever
before. The expansion of liberal economic activity requires a
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degree of stability that can only be achieved through
cooperation, and that cooperation is only possible through
continued democratization because of the confidence that
democratic governments can have in each other’s
intentions. In short, the demand that economic integration
generates for security cooperation can only be fulfilled
through the preservation of democratic governance
throughout a given region.
This being said, security cooperation does not
automatically flow from economic integration. It must be
deliberately constructed. There was some concern within
the workshop that security had been subordinated to
economic issues considered more important. At the same
time, there is a tendency to view military solutions as being
separate from political ones, when the real task is to
combine them to deal with the problems faced. In view of
the rapid changes that are occurring, there is a need for
high-level civilian leadership to provide overall policy
guidance and assist coordination across military, police and
judicial arenas. In addition, there is a need for extensive
cooperation between civilian and military leaders between
states as well as within states. Some of the participants
complained, however, that the civilians had not provided
the degree of leadership needed.
The incentives for subregional cooperation and the goals
of the states attempting such cooperation differ
significantly. Still, subregional cooperation is likely to be
more fruitful than cooperation across dissimilar areas
because of the shared problems, interests and capabilities of
the states involved. Therefore, subregional cooperation is
likely to progress more rapidly than broader hemispheric
cooperation.
Lack of resources is a significant obstacle to subregional
cooperation. Effective information sharing and operational
cooperation require compatible equipment, software, data
formats, procedures, and communications equipment, as
well as transportation and personnel. Another major
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obstacle is that there are significant asymmetries between
states in terms of the capacities of their security
institutions, differences which need to be addressed for
cooperation to be effective. Overcoming these problems
would entail considerable expenses in a time of tight or
declining government budgets. Resource transfers from
wealthier, more technically advanced countries would be
difficult for the same reason. There are also legal
constraints. Many countries, for instance, have laws
preventing the sharing of defense information.
Roles and Missions.
The working group agreed that the identification of
emerging roles and missions must be made jointly by
civilians and militaries, in accordance with the particular
circumstances of each country. This led some participants
to conclude that there was a need for growing civilian
involvement in national security and defense subjects
through education and training programs.
Recommendations.
In any large and diverse gathering of academics and
practitioners such as the Santa Fé conference, there will be
many different points of view expressed. Rather than
picking and choosing, or attempting to come to some kind of
artificial consensus, I will lay out a broad menu of policy
prescriptions, and let the reader decide which are most
pertinent. Some papers and groups focused more on
recommendations than others. Perhaps the most fruitful
was the opening presentation by Richard Downes.
Professor Downes offered an impressive list of both
general and specific proposals, including the following:

•

Military institutions should consider unprecedented
levels of civil-military dialogue and regional
cooperation.
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•

•
•

New arrangements for domestic and regional security
cooperation should be informed by effective civilian
control over the military and the adoption of a
h emisph eric ap p r oac h as a sup p l ement to
nationalism.
The United States should act as a catalyst for
multilateral cooperation.
Domestically, democratically elected civilian leaders
must assume leadership in developing an effective
defense policy. It is the responsibility of civilians
rather than the military to decide when and how
armed force is used. This is best achieved through a
frank and constructive dialogue that recognizes the
political responsibilities of civilian officials and the
technical expertise of military professionals.

−

•

There must be a decision at the national level on the
division of responsibilities between military, police,
and other public safety institutions. Here national
traditions and values should provide the guidelines.
One should expect considerable variation from
country to country.

−

•

A fundamental intermediate step is a national
commitment to train and educate civilian
professionals in strategic affairs and the leadership and management of defense institutions.

The answer to extensive police corruption is
police and judicial reform, rather than the
militarization of law enforcement (which exposes
the armed forces to corruption and diverts them
from military training).

Once policy is established, civilian and military
leaders should work closely together to prepare and
defend before their legislature a budget that
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realistically meets the armed forces’ needs. This
would both help legitimize military spending and hold
policymakers accountable.

•

•

•

On the international level, there is a need for a new
multilateral hemispheric security doctrine for
security cooperation. This should complement, rather
than replace national objectives, and establish
agreement on the basic common denominators of
hemispheric security cooperation.
The above doctrine would be supplemented by greater
levels of multilateral cooperation among police and
judicial officials. However, this would occur through
channels separate and distinct from those providing
armed forces cooperation on security matters.
The basic elements of this new hemispheric security
doctrine might include commitments to:

−
−
−
−
−

improve cooperation with regard to information on
the transit of vessels and aircraft to prevent
the illegal use of national territory;
improv e the exc hange of c l i matol ogi c al
information from sources available to the military;
enhance information exchange on insurgent
groups operating near borders in order to prevent
the establishment of sanctuaries;
exchange information on potential arms
purchases to prevent misinterpretations of
intentions;
debrief results of bilateral and multilateral
military exercises so all countries in the region can
benefit from investments in training;
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−
−

•

define support functions that can be efficiently
provided to those forces combatting drug
trafficking in the region; and
eventually reach agreement on the specialization
of functions by some armed forces, particularly
those of smaller states. Here NATO provides a
model.

For the new security doctrine to work, a multilateral
defense architecture must be developed that cannot
be dominated by any single country. This would be
constructed under the authority and through the
cooperation of national defense ministers, thus
assuring its consistency with the principle of civilian
control. This architecture would include:

−

−

−

−

the establishment of a defense secretariat devoted
to meetings of the ministers of defense. This body
would coordinate the meetings and provide
periodic follow-up on resolutions adopted at those
sessions;
coordination by that same secretariat of agendas
for meetings of the Conference of American Armies
and chiefs of the regional air forces and navies to
focus on commitments arranged through the
hemispheric security doctrine;
creation of electronic communication systems to
better link defense establishments for purposes of
ex ch an g ing i nf or mati on r el ated to the
hemispheric security doctrine; and
periodic meetings of senior defense ministry
officials below the rank of minister to review the
mechanisms of security cooperation implemented
by defense institutions.
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Downes argued that the above approach, while not
providing immediate answers, would be more relevant to
modern defense needs than the current system, which
emphasizes individual national military capabilities and
bilateral relationships, and which offers only limited
opportunities for multinational cooperation. Under civilian
control, with budgets that meet national priorities and
increased levels of multinational cooperation, the region’s
armed forces would be able to meet their security needs
more efficiently and with greater support from the civilian
populace. At the same time, the United States would be able
to enhance the effectiveness of its relations with Latin
American governments, and especially with Latin
American militaries.
Another, somewhat different list of recommendations
was provided by the Argentine defense analyst Luis
Tibiletti, who argued that:

•

•

•

The Latin American political sectors must assume all
responsibility for the formulation of international
security, national defense and public security policies.
To renounce their responsibilities in these matters is
to renounce power.
Closely related to the above recommendation,
political leaders must maintain responsibility for
functions like counternarcotics, counterterrorism and
economic development, rather than surrender them
to the military. Using the military as a tool of civic
action will only weaken civil society, and without a
strong civil society there can be no democracy.
The majority political sectors in each country must
reach a consensus about that nation’s security
agenda. Subsequently, regional and eventually
hemispheric security agendas should be similarly
negotiated. There needs to be a joint identification of
interests, threats and opportunities at subregional
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levels, so that geopolitical barriers to integration can
be removed.

•

•

•

•

Mature relations with the United States have to be
established, eliminating the tendency of the “Colossus
of the North” to try to choose Latin American leaders.
There should also be a re-enforcement of contacts at
the level of parliaments, political parties, and
ministries of defense and foreign affairs that can
counteract the excessive influence of the U.S.
Southern Command, which in the past has often been
exercised without much consideration of democracy.
There should be a substantial increase, monitored by
the OAS, of cooperation among all areas of
government at the national, subregional and
hemispheric levels that have responsibility for
addressing new threats.
There must be a resolution of the “modernization
versus arms race” dilemma in order to permit all
countries to count, in reasonable proportion, on armed
forces that are able to interoperate, based on the idea
of cooperative balance, when the duly constituted
political authorities determine that national security
requires it.
There should be a strengthening of all political and
diplomatic organizations, including NGOs, that have
a role in conflict resolution, using their experiences in
past peacekeeping and mediation efforts to build a
regional security structure that is not overly
dependent on military instruments.

Most of the Latin American civilian participants would
probably have agreed with Tibiletti and Woerner, who
argued that, in general, civilians should move more
aggressively to strengthen their control over the military.
Most of th e par ti c i p ants—mi l i tar y as wel l as
civilian—would probably have agreed with Luis Bitencourt
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Emilio, who emphasized that both the armed forces and civil
society have a responsibility for determining the military’s
roles and missions. For this to occur, civilians have to be
educated on national security issues. An informed society
requires the creation of think tanks, the financing of research
projects, and the organization of seminars and conferences
that can bring together civilians and military officers in
shared educational experiences where they can interact and
learn from each other. This was a theme that was also widely
embraced in the workshops. A summary of the recommendations that came out of those meetings follows.
The Inter-American Defense System.

•

•

•

The participants felt that there needed to be more
communication and cooperation among the
components of the system, such as the OAS and the
Inter-American Defense Board (especially the
former’s Commission on Hemispheric Security) and
the various conferences and ministerials.
They recommended more education to better define
and implement the goals of the system, including the
defense of democracy and human rights, the
maintenance of security, and the containment of
criminality.
They said that civilians, especially those in the
government and media, have to become more involved
in the system. The region’s militaries have generally
agreed to redefine their roles in decisionmaking, but
civilians are often poorly informed and uninterested.
To assist them, the military should recognize them as
the constituencies of the Inter-American Defense
System, and help them become involved in all of its
aspects.
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Inter-Institutional Relations in the National Policy
Process.

•

•

The participants noted the importance of public
perceptions of the military’s role as a foundation for
developing functional inter-institutional relations.
They recommended that a civil-military dialogue be
fostered to help build public confidence.
Along with the above, a step-by-step process should be
developed that formally stipulates the role to be
played by civilians in defense policy, and then charts a
course to prepare both military and civilian elements
to meet their shared responsibilities for defense policy
formulation and implementation. Specifically, the
participants called for:

−

−

−

−
•

the funding of institutes and think tanks, such as
the recently established Center for Hemispheric
Defense Studies in Washington, DC, devoted to
the development of civilian competence in defense
and security matters;
the designation of funds by the military to support
conferences, workshops, seminars and other
meetings designed to facilitate civilian-military
interaction;
the opening of national defense and war colleges to
senior government officials and other key political
actors who would benefit from the educational
programs offered at those institutions; and
the establishment of military liaison offices with
Congress.

The participants recommended that, since the
reformulation of inter-institutional relations is at an
early stage in much of the region, states looking for
solutions should examine the process now underway
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in those countries where the dialogue has already led
to cooperation. Continued regional exchanges are
thus vital to this process.
Cooperative Security and Peacekeeping.
In addressing the question “How do the American
nations prepare and organize for future PKOs?” the
panelists reached the same general conclusions about the
value of education and shared experiences as the previous
panel. Gatherings such as the present conference were
commended as an enormous help in determining whether
the region’s armed forces have the capabilities to undertake
specific operations. Specialized training institutes, such as
Uruguay’s Center for Instruction for Peacekeeping
Operations, and think tanks, like the U.S. Army’s
Peacekeeping Institute, help identify key issues and
strategies. In general, the participants endorsed the
creation of an educational and training system that would
focus on military, governmental and nongovernmental
activities involving PKOs. Such a system would involve
both the military and civilians, and would help educate the
latter as to the armed forces’ peacekeeping and warfighting
capabilities. Beyond this, the panel also suggested that:

•

•

Peacekeeping operations ought to be limited to
countries outside the subregion concerned in order to
alleviate fears and suspicions of intervention and
partiality.
Most of the funding for PKOs should come from either
the United Nations or other international and
regional sources. Too much funding from a single
country creates dependency, and can easily distort
the purposes of the operation or result in a loss of
political resolve.
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•

Authorization to use force must be clearly outlined.
Force should be used only in extreme circumstances,
including self-defense.

Subregional Cooperation.

•

•

The panelists suggested that more resources be made
available, including resource transfers from the
wealthier countries, especially the United States.
They also recommended that laws inhibiting
subregional cooperation—e.g., those banning the
sharing of defense information—be revised accordingly.
Some participants, concerned that U.S. Cold War
priorities (and, more recently, narcotrafficking) had
distorted Latin American development, urged that
the United States reformulate its security assistance
programs in such a way as to promote a broader,
shared set of goals involving democratic stability and
economic integration. It was suggested that this
might require Washington to subordinate or postpone
some of its specific concerns about drug trafficking in
order to enhance the ability of Latin American
countries to cooperate on an integrated set of issues of
which narcotics would be only one part.

Roles and Missions.
Like many other conference participants, some panelists
recommended that more educational and training programs
be created to foster informed civilian involvement in
national security and defense processes.
Unresolved Issues.
As might be expected in a conference of this size and
diversity, many issues were left unresolved. There were
serious disagreements on roles and missions. Many
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participants advocated that the Latin American militaries
undertake a variety of new activities, according to the needs
and values of their particular societies. Others—especially
Latin American civilians—were uncomfortable with this
idea, fearing that civic action, counternarcotics, policing,
and other missions might undermine civilian authority and
weaken the process of democratization. There was an
extended discussion in the Roles and Missions workshop of
the U.S. National Guard and its relationship to the regular
U.S. armed forces. Clearly, there was a great deal of
curiosity about the institution. But there was also some
skepticism, and whether (or to what degree) Latin
Americans were willing to accept it as a role model for their
own militaries— as some Guar d r ep r es entati ves
hoped—was not at all clear.
There was also a good deal of pessimism over the
availability of resources with which the armed forces might
maintain its institutional structure, engage in subregional
cooperation, and embark on various new missions. Money is
tight everywhere. Moreover, even if the United States were
willing to transfer more resources, such aid often comes
with strings attached. The Latin American participants
were very aware that U.S. priorities were often different
from their own. Some expressed resentment about North
American insensitivity to local concerns.
Along these same lines, some participants felt there was
a need to re-evaluate the entire concept of national security
and the strategies that are appropriate for addressing it.
There is a point at which the function of the institution
becomes the institution: Self-preservation and growth are
the ultimate interests of bureaucratic organizations, and
the military is no exception. To one extent or another, this is
reflected in the search for new roles and missions. That, in
turn, raises the question of whether more attention ought to
be paid to non-military national security issues like poverty,
unemployment and landlessness, since a failure to alleviate
those problems can be profoundly destabilizing. The
question is one of priorities. Would not scarce resources be
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better spent on non-military solutions to non-military
dangers? What is the right balance?
In addition, the workshop on Cooperative Security and
Peacekeeping raised—but did not answer—the question of
whether and how the inter-American system could
incorporate peacekeeping: Should the OAS, like the United
Nations, be given chartered authority to promote peace and
stability in the Americas? No closure could be reached on
this issue.
General Woerner listed a number of other unresolved
problems, including the need to:

•
•
•

curtail in some countries the disproportionate
political power of the military;
instill more broadly and deeply a sense of public
accountability and willingness to discipline from
within the military institution; and
be alert to enlargements of the private economic
activity of the armed forces that might challenge the
rightful place of the civilian sector.

This raised still another issue that was in the back of
many people’s minds, namely: How deep was the military’s
commitment to democracy and human rights? The
presentations by Generals Bonett Locarno and Ventura
Arellano were extraordinary for their expressed
commitments to these goals. It is significant that Latin
American militaries are publicly pledging themselves to
such values. In particular, it is important that these
commitments are being made in countries like Guatemala
and Colombia, where there are histories of massive human
rights violations and/or dictatorship. But even when such
statements are made in all sincerity, one cannot forget the
past. Nor should one underestimate the problems in
protecting human rights under circumstances of national
disintegration and violence, such as are currently ravishing
Colombia.
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Clearly, the development of democratic civil-military
relations is a long-term effort. In the United States, the
Founding Fathers divided power between different
branches of government and subordinated the military to
civilian authority. Subsequently, these arrangements were
tested by over two centuries of real-world experience that
involved considerable evolution in both law and practice.
Along the way, civilian authority and responsibility for
national security policy have been strengthened.
The Latin American experience has been very different.
Military authoritarianism and civilian submission are
deeply engrained in the political culture. Accordingly, the
proposals set forth in these pages represent only the initial
steps in a lengthy process of learning, value transformation
and confidence building. Conferences and seminars may
help, but much more is needed. For civilians, experience and
the assumption of substantive responsibilities are
essential. As for the military, one of the dangers in the
short-to-medium run is that it may simply undergo a kind of
institutional hypothermia1 or “cocooning,” temporarily
retrenching and adopting a low profile to protect its
corporate interests while awaiting a more favorable future
climate in which to reassert itself.
Finally, we should not fall prey to the easy assumption
that civilians will always be more democratic or less
militaristic than the military. Caudillismo runs deep in the
political culture of the region. Historically, more than a few
civilian leaders have displayed dictatorial tendencies.
Witness, most recently, Fujimori in Peru and Serrano in
Guatemala.
Notwithstanding all the unresolved problems and
doubts about the future, the overall tone of the conference
was friendly and constructive. Luis Bitencourt Emilio no
doubt spoke for most of the Latin Americans present when
he said that while this is not the most opportune time for
Latin Americans to define a regional defense agenda,
especially at the encouragement of the United States, it is
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important for them to participate. For the first time, Latin
Americans are being presented with an open agenda which
they can help shape. If they do not grasp the opportunity, it
may not come again. In short, some windows for productive
cooperation have been opened. The United States
recognizes that it can no longer impose solutions, and that
th e desig n an d i mp l ementati on of hemi sp her i c
defense/security depend on Latin American participation.
And that, he said, implies that Latin Americans have a
responsibility to take part. It is essential that they
participate.
ENDNOTE - CHAPTER FIFTEEN
1. The term is Richard Millett’s. Cited in Juan Rial, “Civil-Military
Relations in the Transition to and the Consolidation of Democracy in
Latin America,” in Warriors in Peacetime: The Military and Democracy
in Latin America, New Directions for U.S. Policy, Gabriel Marcella, ed.,
Essex, England: Frank Cass, 1994, p. 44.
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